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SUMMARY 
 
Traditionally, early visual cortex (V1-3) was thought of as merely a relay centre for 
feedforward retinal input, providing entry to the cortical visual processing steam. 
However, in addition to feedforward retinal input, V1 receives a large amount of 
intracortical information through feedback and lateral connections. Human visual 
perception is constructed from combining feedforward inputs with these feedback 
and lateral contributions. Feedback connections allow the visual cortical response to 
feedforward information to be affected by expectation, knowledge, and context; even 
at the level of early visual cortex. In Chapter 1 we discuss the feedforward and 
feedback visual processing streams. We consider historical philosophical and 
scientific propositions about constructive vision. We introduce modern theories of 
constructive vision, which suggest that vision is an active process that aims to infer 
or predict the cause of sensory inputs. We discuss how V1 therefore represents not 
only retinal input but also high-level effects related to constructive predictive 
perception.  
Visual illusions are a ‘side effect’ of constructive and inferential visual perception. 
For the vast majority of stimulus inputs, integration with context and knowledge 
facilitates clearer, more veridical perception. In illusion these constructive 
mechanisms produce incorrect percepts. Illusory effects can be observed in early 
visual cortex, even when there is no change in the feedforward visual input. We 
suggest that illusions therefore provide us with a tool to probe feedforward and 
feedback integration, as they exploit the difference between retinal stimulation and 
resulting perception. Thus, illusions allow us to see the changes in activation and 
perception induced only by feedback without changes in feedforward input. We 
discuss a few specific examples of illusion generation through feedback and the 
accompanying effects on V1 processing.  
In Schizophrenia, the integration of feedback and feedforward information is thought 
to be dysfunctional, with unbalanced contributions of the two sources. This is 
evidenced by disrupted contextual binding in visual perception and corresponding 
deficits in contextual illusion perception. We propose that illusions can provide a 
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window into constructive and inferential visual perception in Schizophrenia. Use of 
illusion paradigms could help elucidate the deficits existing within feedback and 
feedforward integration. If we can establish clear effects of illusory feedback to V1 
in a typical population, we can apply this knowledge to clinical subjects to observe 
the differences in feedback and feedforward information.  
Chapter 2 describes a behavioural study of the rubber hand illusion. We probe how 
multimodal illusory experience arises under varying reliabilities of visuotactile 
feedforward input. We recorded Likert ratings of illusion experience from subjects, 
after their hidden hand was stimulated either synchronously or asynchronously with 
a visible rubber hand (200, 300, 400, or 600ms visuotactile asynchronicity). We used 
two groups, assessed by a questionnaire measuring a subject’s risk of developing 
Schizophrenia - moderate/high scorers and a control group of zero-scorers. We 
therefore consider how schizotypal symptoms contribute to rubber hand illusory 
experience and interact with visuotactile reliability. Our results reveal that the impact 
of feedforward information on higher level illusory body schema is modulated by its 
reliability. Less reliable feedforward inputs (increasing asynchronicity) reduce 
illusion perception. Our data suggests that some illusions may not be affected on a 
spectrum of schizotypal traits but only in the full schizophrenic disorder, as we found 
no effect of group on illusion perception.  
In Chapter 3 we present an fMRI investigation of the rubber hand illusion in typical 
participants. Cortical feedback allows information about other modalities and about 
cognitive states to be represented at the level of V1. Using a multimodal illusion, we 
investigated whether crossmodal and illusory states could be represented in early 
visual cortex in the absence of differential visual input. We found increased BOLD 
activity in motion area V5 and global V1 when the feedforward tactile information 
and the illusory outcome were incoherent (for example when the subject was 
experiencing the illusion during asynchronous stimulation). This is suggestive of 
increased predictive error, supporting predictive coding models of cognitive 
function. Additionally, we reveal that early visual cortex contains pattern 
representations specific to the illusory state, irrespective of tactile stimulation and 
under identical feedforward visual input.  
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In Chapter 4 we use the motion-induced blindness illusion to demonstrate that 
feedback modulates stimulus representations in V1during illusory disappearance. We 
recorded fMRI data from subjects viewing a 2D cross array rotating around a central 
axis, passing over an oriented Gabor patch target (45°/ 135°). We attempted to 
decode the target orientation from V1 when the target was either visible or invisible 
to subjects. Target information could be decoded during target visibility but not 
during motion-induced blindness.  This demonstrates that the target representation in 
V1 is distorted or destroyed when the target is perceptually invisible. This illusion 
therefore has effects not only at higher cortical levels, as previously shown, but also 
in early sensory areas. The representation of the stimulus in V1 is related to 
perceptual awareness. Importantly, Chapter 4 demonstrated that intracortical 
processing can disturb constant feedforward information and overwrite feedforward 
representations. We suggest that the distortion observed occurs through feedback 
from V5 about the cross array in motion, overwriting feedforward orientation 
information.  
The flashed face distortion illusion is a relatively newly discovered illusion in which 
quickly presented faces become monstrously distorted. The neural underpinnings of 
the illusion remain unclear; however it has been hypothesised to be a face-specific 
effect. In Chapter 5 we challenged this account by exploiting two hallmarks of face-
specific processing - the other-race effect and left visual field superiority. In two 
experiments, two ethnic groups of subjects viewed faces presented bilaterally in the 
visual periphery. We varied the race of the faces presented (same or different than 
subject), the visual field that the faces were presented in, and the duration of 
successive presentations (250, 500, 750 or 1000ms per face before replacement). We 
found that perceived distortion was not affected by stimulus race, visual field, or 
duration of successive presentations (measured by forced choice in experiment 1 and 
Likert scale in experiment 2). We therefore provide convincing evidence that FFD is 
not face-specific and instead suggest that it is an object-general effect created by 
comparisons between successive stimuli. These comparisons are underlined by a fed 
back higher level model which dictates that objects cannot immediately replace one 
another in the same retinotopic space without movement.  
In Chapter 6 we unify these findings. We discuss how our data show fed back 
effects on perception to produce visual illusion; effects which cannot be explained 
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through purely feedforward activity processing. We deliberate how lateral 
connections and attention effects may contribute to our results. We describe known 
neural mechanisms which allow for the integration of feedback and feedforward 
information. We discuss how this integration allows V1 to represent the content of 
visual awareness, including during some of the illusions presented in this thesis. We 
suggest that a unifying theory of brain computation, Predictive Coding, may explain 
why feedback exerts top-down effects on feedforward processing. Lastly we discuss 
how our findings, and others that demonstrate feedback and prediction effects, could 
help develop the study and understanding of schizophrenia, including our 
understanding of the underlying neurological pathologies.
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Definitions and Abbreviations 
 
ANOVA Analysis of variance- a statistical test used to examine the differences among 
group means, including across multiple conditions. 
BOLD  Blood-oxygen-level dependent; signal measured in fMRI. 
CI  Confidence Interval. A range statistically defined so that it is highly likely that 
a single specific parameter falls within it. Likelihood is defined as a specific 
probability. 
DCM Dynamic causal modelling. A method used to infer the influence of the 
activity of one cortical area over the activity of another based on the BOLD 
response. 
FA  Flip Angle. 
FFD  Flashed face distortion. 
fMRI Functional magnetic resonance imaging. Brain imaging technique measuring 
blood flow as a proxy for changes in brain activity.  
FOV  Field of View. 
GLM General Linear Model. A form of t-test implemented in fMRI data, as there are 
typically multiple independent variables on which to model the continuous 
outcome data (the BOLD signal). Mathematically identical to a multiple 
regression analysis. Can be easily extended into ANOVA.  
LGN Lateral Geniculate Nucleus; relays information from the retina to early visual 
cortex.  
LOC Lateral occipital complex, an object specific region in the extrastriate dorsal 
visual stream. 
MIB Motion-induced blindness. 
MRI Magnetic resonance imaging. Brain imaging technique imaging anatomy and 
certain physiological processes. 
MVPA Multivariate pattern analysis. A group of techniques which allow us to study 
the pattern of activity in an area as opposed to the overall univariate activation. 
PQ Prodromal Questionnaire (Loewy, Pearson, Vinogradov, Bearden, & Cannon, 
2011). 
RHI  Rubber hand illusion. 
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ROI Region of interest. Defined as a subsection of cortex based on anatomical 
landmarks or functional mapping.   
TE  Time to echo.  
TMS Transcranial magnetic stimulation. Method which uses magnetic fields to 
produce electric currents which provoke activation in brain regions. Can be 
used to facilitate or disrupt neural processing in stimulated regions. 
TR  Repetition time.   
T1 Structural fMRI image created using short TE and TR. Specialised to 
demonstrate grey matter white matter boundaries in the cortex. 
vPMC Ventral premotor cortex. An area of premotor cortex specifically implicated in 
illusory experience during the rubber hand illusion.  
V1 Primary visual cortical area; on the posterior pole of occipital cortex around 
the calcarine sulcus. Entry site for cortical visual processing.  
V5 Motion sensitive region in extrastriate visual cortex. Also known as 
hMT+/MT, in reference to its position on the medial temporal lobe.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
In this introductory chapter we will firstly describe the feedforward pathway of visual 
sensory input from the eye to the brain. Secondly, we describe the feedback pathways which 
pass information from various intracortical sources back down to the early visual cortex. To 
produce visual perception, the brain integrates feedforward sensory input from the eyes with 
fed back context and knowledge. We will consider how this integration affects visual 
processing at the lowest sensory levels of the traditional cortical hierarchy. We will use 
philosophical and historical ideas to clarify why feedforward vision alone is insufficient for 
visual perception, and will comment on more modern adaptations of these theories which 
describe vision as a constructive and inferential process. We will then consider how the 
inference inherent to visual perception can produce illusion. We describe the 
conceptualisation of visual illusions as incorrect percepts, resulting from inferences made in 
the integrative process between feedforward and feedback visual processing. Under most 
stimulus and contextual conditions these inferences would lead to optimal perception. As 
illusions arise from this integration, we may gain insight into feedforward and feedback 
integration by studying illusions. Lastly, we will consider how elucidating the integration 
involved in visual illusions can provide a view into errant cortical processing in 
neuropsychological disorder, specifically in Schizophrenia. 
 
1.1. The Human Eye and the Feedforward Visual System 
 
Visual sensory input entering the human eye is converted from photons to neural signals to be 
processed by the brain. Photons of various wavelengths provide the sole sensory input to the 
eye. This input originates in the human visual field, which extends from each eye 60° inwards 
towards the nose, past the vertical meridian, to 107° outwards from the vertical meridian. 
Vertically it extends 70° above to 80° below the horizontal meridian. In each eye, photons 
enter the cornea and are refracted through the pupil into the lens. Pupillary size controls how 
much light enters the eye, through dilation and contraction. Refraction from the lens focuses 
the inverted image of light onto the retinal photoreceptors. 
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Retinal photoreceptors are divided into rod and cone varieties, depending on the type of 
protein each contains. Rod photoreceptors are largely peripherally located and respond under 
low lighting conditions, whilst cone photoreceptors are foveated and are specialised for 
daylight. Cone photoreceptors form the beginning of colour vision, as the three varieties of 
cone photoreceptor absorb different wavelengths of light (short, middle, or long wavelength; 
by ‘S’, ‘M’, or ‘L’ photoreceptors; resulting in blue, green, or red light respectively). These 
photoreceptors link into five different types of ganglion cell, which transduce photons into 
electrical neural action potentials. Different ganglion cell types have different sized centre-
surround receptive fields (RFs; the area of the visual field to which the cell will respond) and 
demonstrate specific sensitivities to depth, shape, and colour. As the system is already 
demonstrating selective response properties and filtering input to the brain, visual processing 
begins in these retinal ganglion cells (Wässle, 2004). 
The electrical action potentials from ganglion cells are transmitted along the optic nerve, 
divided by their spatial origin in the visual field and by ganglion cell type. Optic nerves from 
each eye meet at the optic chiasm and, with the exception of fibres representing the 
inward/medial 60 degrees of each eye’s visual field, cross to the opposite hemisphere. This 
unites signals corresponding to a particular half of the total visual field and results in signals 
from each half being sent to the contralateral brain hemisphere (i.e. all signals from the left of 
the visual field are all sent to the right hemisphere). Optic nerve fibres terminate in various 
layers of the Lateral Geniculate Nucleus (LGN) in the thalamus, depending on the ganglion 
cell type they originated from. Signals are then fed forward to layer 4 of the primary visual 
cortex, ‘V1’ (for discussion about V1 cortical layers see Chapter 6.6).  
V1 is the ‘earliest’ cortical stage of visual processing as it receives ~90% of feedforward 
retinal input. In each cortical hemisphere, visual field information is mapped onto V1, 
retaining the spatial relationships of the original input (Brewer, Liu, Wade, & Wandell, 2005; 
Sereno, Dale, Reppas, & Kwong, 1995; Wandell, 1999; Wandell, Dumoulin, & Brewer, 
2007). Each neuron in V1 has a classic receptive field, a subsection of the viewed visual field 
that it will preferentially respond to (Hubel & Wiesel, 1959). As this spatial representation 
arose from retinal projection and passed through the optic chiasm, the image printed on the 
primary visual cortex of each hemisphere is vertically flipped, and represents the contralateral 
visual field.  
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The calcarine sulcus, an anatomical feature which is positioned in the centre of V1, roughly 
corresponds to the horizontal midline of the visual field. The lower half of the visual field 
image is represented above the calcarine sulcus, and the higher half of the image below. 
Areas V2 and V3 wrap around V1 at the occipital pole. The dorsal V1 (V1d) pattern of 
representation (of the lower visual field) is reflected into V2d, and then again into V3d. The 
same occurs for ventral V1 (V1v) representation (of the upper visual field) in V2v and V3v. 
Additionally, in all three early visual areas, information originating in the fovea is given 
greater cortical space at the occipital pole through cortical magnification, whilst more 
anterior representations of peripheral and far peripheral information cover increasingly less 
cortical space (Duncan & Boynton, 2003). This retinal topography (retinotopy) can be 
mapped in fMRI, as carried out in Chapters 3 and 4.2. In retinotopic mapping, phase 
encoded checkerboard stimuli move in a wedge, radially around the visual field (polar angle 
mapping) or as an annulus outwards from the centre with increasing diameter (eccentricity 
mapping; DeYoe et al., 1996; Engel, Glover, & Wandell, 1997; Engel et al., 1994; Sereno et 
al., 1995). By correlating the peak responses in the time course of each voxel’s activation to a 
particular stimulus phase, we can determine which area of the visual field map the voxel most 
responds to (its receptive field). When all voxels in V1 are examined, we can construct a 
visual field map particular to the individual subject.  
Whilst the retinotopy is represented laterally, V1 neurons are also vertically clustered through 
cortical layers in columns, which demonstrate selective responses for orientation (Hubel & 
Wiesel, 1974; Victor, Purpura, Katz, & Mao, 1994; Yacoub, Harel, & Uğurbil, 2008). 
Furthermore, different neuronal populations in V1 are selective for colour (Engel, Zhang, & 
Wandell, 1997; Victor et al., 1994; Wachtler, Sejnowski, & Albright, 2003), and spatial 
frequency (Mazer, Vinje, McDermott, Schiller, & Gallant, 2002; Victor et al., 1994). These, 
and other, neuronal preferences mean that activity in early visual cortex often correlates with 
low level visual features and the perception of low level visual features. From these 
properties, V1 is traditionally conceptualised as a low level sensory processor with a classic 
columnar arrangement and orientation-selective response properties; as measured by neuronal 
spiking and by fMRI (Hubel & Wiesel, 1959; Menon, Ogawa, Strupp, & Uǧurbil, 1997; 
Sereno et al., 1995; Yacoub et al., 2008). 
Neuronal activity in V1 in response to low level features is fed forwards up a cortical visual 
hierarchy (DeYoe & Van Essen, 1988; Grill-Spector & Malach, 2004). This information 
ascends to V2 and V3, then to assumedly more complex higher visual areas. Information is 
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fed forwards in two separate processing streams - the dorsal stream, which processes object 
representations, and ventral stream, which processes object’s spatial locations and movement  
(Goodale & Milner, 1991; Mishkin, Ungerleider, & Macko, 1983). A purely hierarchical 
view assumes that information becomes more complex, abstract, and non-modal as it ascends 
the hierarchy (Grill-Spector & Malach, 2004). Some higher areas do appear to have 
functional specialisations, such as V5 a dorsal stream area which primarily processes motion 
stimuli (Rees, Friston, & Koch, 2000; Tootell, Reppas, Dale, & Look, 1995). In the ventral 
stream, object processing regions like LOC (Malach et al., 1995) respond for shapes, 
irrespective of their differing low-level features (Andrews, Schluppeck, Homfray, Matthews, 
& Blakemore, 2002; Grill-Spector, Kourtzi, & Kanwisher, 2001; Grill-Spector & Malach, 
2004; Hasson, Hendler, Bashat, & Malach, 2001; Kourtzi & Kanwisher, 2000). Retinotopic 
field maps of visual field spatial location and eccentricity continue into higher regions, and 
can be mapped using more complex stimulus sets (Grill-Spector et al., 1998; Grill-Spector & 
Malach, 2004; Hasson, Harel, Levy, & Malach, 2003). 
 
1.2. Feedback in the Visual Hierarchy 
 
The brain feeds information forward: from retinal input, up the visual cortical hierarchy, to 
higher sensory areas which allow for complex processing. However, this is not the sole 
direction of communication in or to the visual cortex. In addition to feedforward input, any 
given area of cortex also receives feedback connections from around 66% of all brain areas; 
composed of local reciprocal links, long range connections, thalamic and other subcortical 
connections (Larkum, 2013; Markov et al., 2013). Only 5% of excitatory input to V1 cells 
corresponds to feedforward thalamocortical retinal input. The majority of input to V1 is 
instead received through feedback and lateral connections (Budd, 1998; Kayser, Kim, 
Ugurbil, Kim, & König, 2004). Recent work by Michalareas et al. (2016) demonstrated that 
feedback connectivity permeates the visual cortical hierarchy, showing feedback and 
feedforward influences between over 26 human cortical areas using MEG. This data 
compliments and extends their laminar recording data demonstrating this feedforward and 
feedback connection hierarchy in the macaque visual cortex (Bastos et al., 2015; Markov et 
al., 2014). It is critically important to understand the contribution of feedback processing to 
visual cortical activity. Despite complex modelling of the V1 response to feedforward input, 
full processing variance is not yet explained (Douglas & Martin, 2007; Muckli et al., 2015). 
Additionally internally generated activity, including feedback, accounts for roughly 90% of 
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cortical energy consumption (Raichle, 2011; Raichle & Mintun, 2006). This internal 
computation is not necessarily in response to stimuli but nonetheless has an impact on the 
response to and processing of future stimuli. Feedback begins very swiftly after the 
feedforward visual stream - as soon as activation is fed forward from V1, recurrent 
interactions begin between this early visual area and higher visual areas (Bullier, 2001; 
Lamme, 2004). These feedback projections can take as little as 10ms to transfer information 
between extrastriate visual cortex and V1 (Hupe et al., 2001).  
 
The feedforward processing cascade captures only a small fragment of V1’s processing 
capability and models of V1 must be adapted to include the wide response variance allowed 
by cortical feedback, permitting research to, ‘reach beyond the classical receptive field’ 
(Angelucci & Bullier, 2003). In addition to high-resolution retinal input in a particular 
receptive field, V1 neurons are capable of integrating abstracted top-down and lateral inputs, 
and these inputs can additionally modulate classical receptive fields (Muckli & Petro, 2013). 
Feedback contributes to V1’s ability to demonstrate subtle centre and surround receptive field 
properties traditionally associated with higher areas (Angelucci & Bressloff, 2006). We can 
differentiate between three resulting receptive field qualities for each V1 neuron. The classic 
receptive field of a V1 neuron is the area of the visual field to which the cell responds to a 
stimulus, inducing spiking activity with a peak centre response. The receptive field surround 
is the area around the receptive field. The cell will not fire in response to stimulation to the 
surround; however stimulation to this area can modulate effects in the centre receptive field 
through feedback and long range horizontal connections. Finally, the perceptual receptive 
field refers to the area for which the cell has potential to respond to a stimulus given top-
down feedback modulations (Das & Gilbert, 1995; Fitzpatrick, 2000; Kapadia, Westheimer, 
& Gilbert, 1998). The perceptual receptive field can differ from the classical receptive field in 
many parameters such as size, acuity, and feature preferences (Das & Gilbert, 1995; Kapadia 
et al., 1998). For example, Sharpee and Victor (2009) demonstrated that when viewing 
images with matched low level features, changes in the spatial response of the receptive field 
of V1 neurons occurred due to surrounding context, and as an effect of the strength of intra-
cortical feedback modulation.  
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Figure 1.1. Feedback and feedforward connectivity. a) Image from Muckli and Petro (2013) 
showing areas which send cortical feedback to V1 including other primary sensory cortices and higher 
visual areas. b) Image from Gilbert and Li (2013) demonstrating the visual feedforward connectivity 
(blue) and feedback (red) pathways in the macaque.  
 
The impact of cortical feedback on and within visual cortex is substantial. An impressively 
diverse assortment of areas send information to V1 through feedback (see Figure 1.1.a and b); 
including other sensory areas, higher visual areas, and emotion regions such as the amygdala 
(Felleman & Van Essen, 1991; Gilbert & Li, 2013; Shipp, 2007). Higher visual areas have a 
top-down influence on the activity of lower areas (Bar, 2007; Beck & Kastner, 2009; 
Bressler, Tang, Sylvester, Shulman, & Corbetta, 2008) all the way to V1 (Muckli, Kohler, 
Kriegeskorte, & Singer, 2005; Silvanto, Cowey, Lavie, & Walsh, 2005; Ungerleider & 
Kastner, 2000) and even LGN (Gilbert & Sigman, 2007). This influence can be observed at 
all levels of the visual hierarchy, but is most clearly observed in V1, due to its well-
documented mapped response to feedforward visual stimulation. Thus it can be clearly 
demonstrated that V1 reacts to and distinguishes between stimulation far outside its classic 
receptive field and response properties (Angelucci et al., 2002; Grill-Spector & Malach, 
2004; Harrison, Stephan, Rees, & Friston, 2007).  
 
Feedback allows V1 neurons to respond in the absence of feedforward retinal input, for 
example during occlusion (Lee, Mumford, Romero, & Lamme, 1998; Muckli et al., 2015; 
Sugita, 1999), and even in the blind (Amedi, Floel, Knecht, Zohary, & Cohen, 2004). Some 
of this feedback information is contextual- Smith and Muckli (2010) presented natural scenes 
with a quadrant occluded, and found that the non-feedforward-stimulated quadrant in V1 
nonetheless carried a neural representation of the surrounding scene. They could successfully 
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decode individual scene representations from activity within the occluded quadrant. This 
result cannot be explained by low level feedforward visual properties- the quadrant receives 
no meaningful feedforward input and is sufficiently isolated from its feedforward surround as 
to discount contributions from lateral connections at the level of V1. 
 
In V1 both working memory and imagery are represented in a ‘perception-like’ fashion, 
supporting suggestions that perception is not as disparate from knowledge about the 
perceptual world as previously assumed (see Chapters 1.3-1.5). Visual mental imagery 
elicits activation in V1 without any feedforward visual stimulus (Amedi, Malach, & Pascual-
Leone, 2005; Slotnick, Thompson, & Kosslyn, 2005). Category-specific imagery 
representations in V1 can be elicited by auditory stimuli (Vetter, Smith, & Muckli, 2014), 
showing that non-visual stimuli are nonetheless represented in V1 activity patterns. V1 has 
also been shown to represent expected or remembered colour when presented with only 
grayscale images, despite no perception of colour in the image (Bannert & Bartels, 2013). 
Furthermore, Albers, Kok, Toni, Dijkerman, and de Lange (2013) showed that mental 
imagery decoded from V1 activity represents the world in a similar fashion to both 
representations of working memory and of actual feedforward visual stimulation. These 
properties demonstrate that the visual brain can be driven primarily by cortical feedback, and 
can create diverse perception with or without interaction with feedforward sensory input. 
 
As stated, recurrent feedback and feedforward interactions start almost immediately after the 
feedforward cascade. This recurrence serves an important function for visual awareness. 
Feedback mediates both visual attention and visual awareness (Flevaris & Murray, 2015; Li, 
Piëch, & Gilbert, 2006; Maunsell & Treue, 2006). Whilst we think of a stimulus that is 
attended as similar to a stimulus we are aware of, neurophysiological findings suggest the 
two can be distinguished. However, they are difficult to separate in practice. Attention is the 
manner in which the brain selects which sensory inputs to prioritise in terms of processing 
speed and level of detail (Driver & Frackowiak, 2001; Lamme, 2003). Visual attention 
typically increases neural activation in the cortical space dedicated to that stimulus 
(Desimone & Duncan, 1995). Visual attention can be top-down, driven by feedback 
regarding context, aims and interests in the visual environment (endogenous attention, 
Lamme, 2003). Alternatively, salient features of stimuli (for example bright colours) can 
drive increased attention (exogenous attention). This selectivity is based on how memory and 
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learned responses shape sensory processing, and thus is also a fed back influence (Lamme, 
2003).  
 
Neural activation or attention do not necessarily translate to visual awareness of a stimulus 
(Lamme, 2003). Lamme (2003) posits that awareness is reliant on recurrent processing 
between higher and lower areas of the cortical hierarchy (see also Lamme, 2004). Critically 
for understanding experimental outcomes, awareness does not necessarily increase activation 
in the cortex (Watanabe et al., 2011). Recurrent interactions typically begin as soon as the 
feedforward activity related to a stimulus has started to ascend the cortical hierarchy. If 
backwards masking is applied ~40ms after the initial stimulus to interrupt recurrence, the 
initial stimulus is not perceived (Enns & Di Lollo, 2000). TMS can disrupt this awareness 
(Walsh & Cowey, 1998) if applied at the correct time point so as to interrupt recurrence. 
Pascual-Leone and Walsh (2001) found that if feedback from V5 is reduced using TMS, 
subjects cannot perceive moving phosphenes. A different group used TMS to show that 
recurrent feedback and feedforward interactions are required to complete a very simple scene 
categorisation task (Koivisto, Railo, Revonsuo, Vanni, & Salminen-Vaparanta, 2011; subjects 
were required to state whether or not there was an animal in the image). Feedback required 
for conscious perception may occur at very short distance ranges in the cortical hierarchy - 
information originating in foveal V1 is fed back in order to discriminate objects in the visual 
periphery (Chambers, Allen, Maizey, & Williams, 2013).  
 
Lamme (2003; 2004) distinguishes fully conscious and attended awareness from general 
phenomenological awareness (for example the awareness of stimuli in the peripheral visual 
field, which are nonetheless not being processed). Phenomenological awareness occurs when 
recurrent interactions are present between visual cortical regions. This can occur for many 
aspects that make up a scene, as the cortical regions involved have retinotopic maps which 
separate the stimuli. When recurrent interactions involve higher frontal and temporal cortical 
areas, then the stimulus are considered in terms of cognition (goals, memory) and are fully 
conscious. Full awareness is therefore only present for some items in the visual input, with 
feedback and recurrent interactions from ‘cognitive’ areas of the brain.   
 
These top-down influences of cortical feedback on perception, and many others such as 
expectation (Kok, Failing, & de Lange, 2014; Kok, Jehee, & de Lange, 2012), scene category 
(Morgan, Petro, Vizioli, & Muckli, 2015), object versus scene information (Bennett, Petro, & 
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Muckli, 2016; Kravitz, Saleem, Baker, Ungerleider, & Mishkin, 2013; Williams et al., 2008), 
and reward (Serences & Saproo, 2010; Shuler & Bear, 2006; Sirotin & Das, 2009) 
demonstrate high level effects at the traditionally lowest sensory levels. Two information 
streams- feedback and feedforward- interact to produce visual cortical activation and 
ultimately perception (Petro, Vizioli, & Muckli, 2015). 
 
1.3. Historical Theories of Constructive Visual Perception 
 
The properties of light, the retina, optic nerves, primary visual cortex, and feedforward 
processing streams demonstrate how visual inputs reach the brain. Through intracortical 
feedback connections, we see how early and later visual cortical regions can also receive 
higher level and non-visual information. However, these functional properties do not fully 
elucidate why this kind of interactivity in the cortex is required to produce visual perception. 
For this we turn to philosophical and historical theories of visual perception.  
 
Visual perception is the psychological perception of vision, which does not precisely 
correspond to photon input to the retina. The correspondence between the external world and 
resulting visual perception has been a topic of philosophical debate for centuries. 
Philosophical ideas about perception vary between externalist views, in which perceptions 
are reflective of real world aspects, and internalist accounts, in which perceptions are 
reflective of the mind of the perceiver. We know that a purely externalist or realistic view 
cannot be accurate, as researchers observe perceptual effects that are reliant on the perceiver, 
and many individuals experience illusion and hallucination. Early internalist philosophical 
ideas of Plato, Plotinus, and Augustine of Hippo proposed that the reality of matter (in this 
case light input to the retina) is inferior to ideas and conceptualisation (Plato's Theory of 
Forms and Theory of Ideas; Plato; Plato). Later philosophical battles arose between nativist 
theories - the suggestion that concepts, mental capacities, and mental structures are innate 
rather than acquired by learning (Kant, 1781) - and philosophical empiricism - which 
promoted that knowledge and ideas are not innate and are derived from the senses (Berkeley, 
1709).  
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In his Critique of Pure Reason (Kant, 1781), Kant argued that the mind, not external input, is 
the origin of human experience. He therefore suggested that our mental perception of the 
world does not mirror reality; instead the mind shapes what we perceive. In contrast, whilst 
Berkeley believed that we derive knowledge from the senses, he also proposed that nothing 
truly exists as a material substance (immaterialism). Predating modern knowledge of how the 
feedforward visual system operates, he suggested that vision is not truly of objects but arises 
from light and colour (Berkeley, 1709). He theorised that the environment and objects exist 
only within the mind of a perceiver, with their reality dependent on being perceived. His 
theory stressed repeated associations as the basis for this reasoning, and therefore as the basis 
of perception. These ideas gained further traction through philosophical movements such as 
perspectivism, the idea that each world is viewed through an individual’s particular 
conceptual ‘lens’ or schema and that therefore one’s perception is always inherently 
subjective (see, for example, the work of Nietzsche). 
 
von Helmholtz, a scientist in the field of visual perception was heavily influenced by Kant. 
Inspired by his philosophical arguments, he put forward scientific theories on how depth, 
colour, and motion perception could originate within the mind (von Helmholz, 1897). He 
defined the word ‘psychophysics’ to differentiate between a physical change (e.g. the 
wavelength of light) and the resulting percept (colour). In 1867, Helmholtz formally proposed 
that perception occurs as a result of unconscious inference from sensory input and experience 
(von Helmholtz, 1924). To give an example, the sensory input from 3-dimensional objects is 
two dimensional, with the third dimension existing purely in the mind on the basis of prior 
experience and reasoning. Thus, von Helmholtz suggested that perception is a constructive 
process from several sources, not merely an acceptance of the sensory input.  
 
Gestalt psychologists in the early 1900s raised questions around how perception is united into 
a cohesive ‘Gestalt’ rather than perceived as its divided sensory inputs (e.g. contours, changes 
in brightness, orientations). A whole Gestalt percept is somehow ‘other’ than the sum of its 
separate elements- our brains perceive a whole, not disparate parts (Koffka, 1922). The 
concept of a united Gestalt originated with von Ehrenfels (1890) but was made popular by 
Wertheimer’s (1912) paper on gestalt phi motion, a special case of apparent motion where 
subjects experience ‘pure’ illusory motion without experiencing a moving object (see 
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Chapter 1.6.2. for more on apparent motion). From these inaugural works, the field divided 
between two lines. The Graz school of Gestalt psychology (led by Meinong, von Ehrenfels, 
and Benussi) separated input and perception, theorising that perception is produced on the 
basis of input. In contrast, the Berlin school (led by Wertheimer, Koffka, and Köhler) posit 
that Gestalt is a whole percept not necessarily founded on elements from sensory input. 
Perception in their view does not arise directly from input, but from dynamic physical 
processes in the brain (Kohler, 1920; Köhler, 1938). The two fields of Gestalt psychology 
therefore mirror older philosophical arguments.  
 
Gestalt theory has significant implications for the subjective nature of some perception (such 
as context effects, illusions and bistability; discussed later in chapter 1.6.), as it emphasises 
how contextual processing in the cortex can modulate the perception of a stimulus. Gestalt 
theorists also introduced the ideal of an idealised or stable response to stimuli- proposing that 
for a stimulus, the resulting percept will be the most parsimonious option. This percept will 
encompass the optimal amount of the separate sensory inputs (Wertheimer, 1922). Gestaltists 
set out ‘rules’ which determine how sensory inputs are united into a coherent percept, such as 
similarity, proximity, common fate, direction, good continuation, uniform density, and 
symmetry (Wertheimer, 1922). Please note that these rules require integration of a context 
over areas not covered by the receptive field of any single visual cortical neuron, and 
therefore require communication laterally or through feedback from higher visual areas with 
larger receptive fields. Grouping factors in Gestalt psychological theories generally require 
bidirectional communication across multiple levels of a cortical visual hierarchy. Modern 
evaluations of Gestalt grouping principles suggest that initial grouping occurs at each cortical 
level, with feedback from higher to lower regions, until one coherent percept is reached 
(Wagemans et al., 2012). 
 
Helmholtz’s and Gestalt theorists’ work heavily influenced more modern visual perception 
scientists such as Gregory and Rock. Gregory proposed that visual perception is dominated 
by top-down cortical feedback mechanisms i.e. perception arises mostly from internal brain 
computation and communication from higher visual areas down the cortical hierarchy, not 
from light input to the retina (Gregory, 1970). Many of these early theorists have noted that 
light input itself is so ambiguous that existing knowledge is required to make sense of the 
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stimulus. However, the resulting percept may not always be the correct interpretation of a 
sensory input. For Gregory perception was better considered as a ‘hypothesis’, which is based 
on prior knowledge and inference. The Gregorian human brain therefore constructs a 
hypothesis about reality based on the sensory input, the environment or context, and on pre-
existing knowledge; then perceives this most likely hypothesis (Gregory, 1970). If the 
hypothesis is incorrect, then so is the percept (such as occurs in visual illusions). Rock’s 
(1997) Indirect Perception supports this notion of inferential perception, positing that 
perception is a form of ‘problem solving’; attempting to identify the source of a particular 
pattern of retinal stimulation. 
 
1.4. The Bayesian Brain  
 
One outstanding question is the mathematical realisation of such hypothesising and inference 
about the world. For this problem, researchers turned to Bayesian statistical theory (Thomas 
Bayes, 1701–1761). In inferential brain theories, any particular percept is only one of several 
possible hypotheses about the sensory input (in the case of visual perception, photons). These 
hypotheses have differing probabilities. With further input these hypotheses gain or lose 
evidence in their favour and therefore gain or lose probability. The aim of the brain is to 
create an internal model or hypothesis which best explains the sensory input from the outside 
world, and it is this model which dictates perception.  
 
Bayes' theorem is stated as: 
 
 
The theorem calculates the probability of a hypothesis (H) based on knowledge about 
conditions related to the hypothesis (B). Probability in Bayesian theory is not an exact 
observed number; rather it is a quantification of belief or knowledge about a hypothesis. In 
the case of visual perception, it can be the probability of a certain percept. P(H) and P(B) are 
the probabilities of observing H and B, independent of one another. P(H|B), is a conditional 
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probability, describing the probability of observing hypothesis H when B is true i.e. the 
probability of a certain percept given a condition. P(B|H) describes the probability of 
observing event or information B when hypothesis H is true i.e. the probability of a certain 
percept given the observed condition. Each probability and conditional probability is subject 
to a shift in value if the evidence for that hypothesis/information (or the evidence for a link 
between that hypothesis/information and another hypothesis/information) is increased or 
decreased. This statistical model allows the brain to reduce the number of possibilities for 
eventual visual perception. 
 
Bayes theorem can be used to assess the posterior probability of an event given i) real data 
input, ii) a probability estimate based on prior probability, and iii) a likelihood function. The 
likelihood function arises from a statistical model of the observed data. In this formulation H 
is the hypothesis (the model for perception) that may be affected by data measured. B is the 
new measured data. So P(H|B) is the posterior probability of the hypothesis (H), given the 
new data observed (B). P(B|H) is the likelihood of the observed data given the hypothesis, 
based on the sampling distribution of the actual observed data. This indicates how consistent 
the new data observed is with the existing hypothesis. This is then multiplied by P(H) the 
prior probability of the hypothesis before data was observed. This value is then divided by 
the prior probability of the new data observed. This happens iteratively, every time new 
evidence is observed. It is important to note that the prior probability, the sensory inputs, and 
the likelihood of a hypothesis (percept) are all subject to noise which widens their 
distributions. Stimuli in the natural world do not typically exactly replicate, and visual 
sensory input is inherently ambiguous and degraded. Therefore, both the learned associations 
between input and percepts (priors), and the sensory inputs, are associated with noise. In 
terms of the feedforward and feedback communication structure described previously, 
feedforward connections carry new data whilst feedback connections communicate the prior 
probabilities for the hypothesis and for the new sensory data.  
 
Bayesian inference is one method for optimal reasoning that the brain could use to determine 
perception given ambiguous sensory inputs. For example it can be used to elucidate three-
dimensional objects from two dimensional photon input, using priors that state that light 
comes from above (Scholl, 2005). Many aspects of human perceptual behaviour can be 
modelled using Bayesian statistics, for example Moreno-Bote, Knill, and Pouget (2011) 
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showed that in ambiguous bistable grating displays, the perceived depth order varies as would 
be expected under Bayesian sampling rules (for a review of perceptual results that support 
Bayesian brain theories see Kersten, Mamassian, & Yuille, 2004; Mamassian, Landy, & 
Maloney, 2002).  
 
Bayesian priors in vision can be learnt or innate. If humans were born without any innate 
priors we would be unable to perceive anything under Bayesian brain theories. Therefore, 
there must be some innate priors in the system (Gregory, 2006). Natural scenes inherently 
have reliable, repeating statistics (Geisler & Perry, 2011; Rentschler, Jüttner, Unzicker, & 
Landis, 1999). However we also know that some reliable priors about the visual world, for 
example the prior that light comes from above, are malleable through learning (Adams, Graf, 
& Ernst, 2004). Scholl (2005, p 40) clarifies that the two need not be mutually exclusive; “it 
may be possible for the very same process to be both innately determined and yet to later 
change (even radically) in response to interaction with the environment”. He proposes the 
idea of the brain as having ‘factory default’ priors which are changed to a personalised 
specification for an individual through environmental learning. Interplay can exist between 
innate priors formed by genetics and resulting brain structures, and adaptive priors from 
functional learning (Kersten et al., 2004). Innate priors may also aid an organism by directing 
Bayesian learning. In human children, innate priors may make faces hold particular attention 
(although this is controversial; see Gauthier & Nelson, 2001; Kanwisher & Moscovitch, 
2000), driving the brain to learn additional priors about faces through increased exposure. 
Orientation tuning in early visual cortex has innate structural basis, which then develops 
through visual experience (Weliky & Katz, 1997). In ferrets, spontaneous visual cortical 
activity becomes increasingly like the evoked response to natural stimuli through their 
developmental trajectory (Berkes, Orbán, Lengyel, & Fiser, 2011). There is therefore a 
‘Bayesian like’ adaptation of internally generated activity to natural scene statistics. 
 
Functionally for perception, Bayes theorem means that if we had very low belief in a 
particular hypothesis (percept) before any sensory input (P(H)), it remains quite unlikely even 
if evidence is highly compatible with that hypothesis. In contrast, if something was highly 
likely before, we may retain that probability even if the new data observed is quite 
incompatible with the hypothesis. The implementation of a Bayesian brain, where percepts 
have different prior probabilities, allows for perceptual stability and explains why many 
illusions we observe are extensions of existing likely observations. In the case of illusion, 
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researchers have suggested they reflect the optimal outcome of Bayesian inference - that they 
are sensible inferences based on the sensory input and priors available. Furthermore, this 
model for cortical function means that new evidence can be integrated constantly and 
iteratively. The priors, the posterior probability, and therefore percepts, are constantly 
revised. These probability functions can also mathematically be used to predict future data 
points over a posterior distribution, and again many proponents of Bayesian brain theories 
suggest that the cortex functions in a similar manner to predict upcoming stimuli. 
 
1.5. Cortical Prediction 
 
One modern Bayesian-type brain theory which stresses cortical prediction is hierarchical 
predictive coding (PC). PC theories hypothesise that the human cortex operates as a Bayesian 
prediction machine - its central purpose is to predict variance in incoming sensory 
information using top-down modelled expectations to avoid entropy in the system (Clark, 
2013; Friston, 2010; Mumford, 1992; Rao & Ballard, 1999). An internal predictive model of 
the world is formed at higher cortical levels, which have large sensory receptive fields and 
include information about context and knowledge. This predictive model is fed back to lower 
sensory areas forming modal-specific probabilistic expectations about incoming stimuli 
(Clark, 2013; Rao & Ballard, 1999). The generative explanatory model is constructed from 
memory, analogy, and contextual associations (priors), and is consequently ever-evolving as 
an organism gains sensory experience throughout its lifetime (Bar, 2007). This predictive 
modelling is proposed to dominate cortical function. Muckli (2010), p.137, summarised this 
proposition as such: 
 
“Sensory stimulation might be the minor task of the cortex… its major task is to … predict 
upcoming stimulation as precisely as possible”. 
 
Top-down modulation is economic as it allows minimal processing for any stimulus which is 
predicted- only the residual or non-explained sensory input must be processed, as only it is 
informative. This residual input is thought to propagate back up the cortical hierarchy through 
feedforward connectivity and is used to update the existing models (Friston, 2010; Hohwy, 
Roepstorff, & Friston, 2008; Huang & Rao, 2011; Jehee & Ballard, 2009; Lee & Mumford, 
2003; Rao & Ballard, 1999). These ‘prediction errors’ communicate the difference between 
what was expected and what was received, therefore becoming a proxy for sensory 
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information itself (Feldman & Friston, 2010). In Predictive Coding models, increased neural 
activation is assigned to sensory input which is inconsistent with the predictive model 
(Muckli & Petro, 2013), whilst similar Adaptive Resonance theories suggest that unexpected 
stimuli should result in reduced activation (Carpenter & Grossberg, 2011; Grossberg, 2013), 
and other theorists such as Spratling suggest both should be possible in different cases 
(Spratling, 2008b). Some theorists propose that even action exists to remove prediction error 
and sources of entropy in the system (Friston, 2009, 2010). In these free-energy theories 
prediction errors are minimised by modulating the sensory inputs as well as the internal 
cortical models of upcoming stimuli. Prediction errors or ‘free energy’ in this theory is 
conceptualised as the difference between the prior distribution of beliefs (before data) and the 
posterior prior of these beliefs after sensory data has been assimilated.  
 
To clarify, feedforward connections are hypothesised to carry residual error and 
representational stimulus content, whilst feedback connections are hypothesised to 
communicate predictions for incoming sensory input to the level below. This system is one of 
continuous recurrent processing throughout the cortex. Modelling and feedback predictions 
occur at every level of the hierarchy, and each level interacts with and influences the 
computation of adjacent levels (Friston, 2010). The precision and weightings of both 
feedback models and feedforward prediction errors and sensory input vary based on stimulus 
or model reliability and directed attention (Friston, 2009). Critically, fed back models and 
resulting prediction error modulate activation in the early sensory cortices, and 
correspondingly have a large influence on resulting perception. In these models the top-down 
fed back signal is more akin to our traditional conceptualisation of ‘perception’ than the 
bottom-up signal, which communicates largely the accuracy of the predictive causal model 
(Hohwy, 2007b). 
 
The precisions and weightings of models and errors are dependent both on learning and on 
the levels of noise in these variables. Attention is one possible mechanism for balancing 
feedforward and feedback influence, through manipulating the precision of both predictions 
and of predictive errors (Bubic, Von Cramon, & Schubotz, 2010; Den Ouden, Kok, & De 
Lange, 2012; Feldman & Friston, 2010; Friston, 2009; Hohwy, 2010, 2012). Attention 
direction increases gain in error units, and therefore controls the influence of prediction errors 
and prior expectations at different levels (Friston, 2009), by providing increased gain  i.e. 
attention gives weight and precision to error responses (Den Ouden et al., 2012; Feldman & 
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Friston, 2010; Friston, 2005, 2009; Friston, Daunizeau, Kilner, & Kiebel, 2010; Hohwy, 
2012). This variance of precision and attention can explain why we can perceive things that 
are highly unusual in our environment, despite the cortex aiming to minimise error. Stimulus 
inputs are perceived when they are sufficiently reliable, and are made salient by error signal 
and attention. Such surprising stimuli can even modulate existing higher level models if they 
are reliable and salient enough (Clark, 2013). Additionally, precision may be one function of 
lateral interactions mediated by feedback (Clark, 2013; Erlhagen, 2003; Muckli & Petro, 
2013). 
 
1.6. Illusions Dissociate Perception from Stimulation 
 
“Reality is not always probable, or likely.”  
- Jorge Luis Borges 
Thus far we have described how we receive feedforward sensory input from the eye, and 
information through intracortical feedback and lateral connections. We have considered 
historical and recent theories which characterise visual perception as a constructive and 
inferential process, predicting the visual environment based on these two sources of 
information (feedforward and feedback). The perceived visual sensory environment is an 
combination of sensory input and of prior knowledge, attention, perceptual task, expectations, 
memory, analogy, mood, reward, and numerous other cognitive factors; which are 
communicated to the visual cortex through cortical feedback (Gilbert & Li, 2013; Muckli & 
Petro, 2013).  
 
As our experienced world is constructed as opposed to veridical, what we see can diverge 
radically from real-world stimulation and we can experience some dramatic instability in 
perception. For example, in classic bistable percepts such as the Necker cube, Rubin’s 
face/vase illusion, or binocular rivalry; conditions of high ambiguity cause perception to 
regularly switch between two mutually exclusive possibilities. These bistable percepts are 
associated with fluctuations in early visual cortex activity occurring with and prior to changes 
in perception (Haynes & Rees, 2005b; Parkkonen, Andersson, Hämäläinen, & Hari, 2008). 
These perceptual switches are driven by top-down modulation- motion area V5 and parietal 
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cortex indicate the perceived direction in bistable motion (Castelo-Branco et al., 2002; Dodd, 
Krug, Cumming, & Parker, 2001; Muckli et al., 2002; Williams, Elfar, Eskandar, Toth, & 
Assad, 2003) and connections from V5 to V1 dictate the resulting perception (Genç, 
Bergmann, Singer, & Kohler, 2011).  
 
These top down effects on binocular rivalry can be modulated using TMS to disrupt 
feedback. TMS over right IPS prolongs the stability of a single stimulus in binocular rivalry 
(Zaretskaya, Thielscher, Logothetis, & Bartels, 2010). Top down influences on perception 
can be quite specific - TMS over the right anterior Superior parietal lobule (SPL) reduces 
stability i.e. increases perceptual switching (Carmel, Walsh, Lavie, & Rees, 2010; Kanai, 
Carmel, Bahrami, & Rees, 2011). When applied to posterior SPL, stability of the percept is 
increased (Kanai et al., 2011; Kanai, Paulus, & Walsh, 2010). Top down effects are 
information-specific, for example during binocular rivalry between a motion stimulus and a 
static stimulus disruptive TMS applied to V5 extends the period where the motion stimulus is 
not perceived (Zaretskaya & Bartels, 2013). Furthermore, visual cortices may represent the 
current percept during binocular rivalry, whilst higher temporal and frontal areas represent 
the switch in percept (Wang, Arteaga, & He, 2013).  
 
Illusions are excellent examples of constructive perception. In illusions, we observe relatively 
stable deviations from veridical perception. Subjects with intact visual perception perceive a 
visual world which is not correct, based on a context which is ambiguous or which strongly 
implies an incorrect conclusion. Some authors have characterised illusions in terms of 
Bayesian statistical theory as ‘Bayes-optimal percepts’- proposing that the illusion is the most 
likely true case in the sensory environment, given the stimulation input and prior expectations 
about the world. Others have characterised illusion in terms of predictive coding theory, as 
the most sensible predicted stimulus on the basis of the sensory input (see Chapter 6.8 for a 
discussion of the illusions presented in this thesis and Bayes-optimal and predictive brain 
theories). Illusions can be interpreted as an effect of feedback modulation on the feedforward 
input- previous learning, expectation, or knowledge causes the brain to draw inaccurate 
inference from the input (Brown & Friston, 2012). This incorporates the assumption that the 
contexts which produce illusions would typically result in the correct perceptual conclusions 
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in the vast majority of sensory cases (Brown & Friston, 2012; Weiss, Simoncelli, & Adelson, 
2002).  
 
Illusions provide us with an ideal opportunity to study intracortical feedback. Previously, our 
group has isolated feedback by blocking feedforward input to sections of retinotopic visual 
cortex (Bennett et al., 2016; Morgan et al., 2015; Muckli et al., 2015; Petro, Smith, 
Zimmermann, De Martino, & Muckli, 2015; Revina, Petro, Denk-Florea, & Muckli, 2015; 
Revina, Petro, Rao, Smith, & Muckli, 2014; Smith & Muckli, 2010). Alternatively, illusions 
provide a unique opportunity to distinguish feedback and feedforward contributions (Muckli 
& Petro, 2013). They allow us to dissociate perception, which occurs as a combination of 
feedforward and feedback information, from actual feedforward stimulation (Petro, Vizioli, et 
al., 2015). In this manner we can examine the confluence of feedback and feedforward 
effects, as compared to segregated feedback effects.  
 
1.6.1. Illusory Contours 
 
Several common forms of illusion result from the interplay of feedforward and feedback 
effects. When we view a scene we finish objects in our visual world through amodal 
perceptual completion- even when objects are occluded by other objects, the visual system 
assumes that they exist as a whole behind the interruption (such as for the cat in Figure 1.2.a). 
There also exists a complimentary opposite, modal completion- the system infers the 
presence of an object from other objects that it appears to occlude in a form of figure-ground 
segregation (Seghier & Vuilleumier, 2006). Figure 1.2.b shows stimuli that induces both 
amodal and modal completion of triangles. In both cases the system extrapolates beyond what 
is actually received on the retina. However, only in modal completion is there illusory figure 
perception, in which the contextual cues trigger perceived contours of a non-existent object.  
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Figure 1.2. Amodal and modal completion. a) A cat behind a post, demonstrating amodal 
completion. Observers know that the cat continues behind the occluder but do not perceive the 
occluded section of the cat. b) Kanizsa triangle stimulus (Kanizsa, 1976), demonstrating modal 
completion- of an illusory white triangle; on top of two amodal completions- an outlined triangle and 
three black circles.  
Illusory contour paradigms were popularised during the rise of Gestalt psychology (Kanizsa, 
1976). The ‘Gestalt’ of a shape arises in concordance with several Gestalt principles: closure 
of an implied shape into a whole shape, even though the shape outline is broken; edge 
completion; and the overarching principle of Pragnanz – that the most simple explanation of 
input is correct and therefore becomes the resulting percept (Kohler, 1920). Like many 
Gestalt percepts, both modal and amodal completion seem to require feedback from higher 
visual areas such as the lateral occipital complex (LOC) and parietal cortex in order to be 
perceived as illusory whole images (Murray, Foxe, Javitt, & Foxe, 2004; Murray, Kersten, 
Olshausen, Schrater, & Woods, 2002). Furthermore, recurrent interactions between V1 and 
LOC are required for Kanizsa-type illusory figure perception – if this feedback is disturbed 
using TMS, contour completion does not occur (Wokke, Vandenbroucke, Scholte, & Lamme, 
2012). Adaptation paradigms using illusory contours show that both higher (LOC and ventral 
occipitotemporal region (VOT)) and lower (V1 and V2) visual cortical regions are involved 
in inducing the perception of a united Gestalt (Altmann, Bülthoff, & Kourtzi, 2003; Kourtzi, 
Tolias, Altmann, Augath, & Logothetis, 2003).  Lee (2001) showed that V1 neurons respond 
to the illusory contours of Kanizsa figures. V1 reacts differently to amodal and modal 
contours, showing enhanced activity to illusory figures and reduced activity to surround 
objects with amodal completion (Lee, 2001). These differences likely occur as an effect of 
feedback modulation (Murray et al., 2004). Illusory contours have real-world effects- 
1. INTRODUCTION 
40 
 
Montaser-Kouhsari, Landy, Heeger, and Larsson (2007) observe orientation-selective 
adaptation to illusory contours in all retinotopic visual areas, and observe an increase in 
adaptation from lower to higher visual regions, again suggesting these contours are 
represented strongly throughout the hierarchy. 
 
An interesting study by Kok and de Lange (2014) demonstrated the effect of such illusory 
contour and figure perception on neural activity in early visual cortex. V1 activity reflects the 
perception of illusory Kanizsa figures- increasing across the illusory figure itself and 
decreasing in the surround. The results observed were independent of attention. Several 
authors have suggested that feedback is involved in object perception and perceptual 
grouping (Roelfsema, 2006). When studied using high-field fMRI, across cortical layers, 
feedforward stimulus information was distributed across cortical layers whilst feedback 
related to the illusory Kanizsa shapes was found in deep layers of V1, although some subjects 
demonstrated feedback in the upper or even mid-layers (Kok, Bains, van Mourik, Norris, & 
de Lange, 2016). These data support results by (Self, van Kerkoerle, Super, & Roelfsema, 
2013) who demonstrated that figure-ground discrimination in macaques is located in 
infragranular layer V and is consistent with the layer specificity of feedback and feedforward 
integration described in Chapter 6.6.  
 
1.6.2. Apparent Motion 
 
Motion is a crucial component of our visual world. When we observe motion, we do not 
merely perceive the moment-to-moment position of an object or scene. Instead, we 
extrapolate the motion speed and direction to predict where the object will appear next. When 
moving objects are presented with an identically located stationary flash, they are perceived 
as shifted forward in the direction of motion compared to the flash (flash lag effect; Whitney, 
2002). Top-down feedback from V5 contributes to this motion misallocation and therefore 
may ‘predict’ motion (Maus, Fischer, & Whitney, 2013). In agreement with this, disruptive 
TMS delivered to V5 reduces the flash lag effect, bringing the moving bar perceptually closer 
to its true location. This reduction was most pronounced when pulses occurred just as the bar 
reached the flash position and at approximately 60 ms afterwards. These predictive 
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overshoots of motion are common in the psychophysical literature in low-contrast stimuli 
(Kanai, Sheth, & Shimojo, 2004) or for gradually fading objects in motion (Maus & 
Nijhawan, 2006). The effect is so strong that objects are perceived to be disappearing well 
into retinal blind spots, far past the spatial location at which stimulus input ceases (Maus & 
Nijhawan, 2008). In each of these cases the perception is not veridical- we perceive 
disappearances that are inferred. This extrapolation is accompanied by shifts in the neural 
signal, for example in data from cat V1 (Jancke, Chavane, Naaman, & Grinvald, 2004), and 
in shifts of the BOLD signal in humans (Whitney et al., 2003). Berry, Brivanlou, Jordan, and 
Meister (1999) also reported a predictive shift of motion information in the retina.  
 
This extrapolation leads to several notable visual illusions. In the flash-lag effect, moving 
objects appear to have moved further than flashed objects even though they are presented at 
the same spatial location (Nijhawan, 2008). Maus, Weigelt, Nijhawan, and Muckli (2010) 
used stimuli which produced a motion-induced mislocalisation of the endpoint of fading 
objects. They found that the perceived final positions of the fading objects were predicted by 
an interaction of predictive position representations in V3a and offset transients in primary 
visual cortex. Geisler and Kersten (2002) found that the effects of luminance, contrast and 
shape on motion velocity illusions are consistent with Bayesian brain theories, suggesting 
that learning across visual experience allows contextual inference to inform the perception of 
motion. 
 
The apparent motion illusion causes two alternately flashing token stimuli to be perceived as 
a singular object moving between these spaces in the visual field (Kolers, 1963; Shepard & 
Zare, 1983). The perceived trace of apparent motion is activated in V1 as if an object really 
passed across the visual field between the two token presentations, despite the cortex 
receiving no feedforward sensory input from the apparent motion trace (Larsen, Madsen, 
Ellegaard Lund, & Bundesen, 2006; Muckli et al., 2005). Multiple authors propose that the 
expectation of motion between the two locations creates this illusory trace. The effect is 
robust even without attention (Muckli et al., 2005). The top-down expectation and knowledge 
about how objects move between spaces is so strong that apparent motion and an 
accompanying activation trace can be produced on a curved illusory pathway (Akselrod, 
Herzog, & Öğmen, 2014). This trace reflects real neuronal activity in the area- Ahmed et al. 
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(2008) found that there is a wave of spiking in the area between the two token stimuli in 
ferret regions 17 and 18 (the homologue of human V1).  This study used voltage-sensitive 
dyes which are sensitive to cortical feedback (Roland et al., 2006) and have been used to 
demonstrate feedback effects in other illusion studies (Jancke et al., 2004). 
 
This illusory activation is likely formed by motion-related feedback from V5 (Akselrod et al., 
2014; Kaas, Weigelt, Roebroeck, Kohler, & Muckli, 2010; Muckli et al., 2005; see Figure 
1.3.a and 1.3.b; Schwiedrzik, Alink, Kohler, Singer, & Muckli, 2007; Sterzer, Haynes, & 
Rees, 2006; Vetter, Grosbras, & Muckli, 2013; Wibral, Bledowski, Kohler, Singer, & 
Muckli, 2009). The response in early visual cortex to the illusory trace does not start until 
60ms post stimulus, after V5 activity (Wibral et al., 2009). Additionally using dynamic causal 
modelling, Sterzer et al. (2006) demonstrated that feedback from V5 to V1 is engaged during 
illusory motion perception. The feedback motion trace affects behaviour, facilitating the 
detection of stimuli on the trace (Schwiedrzik et al., 2007). If probe targets are presented out 
of time with the predicted position of the illusory moving token they cause a signal increase, 
despite being less frequently detected than consistent targets (Alink, Schwiedrzik, Kohler, 
Singer, & Muckli, 2010). This has been interpreted as prediction error caused by the out of 
time targets being inconsistent with the predicted motion trace. Cortical feedback from V5 to 
V1 is required for apparent motion target prediction, if this feedback is disrupted using TMS, 
the detection advantage observed by Alink et al. is eliminated (Vetter et al., 2013). Hidaka, 
Nagai, and Gyoba (2009) induced apparent motion using bar stimuli, followed by either 
consistent or inconsistently moving bars. Subjects perceived consistent bar motion in both 
cases, demonstrating that apparent motion predictions are strong enough to completely 
overwrite feedforward perceptual information. 
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Figure 1.3. Apparent motion. a) Representation of stimuli used by Muckli et al. (2005). The upper 
stimulus with token presentation alternating between upper and lower visual field was used in 
Experiment 1. b) These ambiguous stimuli were used in Experiment 2 to demonstrate how the motion 
trace is affected by subject perception. Subjects can perceive targets moving horizontally or vertically 
with the same inducing stimulus. c) Representation of stimuli used by Chong, Familiar, and Shim 
(2015) with two oriented Gabor tokens as apparent motion inducers; greyscale circles show the 
inferred middle orientation decoded in V1 activity. 
 
A recent variation on the apparent motion illusion, from Chong et al. (2015; see Figure 1.3.c); 
demonstrated the spatial, featural, and temporal specificity of feedback and prediction on the 
apparent motion trace. They used a set of orthogonal oriented Gabor tokens in place of 
apparent motion tokens and demonstrated that the centre of the motion trace in V1 represents 
an intermediate orientation, as if the stimulus rotated in space between the two tokens. Such a 
stimulus was never presented and subjects do not perceive the intermediate stimulus 
(apparent motion is not a form of imagery, although motion imagery can be decoded in V1 in 
other studies, see Kaas et al., 2010). Therefore this decodable feedback was constructed 
purely from higher level knowledge about stimulus rotation, orientation, and motion (Chong 
et al., 2015). Furthermore, previous behavioural results show that when using oriented 
Gabors as targets, orthogonal Gabor patches placed on the motion trace slow the perceived 
speed of the illusion, as if the interpolation is allowing time for rotation between the two 
points (Georges, Series, Frégnac, & Lorenceau, 2002). Some previous work has found that 
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object translations are extrapolated, but only at higher levels of the visual hierarchy (Weigelt, 
Kourtzi, Kohler, Singer, & Muckli, 2007).  
 
Apparent motion provides us with a well-researched example of our constructive, 
bidirectional visual system in illusions. When our brain is presented with two quickly 
alternating tokens we unconsciously access higher level knowledge and experience which 
predicts that an object is in motion. Feedback from V5 to early visual cortex fills in the likely 
trace of the illusory object motion, promoting neuronal spiking on this trace and producing a 
BOLD signal increase. Consequently, we perceive an object bouncing back and forth.  
 
1.6.3. Motion Silencing 
 
In apparent motion, motion causes extra perception of a moving object trace that is not 
actually presented. Alternatively, the strong effects of motion stimuli can also cause stimuli 
that were presented to remain unseen. Suchow and Alvarez (2011) created a novel visual 
illusion using a circular array of coloured dots which changed in hue, luminance, size, and 
shape. They demonstrated that these properties appear to stop changing when the circle starts 
to rotate (Figure 1.4.a). This establishes that motion dominance can silence other forms of 
visual change. Similarly, in motion-induced blindness a salient target is perceptually silenced 
by the predictable motion of a moving distracter field (Bonneh et al., 2010; see Figure 1.4.b). 
Motion-induced blindness operates as a bistable percept- the target is either completely 
visible or completely extinguished. Like other bistable percepts, it may result from two 
possible predictive or explanatory models exerting a top-down influence over ambiguous 
stimuli (Hohwy et al., 2008). These results demonstrate a causal role for both the rPPC and 
V5/MT in MIB, and suggest that the rPPC is involved in shifting resources between 
competing functional areas, while V5/MT processing initiates and maintains MIB. 
Additionally, motion-induced blindness appears like a form of perceptual completion- the 
motion field appears to complete over the top of the target. We investigate the effects of 
feedback on early visual cortical activity during motion-induced blindness in Chapter 4.2 
using the stimulus depicted in Figure. 1.4.c. This chapter also includes a specific introduction 
to the illusion and potential contributing mechanisms.  
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Figure 1.4. Motion illusions. a) Stimuli used by Suchow and Alvarez (2011) to examine silencing of 
(clockwise from top left) i) colour ii) luminance iii) shape and iv) size changes. b) Classic motion-
induced blindness stimuli. c) Motion-induced blindness stimuli used in chapter 4.1 and 4.2.  
 
1.6.4. Crossmodal Illusions 
 
It is clear that illusory activity is often represented at the level of V1. What is unclear is the 
extent to which V1 represents illusory activity that is not primarily visual. Visual illusions 
dominate illusion research and other sensory illusions are often neglected. V1 can be driven 
purely by cross-modal stimuli, for example auditory stimuli activate early visual cortices 
(Martuzzi et al., 2007). Vetter et al. (2014) isolated feedback in V1 using categorical auditory 
stimulation delivered to blindfolded subjects. They found that cross-modal feedback created 
contextual information in V1 that could be used to decode the auditory stimulus the subject 
listened to. These properties are likely supported by direct connections from early auditory to 
early visual areas which target the periphery (Eckert et al., 2008), consistent with Vetter et al. 
(2014) who showed that decodable information about auditory scene was predominantly 
peripheral. Interestingly, the opposite is also true- visual stimuli that imply auditory stimuli 
can be decoded from early auditory cortices in the absence of actual sound (Meyer et al., 
2010).  
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Importantly for the rubber hand illusion study that we present in Chapter 3, V1 is responsive 
to motor and tactile stimulation. Motor inputs in the mouse drive V1 activity during running 
in complete darkness in a manner similar to the spiking evoked by visual grating stimuli, 
demonstrating motion preparation in early visual cortex (Keller, Bonhoeffer, & Hübener, 
2012). V1 can be rapidly and reversibly recruited by touch (Merabet et al., 2008). 
Additionally, action representations in the ventral stream have links to V1 (Kravitz et al., 
2013). Feedback to early visual cortex may in fact be crucial for movement. Ban et al. (2013) 
showed that V1 represents occluded portions of objects and proposed that early visual cortex 
interacts with other modalities (haptic, tactile, motor) to facilitate action on objects or on the 
environment. Predictive signalling involved in action processing may originate in subcortical 
regions- cerebellar communication predicts the sensory consequences of actions (Wolpert & 
Kawato, 1998). However cerebellar feedback is implicated in many facets of perception 
(Roth, Synofzik, & Lindner, 2013), suggesting that this fed back information is domain-
general not domain-specific (Petro, Vizioli, et al., 2015). Meyer and Olson (2011) found that 
this relationship between modalities is reciprocal- early somatosensory cortices are activated 
by viewing touch in the absence of tactile stimulation. To further the conceptualisation of 
illusions as an effect of cortical feedback, the rubber hand illusion provides an ideal 
opportunity to examine a multisensory illusion for which vision is only one key modality.  
 
Crucially, illusions allow us to demonstrate the strength and flexibility of cortical feedback. 
These stimuli allow us to separate the effects of top-down information and veridical sensory 
stimulation; to understand how this feedback affects ongoing experience; and to examine 
what occurs when feedback and feedforward information interact. Furthermore, the effects of 
such confluence are observed all the way down at the traditionally low level of V1 in 
activation differences and multivariate representations of stimuli. We can therefore study 
these effects in a cortical region with well-defined response properties, which contains 
retinotopic field maps of stimulus representation; thus easing the process of discovering 
differences induced by cortical feedback.  
 
1.7. Illusion, Hallucination, and Delusion 
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“A hallucination is a fact, not an error; what is erroneous is a judgment based upon it." 
- Bertrand Russell 
 
One potential application of understanding cortical feedback is to understand 
neuropsychological disease. Deficits in cortical feedback and feedforward interactions may 
underlie disorders such as schizophrenia (Corlett, Taylor, Wang, Fletcher, & Krystal, 2010; 
Friston, 2005; Hohwy & Paton, 2010; Hohwy & Rajan, 2012; Sanders et al., 2012). Despite 
extensive research and application of pharmacological treatment, both the underlying 
pathophysiology and causal factors of schizophrenia remain unclear and existing treatment 
has limited efficacy (Insel, 2010). Perceptual deficits are highly prevalent across multiple 
domains including in auditory (Silverstein, Matteson, & Knight, 1996) and visual processing 
(Silverstein, Knight, et al., 1996); independent of cognitive dysfunction or recorded 
anatomical abnormalities (Uhlhaas & Mishara, 2007).  
 
Many deficits in schizophrenia appear to stem from an inability to use top-down contextual or 
Gestalt information (Uhlhaas & Mishara, 2007). Matussek (in Cutting & Shepherd, 1987) 
described patients’ visual world as being ‘loosened’ from its context; accompanied by a 
failure to grasp connectivity of objects, action and scene, and unusual allocation of attention 
to parts of a scene as opposed to the scene Gestalt. Multiple studies have demonstrated 
failures to combine perceptual elements into a united percept (Hemsley, 1994; Keri, Kiss, 
Kelemen, Benedek, & Janka, 2005; Uhlhaas & Mishara, 2007; Uhlhaas & Silverstein, 2003). 
Impaired contextual integration exists across spatial and temporal domains (Uhlhaas & 
Silverstein, 2005). Schizophrenic subjects appear typical in some paradigms, impaired in 
others, and advantaged in some cases; particularly when context is designed to be a distractor 
to lower the performance of typical participants (Uhlhaas & Silverstein, 2005). Positive 
(Keane, Silverstein, Wang, & Papathomas, 2013; Uhlhaas, Phillips, Mitchell, & Silverstein, 
2006), negative (Koethe et al., 2009; Tadin et al., 2006), and cognitive symptoms (Uhlhaas et 
al., 2006) correlate with recorded perceptual dysfunctions. Perceptual deficits seem to be 
related to more chronic disorder (Silverstein et al., 2006) and are associated with poorer 
disorder prognosis, increased cognitive impairment, poor treatment prognosis, and lesser 
social function (Silverstein, Schenkel, Valone, & Nuernberger, 1998; Uhlhaas et al., 2006; 
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Uhlhaas & Silverstein, 2005). Importantly, perceptual fragmentation is correlated with 
psychosis severity (Matussek, from Cutting & Shepherd, 1987; Silverstein et al., 1998).  
 
Such behavioural evidence has led to theories that schizophrenic subjects have a global 
processing deficit producing failures to link percepts into a coherent representation (Uhlhaas 
& Mishara, 2007). Crucially, they propose that symptoms of psychosis- hallucinations and 
delusions- do not arise purely from deficits in higher cognitive processing but from disrupted 
contextual feedback modulation of perception (Hemsley, 1994; Silverstein et al., 2006). 
Despite the salience of psychotic symptoms, many authors view perceptual deficits as the 
fundamental disorder, with psychotic symptoms as secondary reactions to unusual perceptual 
input.  
 
1.7.1. Hallucinations and Delusions 
 
In both hallucinations and illusions subjects can perceive an incorrect world-state from 
sensory information; including perceiving sensory stimulation that was not present, or 
misperceiving/not perceiving stimulation that was present. Illusion is robust in a typical 
population, whilst hallucination is common but not universal nor frequent. Importantly, the 
same inducing stimulus will promote similar illusions in most healthy subjects whilst 
hallucination demonstrates significant individual differences. Delusions appear more 
cognitive, demonstrating tenacious fixed false belief and resulting misperception of the 
world. However, many researchers propose that these beliefs are based on experience and 
interaction with the world (Corlett et al., 2010; Friston, 2010).  
 
Dysfunctional top-down feedback may underlie hallucination and delusion in addition to 
perceptual deficits. Corlett, Frith, and Fletcher (2009) propose that the top-down modulation 
is over-exerted in schizophrenic subjects, causing false perception without feedforward input 
(hallucination, see also Fletcher & Frith, 2009).  Some authors have suggested that 
hallucination occurs as a combination of an inability to unite sensory percepts, and 
dysfunction in categorising sensory stimuli generated by actions as self-generated. 
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Schizophrenic subjects show reduced ability to predict the sensory outcomes of their actions 
(Frith, Blakemore, & Wolpert, 2000; Shergill, Samson, Bays, Frith, & Wolpert, 2005; Voss et 
al., 2010). Alternatively, failed top-down perceptual inference could promote an increased 
reliance on bottom-up perception as opposed to higher level-driven strategies (Gilbert & 
Sigman, 2007). Without top-down influence the brain is unable to moderate perceptions and 
unable to integrate knowledge and sensory input (Corlett et al., 2010; Fletcher & Frith, 2009; 
Hemsley, 1994; John & Hemsley, 1992).  
 
Delusions can also form under conditions of dysfunctional feedback. As top-down 
modulations direct attention, errant salience is given to non-relevant stimuli in an already-
distorted sensory world (Heinz, 2002; Hemsley, 2005; Kapur, 2003). This salience promotes 
an incorrect focus on a feature of the external world, which then affects how the world is 
viewed and processed in future, eventually forming delusional thought  (Adams, Stephan, 
Brown, Frith, & Friston, 2013; Corlett et al., 2010; Fletcher & Frith, 2009). This idea is not 
new; Maher (1974) originally suggested that delusions are rational responses to unusual 
experience. Hohwy and Rajan (2012) have proposed that delusions are similar to classical 
illusory experience, arising from faulty percepts. The difference is that illusions are an effect 
of otherwise facilitatory processing, whereas delusions arise from deficit processing. 
Delusions are highly tenacious once formed, which suggests that there is increased rather 
than reduced top-down signalling (Corlett et al., 2009 for a full review of common delusions 
and their link to neural network failures; Corlett et al., 2010). Many illusions share the 
delusional property of being irreversible, such as Muller-Lyer lines (in which measuring the 
lines objectively will not dispel the illusion that they are off different length), demonstrating a 
form of cognitive impenetrability specific to information from low level sensory processing 
(Hohwy & Rajan, 2012).  
 
1.7.2. Visual Illusions in Schizophrenia  
 
Schizophrenic subjects demonstrate distinct differences in illusion perception compared to 
typical subjects. As illusion can be considered an indicator of top-down contextual influence, 
these differences are also informative about underlying dysfunction (Notredame, Pins, 
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Deneve, & Jardri, 2015). In bistable percepts, typical subjects show perceptual stabilisation 
(the tendency to see the preceding percept after a bistable stimulus is removed then 
reinstated), whilst schizophrenic subjects do not (Schmack, Schnack, Priller, & Sterzer, 
2015). The likelihood of stabilisation is also negatively correlated with delusional ideation in 
the schizophrenic (Schmack et al., 2015) and typical (Schmack et al., 2013) population. 
Schizophrenic subjects show a reduced effect of contextual surround in multiple studies 
(Chen, Norton, & Ongur, 2008; Dakin, Carlin, & Hemsley, 2005; Notredame et al., 2015; 
Tadin et al., 2006; Uhlhaas, Silverstein, Phillips, & Lovell, 2004). In the hollow mask illusion 
(Gregory & Gombrich, 1975) neurotypical subjects perceive a mask as constantly convex due 
to the strong top-down expectation that a face will be convex, whereas schizophrenic subjects 
can observe concave face stimuli (Dima et al., 2009; Keane et al., 2013; Schmeider, Leweke, 
Sternemann, Emrich, & Weber, 1996). During the illusion patients show a strengthened 
forward connection from V1 to LOC, whilst controls have a strengthening of the feedback 
connection (Dima et al., 2009). We behaviourally examine a face-space illusion in Chapter 5 
in neurotypical subjects.  
 
Schizophrenic subjects are less susceptible to apparent or illusory motion (Crawford et al., 
2010; Sanders, de Millas, Heinz, Kathmann, & Sterzer, 2013). Furthermore, increased 
delusion scores correlate with reduced apparent motion perception (Sanders et al., 2013). 
Previous studies by the same group showed that patient groups can predict the position of 
visual events on the apparent motion trace (Sanders et al., 2012). It therefore appears that 
they can predict the illusory target position but fail to integrate those top-down influences 
into a coherent motion percept the way that healthy subjects do. Tschacher, Schuler, and 
Junghan (2006) found that schizophrenic patients experienced reduced motion-induced 
blindness (MIB) effects if their symptoms were positive (hallucinations, thought disorder and 
delusions) and more decreased effects if their symptoms were negative (flattened affect for 
example), which suggests that different schizophrenic subtypes form different perceptual 
deficits. Positive symptoms are specifically associated with reduced illusion perception in 
schizophrenic groups (Keane et al., 2013; Sanders et al., 2013) but also in typical subjects 
(Bressan & Kramer, 2013). Importantly, most differences in illusion experience between 
schizophrenic and typical subjects suggest a reduced effect of top-down contextual 
integration through feedback. In theoretical terms, this is consistent with reduced cortical 
prediction or less precise Bayesian priors.  
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1.8. Summary and Thesis Purpose 
 
We know that the cortex is not a passive receiver of sensory data and that perception is not a 
straight translation of the feedforward sensory input. Perception is the result of integration of 
intracortical contextual top-down feedback with feedforward sensory input. Cortical feedback 
modulates processing throughout the cortex, including at the earliest traditional sensory areas 
such as V1. Visual illusions are a valuable tool for probing cortical feedback, as they provide 
a clear case where feedforward input and the resulting percept differ as an effect of top-down 
modulation. However, we are still unaware to what extent illusory activity is represented in 
the cortex and early sensory cortex. If we can develop a full understanding of the neural 
underpinnings of illusions in a healthy population we can use them to investigate cortical 
processing in schizophrenia and other neuropsychological pathologies.  
 
The described research has two associated aims. Firstly and most importantly, we aim to 
investigate how cortical feedback and feedforward mechanisms modulate perception in 
several visual illusions. We present two fMRI studies: the first study examines the role of 
crossmodal feedback to visual cortex during the rubber hand illusion (Chapter 3). In 
Chapter 2 we investigate the same illusion behaviourally in healthy subjects who have 
scored highly on the Prodromal Questionnaire. The second examines whether the 
representation of a target in V1 is destroyed during motion-induced blindness perception 
across two fMRI datasets (Chapter 4.2). This is accompanied by a behavioural study which 
ascertained which target parameters (size, eccentricity) were possible when using oriented 
Gabors as motion-induced blindness targets (Chapter 4.1). We additionally present a 
behavioural study investigating a recently described illusion, flashed face distortion (Tangen, 
Murphy, & Thompson, 2011). We vary the timing of face presentations and modulate the 
race of the faces presented to determine whether this effect occurs due to face-specific or 
object-general predictive comparative encoding (Chapter 5). 
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We chose these illusions because they presented the opportunity to investigate novel 
properties of cortical feedback during illusory perception. The rubber hand illusion provides 
the opportunity to investigate an illusion that does not solely arise from visual input, but 
additionally from the influence of tactile and proprioceptive inputs. It is crucial to include 
influences from other senses to develop full picture of how feedback manipulates the visual 
system, particularly given previously reported effects of non-visual information in the visual 
cortex (Liang, Mouraux, Hu, & Iannetti, 2013; van Kemenade, Seymour, Wacker, et al., 
2014; Vetter et al., 2014) and several illusions which rely on the co-occurrence of 
multisensory stimuli (Shams, Kamitani, & Shimojo, 2000). Additionally, sensory perception 
rarely occurs with only one sense in isolation and, although this thesis largely discusses the 
effects of feedback and theories of inference in vision, these theories are proposed to inform 
all senses and modulate how they interact. Thus it is important to begin considering the 
impact of sensory feedback on the primary cortices of other senses.  
 
Our next illusion, Motion-Induced Blindness (MIB), shows a stunning modulation of 
perception in which a bright target completely disappears from conscious vision. Such a 
salient stimulus invokes a large response in early visual cortex. Nonetheless, internal 
processing blinds participants to seeing this target. This illusion presented us with the 
opportunity to study an illusion in which we could formulate a specific hypothesis for an 
effect on V1 multivariate activation without a change in stimulus. Lastly, flashed face 
distortion (FFD) allows us to examine a new illusion which has not yet been fully explored in 
terms of expectation and prediction. FFD provides a promising avenue for research due to the 
dramatic effects observed with typical stimuli in typical participants. Additionally, FFD is an 
ideal illusion with which to probe the timing specifications of feedback. The timing of 
different feedback effects and how these could possibly be integrated seamlessly is one 
particular concern for predictive coding theories of cortical function (see chapter 6.6). 
 
Secondly, we aim to develop a theory of how these systems function in schizophrenic 
subjects and what neural outcomes would be expected in these illusory paradigms. With 
reliable illusory paradigms, we can form a link between feedback hypotheses and visual 
illusions, then between these visual illusions and the behavioural and neural outcomes in 
schizophrenic subjects. Our chosen illusions are largely well-documented in schizophrenic 
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populations. The rubber hand illusion has been extensively investigated in these subjects, as 
both a method to probe top-down effects and to probe self-perception in the disorder. This 
illusion is strengthened in schizophrenic subjects (Thakkar, Nichols, McIntosh, & Park, 
2011). The MIB is also relatively well-established in Schizophrenic populations but, 
conversely, is either attenuated or strongly attenuated in schizophrenic subjects. See the 
discussion (chapter 6.9.) for theories on why the pattern of differences for each illusion may 
vary in these subject populations. Lastly, FFD has not been established in Schizophrenic 
population but it presents a very promising paradigm; as it allows us to probe both timing 
parameters in these clinical subjects, induces an illusory percept which seems hallucinatory, 
and may also be face-based. Schizophrenic participants have notable face processing deficits 
(Bortolon, Capdevielle, & Raffard, 2015; though these deficits may be caused by deficits in 
contextual integration); and do not experience illusions which depend on established priors 
regarding faces (for example the hollow mask illusion Dima et al., 2009). The causes and 
mechanisms of schizophrenia are poorly understood and interactive hierarchical models, such 
as the predictive coding hypothesis (see Chapter 6.8), could explain core symptoms of the 
disorder, help define its pathophysiology and create opportunities for novel therapy. 
Furthermore, feedback and feedforward mechanisms also underlie cortical processing in non-
human mammals. Therefore animal models of feedback can be utilised to investigate cortical 
processing in schizophrenia. 
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2.1. Abstract 
 
In the Rubber Hand Illusion, subjects experience perceived ownership over a rubber limb 
following synchronous visuotactile stimulation to the subject’s real hand and the rubber hand. 
Although the illusion is robust in a typical population, previous studies have shown that 
participants prone to psychosis experience more intense rubber hand ownership. We 
investigate whether the atypicalities involved in psychosis proneness are also involved in 
enhanced vulnerability to the rubber hand illusion, across varying visuotactile stimulation 
asynchronicity.  We used the Prodromal Questionnaire (Loewy et al., 2011) to define two 
groups: subjects with a medium-high combined positive symptom and distress score (sub-
clinical), and control subjects with a score of zero. We stimulated the real and rubber hands 
synchronously or asynchronously (200, 300, 400 or 600ms asynchronicity) and recorded 
subjective ratings of illusion strength. We found that as visuotactile asynchronicity increases, 
the strength of the illusory percept decreases (as shown by Shimada, Fukuda, & Hiraki, 
2009). However, we did not find any effect of psychosis-proneness on rubber hand illusion 
perception. 
 
2.2. Introduction 
 
Predictive coding theories of cortical function suggest that the brain uses prior experience to 
inform perception (Bar, 2007; Clark, 2013; Friston, 2010; Muckli & Petro, 2013; see 
Chapter 1.5). The cortex is thought to infer the source of new sensory inputs in a manner 
akin to Bayesian mathematical theory, estimating the probability of a particular percept in 
light of prior knowledge about related sensory inputs and the likelihood of the percept 
(Friston, 2012; Knill & Pouget, 2004). These internal perceptual likelihoods are combined 
with sensory inputs to form conscious perception, thus creating a percept that is inferential 
not veridical (see Chapter 1.4). Bayesian learning and inference is proposed to underlie 
human body schema (Seth, 2013). A coherent body representation develops across a history 
of multisensory inputs consistent with the percept that the body belongs to oneself (Armel & 
Ramachandran, 2003; Körding & Wolpert, 2004). ‘Body ownership’ describes the 
understanding that one’s body belongs uniquely to the perceiver and that one’s bodily 
sensation is unique to oneself (Gallagher, 2000). Under typical conditions Bayesian learning 
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constantly reinforces correct body ownership e.g. you feel a touch to your limb, which is also 
seen, and heard. Thus evidence for the limb belonging to you is strengthened. Cortical body 
schema in this conceptualization is never static. Rather it is a result of several levels of 
integration of stimulus inputs from multiple senses and the source of these inputs, which 
allows us to delineate the difference between the self and other.  
 
The rubber hand illusion (RHI) allows body ownership and schematic body representation to 
be manipulated under conditions of matching visual and tactile information originating from 
the rubber and real hands respectively (synchronous stimulation; Botvinick & Cohen, 1998; 
Ehrsson, Spence, & Passingham, 2004; Hohwy & Paton, 2010; Tsakiris & Haggard, 2005). In 
the RHI, this synchronous visuotactile stimulation produces the illusion that the rubber hand 
‘belongs’ to the participant’s body and is the source of their sensation (Botvinick & Cohen, 
1998). Recent work has shown that the RHI can arise under a Bayesian mathematical model 
with both spatial and temporal inputs, and that under this model the illusion is stronger when  
synchronous stimulation is applied (Samad, Chung, & Shams, 2015). Proprioceptive rules 
must also be met for illusory ownership to occur- the rubber hand must be biologically 
plausible (within peripersonal space, anatomically congruent, and of realistic orientation; 
Costantini & Haggard, 2007; Guterstam, Gentile, & Ehrsson, 2013; Hohwy & Paton, 2010; 
Lloyd, 2007; Preston, 2013). Previous studies have typically used one asynchronous 
condition (~500ms asynchronicity), and generally report no RHI during such stimulation 
(Ehrsson, Holmes, & Passingham, 2005; Ehrsson et al., 2004; Tsakiris, Hesse, Boy, Haggard, 
& Fink, 2007).  
 
Whilst the rubber hand illusion may seem to be an exceptional manipulation of body schema, 
in truth our internal body representation is so malleable as to allow subjects to perceive a 
whole-body virtual reality mannequin as their own body (Blanke & Metzinger, 2009; 
Ehrsson, 2007; Lenggenhager, Tadi, Metzinger, & Blanke, 2007). As long as visuotactile 
sensory input is consistent (i.e. coherent seen touch to the VR mannequin, felt touch to the 
subject’s body, and proprioceptive similarity in posture), subject’s feel as though the VR 
body is the source of their sensation. Subjects also experience proprioceptive drift towards 
the virtual reality mannequin - a shift in the perceived real body position towards the 
integrated limb, or mannequin.  
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Bodily ownership is further disrupted in some clinical conditions. Self-disturbances are a core 
symptom of Schizophrenia (Sass & Parnas, 2003; Vogeley, 2003), including distortions 
between the self and the external world (David et al., 2006). Such distortions in bodily 
ownership may correlate with psychosis symptom strength or coincide with psychosis onset 
(Nelson, Yung, Bechdolf, & McGorry, 2008). Body ownership has been studied empirically 
in schizophrenic and schizotypal populations using the RHI (Germine, Benson, Cohen, & 
Hooker, 2013; Thakkar et al., 2011). Schizophrenic subjects display significant disturbances 
in self-perception, which may be either reduced or increased, producing an enhanced 
distinction between the self and others (Thermenos et al., 2013). In schizophrenic subjects, 
the RHI is stronger, appears more rapidly following stimulation onset, and induces greater 
proprioceptive drift towards the fake hand (Peled, Ritsner, Hirschmann, Geva, & Modai, 
2000; Thakkar et al., 2011). It is hypothesised that schizophrenic subjects either express a 
reduced top-down exertion of high level effects, or a stronger bottom-up influence of sensory 
input (Adams et al., 2013; Corlett et al., 2010). In the case of the RHI, either the strength of 
top-down body schema is reduced or the weighing of bottom-up visuotactile stimulation is 
increased. Such dysfunction may be a key mechanism in enhanced rubber hand illusion 
experience.  
 
Schizophrenic symptoms can be expressed in the typical population to varying degrees, on a 
continuum of mental health known as schizotypy. Schizotypal subjects present symptoms 
associated with the disease whilst remaining sub-clinical, ranging from normal and 
imaginative states to psychosis (Bentall, Claridge, & Slade, 1989). Schizotypal traits interact 
with RHI susceptibility- Germine et al. (2013) found that positive schizotypal symptom 
presence in healthy subjects correlated with stronger illusion perception. Psychosis develops 
following a prodromal period, which may be a useful biomarker and a key target for 
intervention to control disease development (Addington et al., 2007). Bodily disturbance is 
evident in this prodromal stage and may form part of an existing vulnerability to psychosis 
(Lenzenweger, 2006, 2011; Nelson, Thompson, & Yung, 2012; Nelson et al., 2008; Sass & 
Parnas, 2003). Susceptibility to illusions such as the RHI therefore may be indicative of 
psychosis-proneness.  
 
2. CROSSMODAL BOUNDARIES OF THE RUBBER HAND ILLUSION IN SCHIZOTYPY 
58 
 
Shimada et al. (2009) examined illusion strength under varying visuotactile asynchronicities 
in a healthy population, finding that greater asynchronicities weakened the illusion. They 
demonstrated that the illusion percept is not significantly diminished until visuotactile 
asynchronicity is above 300ms, although some participants did experience the illusion at 
asynchronicities of 400 and 600ms. Whether schizophrenic patients would show a similar 
window of temporal integration is not clear. Schizophrenic participants demonstrate a wider 
temporal integration window in multiple multisensory studies and may therefore experience 
the RHI at greater asynchronicities (Parsons et al., 2013). 
 
The current study examines the visuotactile boundaries of the RHI in a psychosis-prone 
group and in a control group. We recruited subjects who had responded to the Prodromal 
Questionnaire (Loewy et al., 2011), selecting one subset (control) from zero scorers and the 
experimental group from responders who scored highly, but were sub-clinical, in a combined 
measure of positive symptomology and symptom-based distress (Med-High Prodromal 
Group, MHPG). We presented RHI stimulation at 0, 200, 300, 400 and 600ms 
asynchronicity. Based on previous findings it was hypothesized firstly that the MHP group 
would experience the RHI more strongly during synchronous stimulation than controls 
(Germine et al., 2013), and that illusion response would decrease with increasing visuotactile 
asynchronicity in both groups (Shimada et al., 2009). We further hypothesised that the 
average illusion onset time would be shorter in the MHP group; that the MHP group would 
respond more strongly to ‘distracter’ statements about atypical experience; and that the MHP 
group would continue experiencing the illusion past the 300ms ‘cut-off’ that occurs in control 
subjects (Shimada et al., 2009).   
 
2.3. Method 
 
2.3.1. Participants 
 
20 healthy subjects were recruited from a group of undergraduates who had completed the 
prodromal questionnaire (PQ; Loewy et al., 2011). 10 subjects were recruited from those who 
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scored 0 on both positive psychotic symptoms and symptom-based distress (controls; 5 f); 10 
subjects were recruited from subjects with medium to high scores on symptoms and 
associated distress (MHP group; 7 f). It is important to note that these scores were sub-
clinical level. Subject groups were not matched; however both groups were recruited from a 
population of university undergraduates in their 20s. In each group, 2 subjects were 
ambidextrous; all other subjects were right-handed (as measured by the Edinburgh 
Handedness Questionnaire,Oldfield, 1971). All subjects had normal or corrected-to-normal 
vision. The experiment was approved by the ethics committee of the College of Science and 
Engineering, University of Glasgow. 
 
Figure 2.1. Stimulus set up. Subjects viewed a stimulated rubber hand whilst a second stimulation 
device was applied to the hidden real hand. There was 20 cm distance between both stimulation 
devices and the real and rubber hand. Subjects fixated on the rubber hand during stimulation, and then 
responded to Likert statements presented on the monitor using their right hand.  
 
2.3.2. Apparatus: 
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An air-powered stimulation device was designed in the department of Psychology (shown in 
Figure. 2.1.). Hidden by a box screen, one stimulation rod was applied to the subject’s real 
hand. In full view, the other device was applied to the fixated rubber hand. These devices 
were fixed 20cm apart, with the same distance between subject’s real hand and the rubber 
hand. We applied stimulation to the same location on the rubber and real hand at a rate of 
1Hz. Material similar to the subject’s clothes covered the space between the rubber hand and 
subject’s body. We presented instructions to the subject on a monitor. Subjects freely 
reported any illusion onset and rated their experience following each stimulation period using 
the keyboard on a 1-7 likert scale for 7 statements (Table.1.). The seven Likert statements 
probe the perception of the rubber hand. Statements 1-3 determine the extent to which the 
hand is integrated as part of the body where sensation originates. Statement 4 is a measure of 
the perceptual aspect of proprioceptive drift. Statements 5-7 determine unusual percepts 
subjects may have during the RHI. The choices were presented as a visual-analog scale on the 
screen. Subjects wore earplugs to avoid the tapping device providing an auditory cue of 
synchronicity. 
 
Likert Statements: 
1. It seemed as if I were feeling the touch of the rod in the location where I saw the 
rubber hand being touched.  
2. It seemed as though the touch I felt was caused by the rod touching the rubber hand. 
3. It felt as if the rubber hand were my hand. 
4. It felt as if my real hand was drifting towards the rubber hand. 
5. It seemed as if I might have more than one left hand or arm. 
6. It felt as if my real hand were turning rubbery. 
7. The rubber hand began to resemble my own hand (skin tone, features, shape). 
 
Table 2.1. Likert statements. Subjects were prompted to respond to Likert statements following each 
stimulation block. Statements are taken from Botvinick and Cohen (1998). The statements 1-3 probe 
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illusory rubber hand ownership, the 4
th
 statement probes proprioceptive drift, statements 5-7 probe 
unusual percepts.  
 
2.3.3. Design and Procedure 
 
Subjects provided written informed consent and completed the Edinburgh Handedness 
inventory (Oldfield, 1971). Subjects were provided with earplugs to remove auditory cues of 
stimulation asynchronicity. They sat at a table with their left hand placed in the box screen, 
palm facing down, with the tapping device hitting below the knuckle of the left middle finger. 
A life-sized rubber hand was fixed between the subject’s left and right hand in clear view, 
with a second tapping device hitting the same location. Subjects were instructed not to move 
their left hand during the experiment and to fixate on the rubber hand. These instructions 
were repeated on screen throughout the experiment. Subjects first experienced a 5-minute 
block of synchronous stimulation. We then presented randomised blocks of varying 
visuotactile synchronity (60s per block: 0ms, 200ms, 300ms, 400ms and 600ms 
asynchronicity). Each block synchronity was repeated twice. During each stimulation period 
subjects freely reported a ‘perceptual change’ (illusion perception) using a key press. The 
details of the illusion were not provided so as not to mislead subjects. Following stimulation, 
subjects responded to statements about their illusory experience on a Likert scale (1 = very 
negative, not at all descriptive of perception, 7 = very positive, very descriptive of perception; 
statements taken from Botvinick & Cohen, 1998). Between each block there was a rest period 
determined by the subject, who pressed space to continue.  
 
2.3.4. Analysis 
 
Likert Statements 
 
Of the Likert statements; items 1- 3 represent probes for illusion perception, item 4 probes 
proprioceptive drift, and items 5-7 judge alternative unusual phenomenon. Descriptive 
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statistics were calculated for the response to each Likert statement following each visuotactile 
asynchronicity condition, averaged across the two presentations of each asynchronicity. To 
ascertain if subject group had an impact on the statement responses following the 5-minute 
synchronous block we used Wilcoxon rank-sum tests for each statement response. We then 
used a three factor mixed ANOVA to test the main between-subject effects of subject group; 
within-subject effects of Likert statement (1-7), and visuotactile asynchronicity (0, 200, 300, 
400, and 600ms); and their interactions on Likert statement responses. We used post-hoc 
Bonferroni-corrected t-tests to compare means between different levels of the main and 
interaction effects.  
 
Online Responses 
 
We produced descriptive statistics describing the response profile for the first online button-
press response for each visuotactile asynchronicity and subject group.  
 
2.4. Results 
 
5-Minute Synchronous Stimulation Period 
 
We examined the subjective Likert responses provided for statements 1-7 following the long 
synchronous stimulation period (Figure 2.2.) 
2. CROSSMODAL BOUNDARIES OF THE RUBBER HAND ILLUSION IN SCHIZOTYPY 
63 
 
 
Figure 2.2. Long stimulation period. Mean Likert scale response to each statement item per group 
(control subjects in blue, MHPG subjects in purple). Points represent individual subject means, whilst 
point size denotes number of responses at that rating. Error bars represent standard error of the mean. 
 
The control group provided descriptively higher responses to Likert statements 1-3 (#1 m=4.7 
v 3.7; #2 m=4.7 v 3.6; #3 m=3.2 v 2.7). However, there was no significant difference 
between the two groups on statement #1 (W(18) =113.5, z=0.619, p=0.536), #2 (W(18) 
=121.5, z=1.227, p=0.220), or #3 (W(18) =101.50, z=-0.232, p=0.817). Additionally, we 
found no significant difference between the control and MHP group for responses to 
statement #4 (W(18)=103, z=-0.117, p= 0.907), #5 (W(18)=127.5, z=1.736, p=0.083), #6 
(W(18)=87.5, z=-1.322, p=0.186), or #7 (W(18)=101.5, z=-0.232, p=0.817). 
 
Preliminary descriptive statistics, restricted to subjects who give a press response for illusion 
experience in the 5-minute stimulation block, suggest that there may be an effect of group in 
this subset, but we did not collect a large enough sample to statistically analyse this. 
 
Parametric Variation of Visuotactile Synchronity (0, 200, 300, 400, 600ms) 
2. CROSSMODAL BOUNDARIES OF THE RUBBER HAND ILLUSION IN SCHIZOTYPY 
64 
 
 
Figure 2.3. Short stimulation periods. Mean Likert scale response to each statement item per group 
(control subjects in blue, MHPG subjects in purple), and per visuotactile asynchronicity (colours 
indicated in legend). Points represent individual subject means. Error bars represent standard error of 
the mean.  
 
Using a three-factor mixed ANOVA, we assessed the contributions of visuotactile 
synchronicity, Likert statement, and subject group on the Likert score provided (Figure 2.3.). 
We used Mauchly’s test of sphericity to ensure equal variance for the differences between 
levels of our factors. Our data met the assumption of sphericity for the factor of visuotactile 
stimulation (Mauchly df=9, p=0.38) but did not meet this assumption for Likert statement 
(df=20, p<0.0001).  Additionally, this test can fail to detect departures from sphericity in 
small samples such as ours. Therefore, we report Huynh-Feldt-corrected values throughout. 
  
We found a main effect of visuotactile synchronicity (F(3.6)=8.88, p<0.0001, partial eta 
squared 0.33); in which Likert responses to the statements decrease as visuotactile 
asynchronicity increases. Like Shimada et al. (2009) we found significant differences 
between Likert statement responses at 0ms and 300ms asynchronicity (Mean 
difference=0.571, p<0.038) and 0ms and asynchronicities greater than 300ms. For the full list 
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of Bonferroni-corrected differences between visuotactile asynchronicities, see Table.A.2.1. in 
Appendix 2. We did not find a significant interaction between group and visuotactile 
synchronicity (F(3.6)=0.352, p=0.82, partial eta squared 0.019). We found a significant main 
effect of Likert statement (F(3.6)=6.19, p<0.0001, partial eta squared 0.26) but again did not 
find a significant interaction between group and Likert statement (F(3.6)=1.1, p=0.36, partial 
eta squared 0.058). The only significant difference observed was between Likert responses to 
statements 1 and 5 (Mean difference=1.475, p<0.049). For Bonferroni-corrected significant 
differences between Likert statements, see Table.A.2.2. in Appendix 2. We did find a 
significant interaction between visuotactile synchronicity and Likert statement (F(17.2)=2.23, 
p=0.04, partial eta squared 0.11). For Bonferroni-corrected significant differences between 
responses to visuotactile asynchronicity by Likert statements, see Table.A.2.3. in Appendix 
2. We did not find an interaction between all three factors (group, visuotactile synchronicity, 
and Likert statement (F(17.2)=1.23; p=0.24, partial eta squared 0.064). It is important to note 
that in all cases our analyses are underpowered as our subject group is small.  
 
Onset Latency of Rubber Hand Illusion between Groups 
 
Figure 2.4.a displays the mean time into the stimulation period subjects responded with a 
button press to indicate ‘perceptual change’. During the long synchronous stimulation block, 
subjects in the MH group responded more slowly than subjects in the control group. During 
other stimulation blocks there is variation in the faster response group. Importantly, many 
subjects did not indicate a perceptual change and therefore these descriptive statistics are not 
representative of the group. Figure 2.4.b indicates the number of responses made by each 
group in each visuotactile asynchronicity. A greater number of MHPG subjects responded 
during the long synchronous stimulation block and in the 300ms and 400ms visuotactile 
stimulation blocks.  
2. CROSSMODAL BOUNDARIES OF THE RUBBER HAND ILLUSION IN SCHIZOTYPY 
66 
 
 
Figure 2.4. Button press responses to ‘perceptual change’. a) Mean onset latency of button presses 
indicating ‘perceptual change’ per group and per visuotactile asynchronicity. Bars indicate the range 
of responses (min to max value recorded). b) Number of subjects that reported ‘perceptual change’ 
per group and per visuotactile asynchronicity. 
 
2.5. Discussion 
 
Multimodal hierarchical interactions between three senses contribute to a Bayesian inference 
about the source of sensory inputs. This inference gives rise to illusory ownership of a rubber 
limb during the RHI (Apps & Tsakiris, 2014; Hohwy, 2007a, 2010; Seth, 2013). We suggest 
that the resulting perceptual illusion solves the mismatch between sensory input of visual 
localization outwith the body and existing internal high level body schema dictating that the 
hand is external; and tactile and proprioceptive inputs from the real hand to the sensory 
cortex signaling that the viewed hand is one’s own, (Hohwy & Paton, 2010). The internal 
body schema model reduces its likelihood so significantly in the face of visuotactile conflicts 
that prior body representation is ‘explained away’ by the illusion to include the rubber hand 
(Hohwy & Paton, 2010). 
 
As visuotactile asynchronicity increases, the strength of the conflict between visuotactile 
stimulation and existing body schema decreases. Correspondingly, we found an interaction 
between visuotactile asynchronicity and Likert statement, and a significant main effect of 
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visuotactile asynchronicity on RHI experience in both control subjects and MHPQ subjects 
(as seen by Shimada et al., 2009 in typical subjects). In short stimulation blocks, we found 
that the response to illusion-probe statements (#1, 2, 3, 4) and the probe statements for 
atypical experience (#5, 6, 7) interacted with increasing asynchronicity in all subjects. The 
response to Likert statements also changed across Likert statements, but this effect is not 
linear.  
 
Descriptively, we noted that the number of subjects who responded for illusory experience 
during the stimulation decreased as asynchronicity increased. Additionally, our paired 
comparisons showed that 300ms could be considered a ‘cut off’ after which perceptual 
responses significantly differ from synchronous stimulation (0ms asynchronicity). This 
suggests that the brain requires a temporal coherence of less than 300ms in order to bind 
visual and tactile inputs for self-processing. Shimada et al. (2009) found that at a temporal 
discrepancy of 600ms the RHI did not occur, and set 300ms as a ‘cut-off’, proposing that 
stimuli delayed by more than 300ms are not recognized to be self-generated. This is coherent 
with other work showing that if the tactile stimulation is delayed by over 300ms, subjects can 
tickle themselves (Blakemore, Frith, & Wolpert, 1999; Blakemore, Wolpert, & Frith, 2000). 
Beyond latencies of 200-300ms healthy subjects detect discrepancies between two 
multisensory stimuli presented together (Franck et al., 2001; Shimada, Hiraki, & Oda, 2005). 
Furthermore, Shimada, Suzuki, Yoda, and Hayashi (2014) repeated their RHI investigation 
with an accompanying visuotactile asynchrony detection experiment (stimuli also applied to 
the hand). Visuotactile asynchrony detection and the self-reported RHI experience were 
found to be related. 
 
We found no significant differences in rubber hand illusion experience between groups for 
the long synchronous stimulation period and no significant difference between groups in 
illusory experience for any visuotactile synchronicity. Across visuotactile asynchronicities, 
we did not find a significant effect of subject group on RHI experience. These results were 
unexpected on two levels. Firstly, previous studies demonstrate higher illusion experience in 
schizophrenic groups (Peled et al., 2000; Thakkar et al., 2011) and schizotypal groups 
(Germine et al., 2013). It should be noted that Germine et al. (2013), found a significant 
relationship between psychosis proneness and RHI experience only during synchronous 
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stimulation. When asynchronous stimulation was introduced, they found the RHI diminished 
almost completely in all groups. Their schizotypal group did not respond on a heightened 
scale to statements regarding atypical experience, only to RHI probe statements. Peled et al. 
(2000) and Thakkar et al. (2011) also found that illusion strength correlated with positive 
symptomology only following synchronous stimulation. In support of our results, Naohiko 
and Shimada (2014) conducted a replication of the work of Shimada et al. (2009) with typical 
and schizotypal subjects and found no difference between high and low schizotypy groups 
across visuotactile asynchronicities. 
 
As the RHI likely arises from an interaction of bottom-up (sensory input) and top-down 
(body schema and inference) computation, disturbances in merging these processing streams 
may lead to the exaggerated RHI witnessed in schizophrenia. Such dysfunction affects 
processing of the sensory world, including the interaction of the self and the external world 
(Mishara & Sterzer, 2015). Mayer-Gross (1932) suggested that reduced top-down perceptual 
expectation about the body contributes to ‘self-disturbances’ in the disorder (see also Mishara 
& Sterzer, 2015). More recently Asai, Mao, Sugimori, and Tanno (2011) suggested that 
during the RHI, schizophrenic subjects may replace their own ‘missing’ top-down bodily 
schema with external ownership of the rubber hand, facilitating more robust illusion 
experience. Peled et al. (2000) suggest that reduced top-down connectivity could drive this 
loosened body schema, allowing for the false binding of bottom-up stimuli (in this case visual 
and tactile) to dominate perception. Furthermore, visual information may be under-weighed 
in schizophrenia in influencing processing of other modalities (auditory and proprioceptive; 
De Gelder & Bertelson, 2003; Williams, Light, Braff, & Ramachandran, 2010).  
 
Predictive coding models propose that the disturbances of the self that are observed in 
schizophrenia arise from imprecise predictions about the sensory consequences of actions 
(Adams et al., 2013; Blakemore & Frith, 2000; Frith, 1987; Synofzik, Thier, Leube, 
Schlotterbeck, & Lindner, 2010; Voss et al., 2010). In typical subjects there is successful 
suppression of internally generated sensation by top-down predictions (Seth, 2013). Other 
authors characterise this as a disturbance in corollary discharge mechanisms which allow 
typical subjects to recognize self-generated sensation (for example by action, Mathalon & 
Ford, 2008). Anomalous self-experience and RHI-experience in schizophrenia are likely 
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related to NMDA Glutamate dysfunction. Ketamine administration to healthy subjects 
increases RHI strength and proprioceptive drift during synchronous and asynchronous 
stimulation (Morgan et al., 2011). 
 
Enhanced RH illusions can be linked to the formation of positive symptomology. Parnas and 
Sass (2001) suggested that schizophrenic delusions develop on the background of pre-
existing anomalies of self-experience. Corlett, Honey, Krystal, and Fletcher (2011) suggest 
that in schizophrenia false interpretations of the sensory world create delusions and 
hallucinations on the basis of correct feedforward inputs (see also Fletcher & Frith, 2009). 
The RHI can be considered an example of this false belief in even healthy subjects. Others 
hypothesise that hallucinations and delusions are caused by self-misattribution in actions or 
body recognition (Arzy, Mohr, Michel, & Blanke, 2007; Asai et al., 2011; Platek & Gallup, 
2002). Furthermore, the over-inclusive sense of ownership and agency observed in 
schizophrenia patients in RHI paradigms is similar to facets of common delusions (Frith et 
al., 2000). These theories both implicate aberrant prediction error as the cause of saliency or a 
surprise in response to normal sensory inputs (Hemsley, 2005). Delusions result when a 
maladaptive cognitive explanatory model is formed based on these prediction errors and 
feedforward stimulation, which is then applied to future sensory experiences (Adams et al., 
2013; Corlett et al., 2011; Fletcher & Frith, 2009; Heinz, 2002; Kapur, 2003). 
 
Prodromal phases of psychosis development are a key target for schizophrenia research in 
hope of identifying predictive aspects of high-risk subjects, developing early interventions, 
and preventing or slowing disease progression. Møller and Husby (2000) suggest that self-
experiencing undergoes a core change during the prodromal phase. Retrospective studies of 
the prodrome support this theory (see Parnas, Jansson, Sass, & Handest, 1998; Parnas et al., 
2005). In studies of first admission non-psychosis patients, self-disturbance is a strong 
predictor of future schizophrenia diagnosis (Parnas, 2003; Parnas & Handest, 2003; Parnas et 
al., 2005). Nelson et al. (2012) found that scores on the Examination of Anomalous Self-
Experience scale predicted time to transition to schizophrenia in UHR subjects (EASE, 
(Parnas et al., 2005). Additionally, the same anomalies in prefrontal, lateral, temporal and 
parietal structures implicated in self-disturbances are hypothesized to be an early structural 
characteristic for premorbid risk of schizophrenia (Thermenos et al., 2013).  
2. CROSSMODAL BOUNDARIES OF THE RUBBER HAND ILLUSION IN SCHIZOTYPY 
70 
 
Schizophrenic groups typically present with a fundamental time perception deficit relevant to 
the RHI. This deficit is unaffected by stimuli duration (Carroll, Boggs, O’Donnell, Shekhar, 
& Hetrick, 2008; Elvevåg et al., 2003), and occurs independent of stimuli sensory modality 
(Davalos, Kisley, & Ross, 2003). Foucher, Lacambre, Pham, Giersch, and Elliott (2007) 
showed that schizophrenic patients perceive unimodal and bimodal visual and auditory 
stimuli as simultaneous over longer periods of time compared to control subjects. A similar 
effect was observed in studies of visual-only flicker fusion (Parsons et al., 2013). Dysfunction 
in perceptual binding in patients leads to erroneous causality judgements- for example 
Tschacher and Kupper (2006) demonstrated that increased perceived causality between 
stimuli was correlated with positive symptomology. We would therefore presume that 
schizotypal or prodromal subjects demonstrate a wider window of RHI integration. 
  
However, other results suggest that prodromal subjects could show reduced binding as 
opposed to strengthened binding. Tschacher and Bergomi (2011) found that schizophrenic 
spectrum patients show attenuated type II binding (reduction in binding temporally delayed 
stimuli across different senses), proposing that this reduced neurocognitive binding is related 
to abnormalities in long-range neural synchronization (Meyer-Lindenberg, 2010; Uhlhaas et 
al., 2006). As psychosis is analogous to reduced multisensory integration rather than 
enhanced (Garcia, Sacks, & de Mamani, 2012), weaker somatosensory representation is a 
more characteristic theory for enhanced susceptibility to the RHI in people with 
schizophrenia (Peled, Pressman, Geva, & Modai, 2003). Schizophrenic patients also show 
abnormalities in oscillatory activity including reduced amplitude of evoked phase-locked 
oscillations. This deficit may prevent accurate coordination of cortical areas in order to 
integrate incoming sensory information (Javitt, 2009; Spencer et al., 2004; Uhlhaas et al., 
2006).  
 
Future Steps/Criticisms 
 
Our two groups were recruited from subjects who had previously completed a mental health 
questionnaire which included the Prodromal Questionnaire. The score used to distinguish 
between the two groups was positive psychosis symptoms with related distress (subjects who 
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felt their symptoms also negatively impacted on their lives). Our control group was sampled 
from respondents who scored 0 on the combination of positive symptoms and distress 
(experiencing no positive symptoms and no distress). The MHPG was sampled from 
respondents which were medium-high scorers on these items, resulting in a group which was 
not at the top of the scale, and did not qualify for clinical evaluation. Such subjects are still 
members of the ‘typical’ response spectrum. Without a significant gap in positive symptoms 
and distress, significant differences were less likely to be observed between the two groups in 
our experiment. Future investigation should include subjects across an entire response profile 
to the Prodromal Questionnaire (from 0 scoring control subjects to subjects who respond at a 
clinical level). We could then examine whether there is an effect as psychosis tendency 
increases linearly, and determine if there are progressive differences in self-disturbance as the 
PQ score increases. 
 
Furthermore, not all subjects included in the study perceived the illusion. There were a higher 
number of subjects who perceived the illusion in the control group than in the MHPQ group. 
Therefore mean statement responses are affected by non-responders. In a larger sample, 
analysis would be conducted only on subjects who experienced the illusion in the initial 
synchronous stimulation period. Analysis of the button press was further complicated by the 
deliberately vague instruction to report ‘perceptual change’ and several subjects who rated 
their illusion experience as strong on the Likert statements did not ever respond with a button 
press.   
 
2.6. Conclusion 
 
RHI experience demonstrates how malleable and impermanent body schema is, even in 
healthy subjects. Furthermore, the RHI shows that perceived reality is highly affected by 
sensory probability and integration (Hohwy & Paton, 2010). From the results of this study, 
we cannot support our hypothesis that as the proneness to psychosis increases the strength of 
the RHI also increases. There is preliminary evidence to suggest that with a larger subject 
pool and subjects from a higher psychosis proneness population, the results would have 
concurred with previous findings. However, we can agree with previous findings regarding 
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the effects of asynchronicity on the illusion - as the asynchronicity of visuotactile stimulation 
increases, the strength of the illusion perceived (as determined by the Likert scale) decreases 
(Shimada et al., 2009). From our results, we have additionally found that a temporal 
contiguity of less than 300ms is needed to elicit the RHI (Shimada et al., 2009).  
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3.1. Abstract  
 
During the rubber hand illusion, synchronous tactile stimulation to the subject’s hidden real 
hand and to a visible rubber hand causes healthy subjects to perceive ownership of a fake 
limb. The illusion occurs as a result of coherent feedforward tactile and proprioceptive inputs 
to the sensory cortices, which then alter high level models of body schema. Whilst the ventral 
premotor cortex is traditionally considered to be the seat of the RHI, other diverse regions 
including visual motion area hMT+/V5 may be involved. We investigated how crossmodal 
and illusory feedback affects the response in motion sensitive area V5 and in early visual 
cortex (V1). In fMRI, participants viewed the rubber hand through a mirror whilst their 
hidden real hand was stimulated either synchronously or asynchronously. We used instant 
reports of subjects’ experience to dissociate stimulation type and illusory experience. We 
found that stimulation and illusion experience interact to produce activation in V5 and V1, 
whilst BOLD activity in vPMC and the retinotopically specific rubber hand area of V1 
increases when subjects experience the illusion. Multivariate pattern analyses demonstrated a 
coherent pattern during illusion perception in V1 and in the retinotopically specific 
subsection corresponding to the rubber hand (VHand). We therefore find effects of both 
multisensory stimulation and illusion perception in V5 and early visual cortex. These 
response properties do not result from retinal stimulation and thus occur through intracortical 
feedback. 
 
3.2. Introduction  
 
Predictive multimodal hierarchical interactions are proposed to underlie coherent body 
representation in sensory illusions such as the rubber hand illusion (RHI; Apps & Tsakiris, 
2014; Hohwy, 2007a, 2010; Seth, Suzuki, & Critchley, 2011). The RHI is a visuotactile 
illusion in which subjects perceive ownership over a rubber hand. This occurs after 
synchronous tactile stimulation to the subject’s own hand and visual stimulation to the rubber 
hand (Botvinick & Cohen, 1998; Ehrsson et al., 2004; Tsakiris & Haggard, 2005). Hohwy 
and Paton (2010) suggest the illusion is a perceptual solution to prediction error occurring 
between the sensory cortex coding real tactile stimulation and the visual system signalling 
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that the stimulation is to an external object. Prediction error occurs upon inconsistencies 
between modelled and incoming stimuli, and is transmitted up the cortical hierarchy to 
correct existing predictive models (Friston, 2010; Kok et al., 2012; Lee & Mumford, 2003; 
Rao & Ballard, 1999; Spratling, 2010). In the RHI the existing internal modelled body 
schema is inconsistent with the incoming tactile and proprioceptive signals. Illusory 
ownership arises when the sensory cortex succeeds in explaining away the discrepancy.  
 
In light of this account, illusions like the RHI are a useful way to study how predictive 
feedback affects the visual response. Early visual cortex receives both feedforward input 
from the retina, and feedback input originating in higher cortical areas (Muckli & Petro, 
2013). Feedback connections can modulate V1 in a spatio-temporal (Alink et al., 2010) and 
context-dependent manner (Smith & Muckli, 2010) and predictions can be both intra- and 
supra-modal (Erlhagen, 2003). Consequently, feedback allows V1 to represent non-visual 
information, including the categorical content of auditory stimulation in the absence of visual 
input (Vetter et al., 2014). In the apparent motion illusion, the perceived motion trace is 
activated in V1, by feedback from V5, despite no feedforward stimulation ((Muckli et al., 
2005; Muckli et al., 2002; Sterzer et al., 2006; Vetter et al., 2014; Wibral et al., 2009). 
Facilitated detection of targets on the illusory motion trace is destroyed when V5 is inhibited 
(Schwiedrzik et al., 2007; Vetter et al., 2014). V5 is proposed to play a primary role in the 
neural processing of the RHI (Bekrater-Bodmann et al., 2014; Schwiedrzik et al., 2007; 
Vetter et al., 2014). However, whether V5 responds only to visual motion during RHI 
induction (Kamitani & Tong, 2005; Seymour, Clifford, Logothetis, & Bartels, 2009) or to the 
tactile motion pattern of stimulation (Kamitani & Tong, 2005; Seymour et al., 2009; van 
Kemenade, Seymour, Christophel, Rothkirch, & Sterzer, 2014; van Kemenade, Seymour, 
Wacker, et al., 2014; Wacker, Spitzer, Lützkendorf, Bernarding, & Blankenburg, 2011) 
remains unclear. 
 
We use the rubber hand illusion to test whether illusory perception and multisensory 
visuotactile stimulation affect cortical response in V5 and early visual cortex, in the absence 
of differential feedforward visual input. We employ a RHI setup where participants provide 
instant feedback of their perception, allowing us to dissociate illusory state and visuotactile 
stimulation. We investigate the univariate activity changes in visual cortex during different 
3. VISUOTACTILE ILLUSION PERCEPTION IN EARLY VISUAL CORTEX 
76 
 
tactile stimulation types and during the illusion; and multivariate activity patterns 
corresponding to tactile stimulation and the illusion. This is particularly crucial as most 
previous studies which have found non-visual information in early and higher visual cortex 
have found this is represented in the pattern of activation, not in overall activation (Albers et 
al., 2013; Harrison & Tong, 2009; Haynes & Rees, 2005b; Muckli, 2010; van Kemenade, 
Seymour, Wacker, et al., 2014; Vetter et al., 2014). Furthermore, we examine the multivariate 
pattern in regions of visual cortex across time; reasoning that the illusion develops across 
time, and that some regions may be involved in inciting the illusion but not in sustaining it. 
We also examine whether there is evidence for predictive error in the visual system during 
the RHI. 
 
3.3. Method 
 
3.3.1. Participants 
 
29 healthy subjects (mean age 24, range 18-40; 19 female; normal or corrected-to-normal 
vision) were recruited through the University of Glasgow Psychology department subject 
pool. Subjects provided written informed consent, underwent MRI safety screening, and were 
paid for participation. The University of Glasgow ethics board approved the procedure 
(FIMS00747). Data from one subject was discarded due to technical issues.  
 
3.3.2. Apparatus 
 
We attached a custom-made tapping device driven by an air compressor to the scanner bed. 
This device tapped the subjects’ left hand and a rubber left hand using plastic rods. Inside the 
MRI bore, the tapping device was calibrated for each subject to touch their hand and the 
rubber hand at the same location. Subjects’ hands were hidden from their view under a 
screen. Subjects fixated on a board near the foot of the scanner bed (Figure 3.1.). The rubber 
hand was positioned at a biologically plausible angle and extension, and made visible in 
subjects’ left visual field via a mirror mounted to the head coil. The rubber hand was 
Caucasian and wore a sleeve matching that worn by participants. Subjects held a response 
keypad in the non-stimulated, right hand.  
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Figure 3.1. Rubber hand apparatus in the MRI scanner. a. The subject is prone, with an overhead 
mirror directing gaze towards the rubber hand and fixation screen. A flexible screen conceals the real 
hand and the first tapping device. The second device and rubber hand are visible. The fixation screen 
sits across the subject’s lower body. The tapping devices are attached to the scanner table to optimally 
touch the real and rubber hand. The subject’s right hand holds a response keypad. 1b. Elevation 
(subject) view: The subject views the fixation cross on a screen. The rubber hand and the rubber hand 
tapping device were visible in the lower left visual field. 
 
3.3.3. Procedure 
 
The experiment consisted of four runs of rubber hand stimulation. Each run lasted for 12 
minutes and consisted of 6 randomly ordered blocks where tapping stimulation was either 
synchronous or asynchronous (3 of each). During synchronous tapping, the real hand and 
rubber hand were tapped at the same time. Each tap lasted 300ms with 700ms between taps. 
During asynchronous tapping, stimulation to the real and rubber hand was offset by 400ms. A 
block entailed 30s fixation, 60s stimulation (synchronous or asynchronous), rubber hand 
removal, and 30s of synchronous ‘test tapping’ with no rubber hand present. This test tapping 
condition functioned to provide a condition where visual movement of tapping devices was 
ongoing but the rubber hand was not present. Author FM replaced the rubber hand in time for 
the next fixation onset. Subjects were instructed to fixate and used the response keypad to 
freely report the onset (right index finger) and offset (right middle finger) of the illusion of 
rubber hand ownership.  
 
23 of 29 subjects were also presented with retinotopic mapping sequences to locate early 
visual areas. Phase-encoded polar angle stimuli (Schira, Tyler, Breakspear, & Spehar, 2009) 
were projected onto a screen using E-Prime (version 2.0, Psychology Software Tools Inc., 
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Sharpsburg, PA, USA; http://www.pstnet.com). Subjects reported central fixation colour 
change by button response. A flickering checkerboard wedge (22.5° polar angle) appeared at 
the right horizontal meridian and rotated clockwise, completing 12 full cycles of 360°, each 
of which lasted for 64s.  
 
We localised lateral occipital cortex (LOC) in 16 subjects using Matlab for stimulation 
(R2012a, MathWorks, Natick, MA, USA). The LOC localiser was designed in the 
department (by J Lao, 2010). The stimuli were a fixation condition with a cross centred on 
blank grey screen, and greyscale images of objects, landscapes, and scrambled objects (the 
images used were from Kourtzi & Kanwisher, 2000, with permission). Images were 
presented at 23°x18° VA. In each run 7 blocks of each image type were presented in random 
order. Each block contained 20 images, presented for 450ms followed by 330ms inter-
stimulus interval. Between blocks the fixation screen was presented for 12 s. LOC was 
defined by contrasting intact images> scrambled images.  Subjects performed a one-back task 
while fixating centrally. 
 
3.3.4. MRI Parameters 
 
We measured blood oxygen level-dependent (BOLD) signals using an echo-planar imaging 
sequence on a 3T Siemens Tim Trio scanner with a 32 channel head coil. Four runs of 385 
volumes were recorded for 20 subjects at voxel size of 1.5×1.5×1.9 mm (28 axial slices, TE: 
30ms, TR: 2000ms, FA: 62° FOV: 192mm
2
, inter-slice time: 71ms, gap thickness: 0.19mm). 
Resolution was dropped to 3mm
3
 (28 axial slices, TE: 30ms, TR: 2s, FA: 62° FOV: 210mm
2
, 
inter-slice time: 71ms, gap thickness: 0.3mm, 5 retinotopically mapped) for the remaining 
subjects to allow for greater coverage. A high-resolution, 192-volume, 3D anatomical scan 
(3D MPRAGE, 1mm
3
 resolution) was also recorded. A short scout anatomical (128 vols) was 
recorded before each functional run. Polar angle retinotopic mapping (404 volumes) and 
LOC mapping (305 volumes) were run with identical parameters. 
 
3.3.5. fMRI Pre-Processing 
 
In Brainvoyager QX, anatomical images were normalised to Talairach space. Functional data 
for each subject and run (including retinotopic mapping and LOC localisation) were corrected 
for slice time with cubic spline interpolation and 3D motion using trilinear/sinc interpolation, 
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and were temporally filtered (high-pass filter with linear de-trending). The first 2 volumes per 
run were skipped to avoid saturation effects. No spatial smoothing was applied. Functional 
runs were aligned to each subject’s T1-weighted structural image then spatially normalized 
into Talairach space.  We examined subject motion over 6 parameters (3 translational and 3 
rotational directions) and found motion never exceeded 1.5mm. We examined inter-subject 
alignment between functional data runs based on correlations of V1 spatial coverage. One 
subject showed alignment of r<0.90 and this was driven by a single run which we excluded 
from analysis. 
 
3.3.6. Behavioural Analysis  
 
Four types of behavioural response were possible: Synchronous stimulation with rubber hand 
illusion perception (SI); synchronous stimulation but no rubber hand illusion (SN); 
asynchronous stimulation with illusion (AI); or asynchronous stimulation with no illusion 
(AN). We first calculated the amount of rubber hand illusion perception per stimulation 
condition (synchronous or asynchronous). Per subject, the length of time (in volumes) spent 
experiencing the illusion was summed per run and stimulation condition, and averaged across 
runs. We performed Wilcoxon signed rank tests to determine whether there was more illusion 
perception during synchronous or asynchronous tapping. We used a repeated-measures 
ANOVA to test for the interaction of stimulation condition (synchronous or asynchronous) 
and illusion perception (rubber hand perceived as own hand or not). To test if illusion 
experience occurs faster during synchronous stimulation, we averaged the time from 
stimulation onset either to illusion onset or report of no illusion. We performed Wilcoxon 
signed rank tests to determine if the onset of illusion perception was earlier during 
synchronous versus asynchronous stimulation. Matlab (R2012a, MathWorks, Natick, MA, 
USA) was used for behavioural analysis. 
 
3.3.7. fMRI Analysis: Region of interest (ROI)  
 
Primary visual cortex (V1) was defined in 24 (of 28) subjects using retinotopic polar angle 
mapping. Left and right V5 were defined in 28 subjects by contrasting all moving conditions 
(synchronous + asynchronous + test tapping) against fixation (regardless of perceptual 
experience). Lateral Occipital Complex (LOC) was defined in 12 subjects by contrasting 
hand present (synchronous + asynchronous) > hand absent (test tapping). In the remaining 16 
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subjects, LOC was defined using a localiser. A hand-specific patch (‘VHand’) within V1 was 
defined in 27 subjects with the contrast hand present (synchronous + asynchronous) > hand 
absent (test tapping). In subjects without retinotopic mapping, VHand patches were examined 
for their spatial relationship to the calcarine sulcus, to ensure they lay within V1. Ventral 
premotor cortex (vPMC) was defined anatomically in all subjects based on its relationship to 
sulcal architecture (Rizzolatti, Fogassi, & Gallese, 2002). For the TAL coordinates and 
number of voxels in each ROI, see Tables A.3.1. – A.3.6. in Appendix 3. Within these ROIs 
(V1, left and right V5, LOC, vPMC, VHand), we contrasted beta weights in four general 
linear models described below.  
 
3.3.8. fMRI Analysis: Univariate 
 
Functional data in regions of interest was examined using four multi-subject, multi-run 
(MSMR) general linear models (GLM). In the first random effects (RFX) GLM, we modelled 
synchronous, asynchronous, hand absent (test tapping) and fixation conditions (n=28). In the 
second GLM, we used a used a 2 (stimulation [synchronous or asynchronous]) by 2 (illusion 
[perceived or not]) factorial design. In the third GLM, we again used an FFX factorial design, 
modelling stimulation condition by illusion perception as in the second GLM. However, we 
additionally modelled the effects of tapping stimulation (synchronous, asynchronous and test 
tapping conditions, which were defined as predictors in the first GLM) in order to eliminate 
confound effects of tapping phase information and onset. The model therefore characterises 
both the basic tapping conditions and stimulation condition by illusion perception. We refer 
to this as a ‘residuals analysis’, as it is conducted on variance not explained by the tapping 
stimulation. The two factorial GLMs were confined to subjects with data for all 
stimulation/illusion percept pairings (n=21). Lastly we ran a 2 (stimulation [synchronous or 
asynchronous]) by 2 (illusion [perceived or not]) by 7 (ROI) factorial design to determine 
whether ROI had a significant impact on BOLD activation. We used contrasts to determine 
the effects of synchronous (S) versus asynchronous (A) stimulation, and of changes in 
stimulation, illusion perception, or the interaction of these factors in the predefined ROIs. 
GLM analysis and data visualisation was carried out in BrainVoyager QX (Version 2.4, Brain 
Innovation). 
 
3.3.9. fMRI Analysis: Representational Similarity 
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We conducted multivariate analyses using a design which separated conditions of stimulation 
(synchronous or asynchronous) by illusion (rubber hand ownership or not).The multivariate 
activity patterns within a ROI can be considered a neural representation of a stimulus 
(Kriegeskorte, Mur, & Bandettini, 2008). For each ROI, we computed Representational 
Similarity Matrices (RSMs) on the pattern of beta weights (using iterative Pearson’s 
correlates) for the four combinations of stimulation condition and illusion presence (SI, SN, 
AI, AN), across trials and subjects. We compared the multivariate representational pattern for 
each combination to all other combinations and trials, resulting in a correlation value 
reflecting similarity in multivariate pattern and a meaningful diagonal. The diagonal reflects 
the correlational similarity of all trials for each combination of stimulation condition and 
illusion presence for each subject. Off-diagonal values reflect correlation between trials of 
one combination of stimulation condition and illusion presence and another. Negative values 
are not possible in this measure of correlational similarity. To assess significance of the 
pattern similarity, we conducted permutation testing (n=1000) for each condition pairing and 
along the diagonal. In each permutation we randomly shuffled beta weights across trials and 
subjects and calculated a correlation value. We then calculated the occurrence of values 
higher than the true value and stated the p-value as the chance of obtaining a value as high as 
the true one in these random permutations. We performed Bonferroni adjustments on the p-
values to account for multiple comparisons. We used Matlab (R2012a, MathWorks, Natick, 
MA, USA) for multivariate analyses. 
 
3.3.10. fMRI Analysis: Representational Similarity across Time 
 
Whilst representational similarity matrices allow us to examine our data without spatial 
averaging, they still require data to be average across the time course. As the RHI evolves 
and diminishes across time, we wished to examine these multivariate patterns at each time 
point. To this aim we examine the degree of similarity between neural representations elicited 
by each stimulation condition and illusory percept combination (synchronous stimulation 
with illusion, synchronous stimulation with no illusion, asynchronous stimulation with 
illusion, asynchronous stimulation with no illusion) at each time point prior to and following 
a change in percept (illusion or no illusion). For each ROI, we used a single time point/single 
trial approach to assess this evolution. We extracted the multi-voxel patterns within an ROI 
for each of the 10 TRs prior to and following each reported perceptual change. These epochs 
were aligned to the onset of the percept (report of illusion perception or none). In this case, 
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the report of no illusion could represent the offset of an illusory experience, or a report that a 
subject is not experiencing the illusion. For response-aligned multivariate BOLD time-
courses, single trial representational similarity matrices (stRSMs) were computed on the 
BOLD percent signal change independently per subject, ROI and condition. Within each ROI 
and condition, we iteratively correlated (Pearson correlation) the values of the multivariate 
pattern of voxels at one time point with the multivariate pattern of voxels at each other 
possible time point. This procedure was repeated across all possible trial combinations (i.e. 
all other trials of that condition pair, and also against all other condition trials from that 
subject). The resulting matrices for each subject were averaged to obtain the final stRSM. 
Higher similarity (warm colours) reflects comparable multivoxel patterns of BOLD activation 
across time points.  
 
To test for statistically significant differences between the stRSMs for each condition, we 
performed a 2 (illusion [perceived or not]) x 2 (stimulation [synchronous or asynchronous]) 
linear mixed model with an expanding sliding window approach. Independently per level, we 
centred a 2x2 TR window on the first point of the diagonal of both matrices and computed 
the mean of the values within the window (our TR was 2 seconds so 2x2 TRs is 4x4 
seconds). We used the averaged values within the windows of our 4 levels 
(synchronous/illusion [SI]; asynchronous/illusion [AI]; synchronous/no illusion [SN]; 
asynchronous/no illusion [AN]) as inputs for our linear mixed model. The analysis was 
repeated on increasingly larger windows that expanded by 1 TR in each direction (when 
applicable), centred on each point of the diagonal. We performed Bonferroni adjustments on 
the p-values to account for multiple comparisons. This expanding sliding window approach 
allows us to investigate whether differences across stRSMs encompass a few time points or 
whether these are sustained over a larger time window. 
 
3.4. Results  
 
3.4.1. Behaviour 
 
Time spent perceiving the illusion was significantly longer during synchronous stimulation 
than asynchronous (z=2.9, p=0.0046; averages of 56.2 TRs and 35.4 TRs over the entire 
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stimulation period for synchronous and asynchronous respectively, Figure 3.2). Subjects 
spent significantly more time not perceiving the illusion during asynchronous stimulation 
than during synchronous stimulation (z=3.3277, p=0.0009). During both synchronous and 
asynchronous stimulation, there was no significant difference in time spent perceiving the 
illusion versus not perceiving it (z=-1.6, p= 0.1011 and z=-1.9, p= 0.06 respectively). A 
repeated measures ANOVA of stimulation condition and illusion perception showed a 
significant interaction of condition and time spent perceiving the illusion (F(27)=15.1, 
p<0.001). The onset of illusion perception was not significantly different during synchronous 
versus asynchronous stimulation (z=1.9416, p=0.06). 
 
 
Figure 3.2. Behavioural responses. Amount of time spent experiencing the illusion or not, expressed 
as TRs (TR=2000ms); averaged across runs per subject and across subjects, per stimulation condition 
(1 TR = 2s, * p< 0.005, ** p<0.001). 
 
3.4.2. fMRI:  Univariate Effects of Stimulation & Illusion Perception  
 
We performed region of interest (ROI) analyses using a random effects general linear model 
of basic stimulation conditions. In V1 we found no significant effects of synchronous versus 
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asynchronous stimulation. In V1Hand, we found greater BOLD activation during 
synchronous stimulation than asynchronous stimulation (t(RFX)=2.177, p=0.039). In a ROI 
analysis using this RFX GLM, we found no significant effects of synchronous versus 
asynchronous tap stimulation in left or right V5. In a ROI analysis using this RFX GLM, we 
found no significant effects of overall synchronous versus asynchronous tap stimulation in 
vPMC. 
 
In a ROI analysis using the first factorial GLM (stimulation [synchronous or asynchronous] x 
illusion [perceived or not]), we found an interaction of stimulation and illusion perception in 
right V5 (F=3.65; p=0.00026); left V5 (F=3.14; p=0.0017); and V1 (F=-3.79; p=0.00015, 
Figure 3.3). As expected, V1 activation was lower with illusory experience during 
synchronous stimulation than with no illusory experience during synchronous stimulation or 
with illusory experience during asynchronous stimulation. Like V1, V5 activation was 
highest for incongruent stimulation and percept pairings. In right V5, activation was highest 
when there was synchronous stimulation with no illusion and lowest when there was illusion 
during synchronous stimulation. In left V5, activation was highest when there was illusory 
experience during asynchronous stimulation and lowest when there was no illusion under the 
same stimulation conditions. Using the first factorial FFX GLM (see Figure 3.3.), we 
observed separate main effects of stimulation and illusion in vPMC, in which synchronous 
stimulation contributed lower bold signal than asynchronous stimulation (t(FFX)=-2.068; 
p=0.039) and illusion perception contributed higher bold signal than no illusion (t(FFX)=-
4.068; p=0.000048).  In V1Hand we did not find significant effects of stimulation, illusion, or 
their interaction. No effects of stimulation, illusion, or their interaction were found in LOC.  
 
In a ROI analysis using the factorial GLM on the residual data (stimulation [synchronous or 
asynchronous] x illusion [perceived or not]; conducted on variance not explained by the 
tapping stimulation), we found an interaction of stimulation and illusion perception in right 
V5 (F=3.94; p=0.00008), left V5 (F=4.78; p=0.000002), and V1 (F=-3.91; p=0.000093, 
Figure 3.3, dashed). Again, V1 activation was lower when there was illusory experience 
during synchronous stimulation than when there was illusory experience during asynchronous 
stimulation. In right V5, activation was highest when there was illusory experience during 
asynchronous stimulation and lowest when there was an illusion during synchronous 
stimulation. In left V5 activation was highest when there was illusory experience during 
asynchronous stimulation and lowest when there was no illusion under the same stimulation 
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conditions. Using the factorial GLM on the residuals data, we again observed a main effect of 
illusion in vPMC, in which illusion perception led to higher bold signal (t(FFX)=3.1; 
p=0.0019). This effect appears to be driven by high activation for illusion perception during 
asynchronous stimulation.  In V1Hand, we found a main effect of illusion, in which illusion 
perception contributed higher bold signal than no illusion (t(FFX)=-2.05; p=0.041). We 
found no effects of stimulation, illusion, or their interaction in LOC.  
 
 
 
Figure 3.3. ROI definitions and Factorial GLMs in our regions of interest. Full data (solid lines) 
and data with the tapping stimulation pre-modelled and removed (residual data, dashed).  
 
We chose not to use a three-way ANOVA with an additional factor of ROI as our main 
analysis as different subjects had different numbers of ROIs available for analysis (for 
example only n=18 subjects had a mapped V1). However, when checked there was not an 
effect of ROI (F(3)=1,p=.415; partial Eta squared = 0.143); an interaction between ROI and 
stimulation type (F(3)=1,p=.416; partial Eta squared = 0.143) or between ROI and illusion 
perception (F(3)=1,p=.415; partial Eta squared = 0.143) 
 
3.4.3. fMRI: Multivariate Representation of Illusory Perception 
 
Representational similarity matrices, computed between stimulation type and illusion 
perception pairings (SI, SN, AI, AN), show Pearson’s r correlations between the 
representative multivariate patterns in each ROI (Figure 3.4). In V1 we observed significant 
positive correlations between and within the multivariate patterns created by the illusion 
conditions (SI r=0.24, AI r=0.29, SI and AI r=0.27; all p(Bonf)<0.05). However, despite 
identical visual and tactile stimulation, we did not observe significant similarity within or 
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between illusion conditions and their corresponding non-illusion conditions (SN r=0.13, AN 
r=0.19, SI and SN r=0.13, AI and AN r=0.14).  
 
A similar pattern of results was observed in VHand, with significant positive correlations in 
multivariate pattern between the two illusion conditions (SI and AI r=0.28; p(Bonf)<0.05). In 
VHand there was greater variability in multivariate response to illusion during synchronous 
stimulation, but significant similarity in illusion during asynchronous stimulation (AI r=0.26; 
p(Bonf)<0.05). Again we did not observe significant similarity within or between illusion 
conditions and their corresponding non-illusion stimulation conditions (SN r=0.18, AN 
r=0.14, SI and SN r=0.14, AI and AN r=0.12). These results suggest that in V1, and its subset 
VHand, illusion perception provokes a similar multivariate pattern across trials irrespective of 
stimulation type. This multivariate pattern is dissimilar to patterns observed when the illusion 
is not experienced.  
 
We also found significant similarity during illusion perception across trials in vPMC (SI 
r=0.29, AI r=0.28; all p(Bonf)<0.05) demonstrating that illusion-relevant patterns are found 
in vPMC, but that these patterns are not similar across stimulation types. The same similarity 
was not observed in non-illusion conditions. In right V5 significant similarity was only 
observed during no illusion perception in asynchronous stimulation (AN r= 0.41, 
p(Bonf)<0.05). In LOC there was significant similarity across trials of no illusion perception 
during synchronous stimulation (SN r=0.26, p(Bonf)<0.05). 
 
 
Figure 3.4. Representational similarity of stimulation and illusion condition pairings in each 
ROI. Gradient scale shows Pearson’s r correlation strength. Stars indicate significance in a condition 
pairing (permutation tested, n=1000, to p(Bonf)<0.05).  
3. VISUOTACTILE ILLUSION PERCEPTION IN EARLY VISUAL CORTEX 
87 
 
 
3.4.4. fMRI: Multivariate Representation of Illusory Perception across Time 
 
Examination of representational similarity (Pearson’s r correlations on the multivariate 
activation pattern) across time epochs revealed distinct temporal profiles in V5 and V1 for 
each percept during each stimulation condition (Figure 3.5). In right V5, we observed a 
significant effect of stimulation between 8 and 20s prior to perceptual onset (p<0.05). This 
effect was driven by strong similarity in the neural pattern sustained prior to perceptual onset 
during asynchronous stimulation. Furthermore, we found significant effects of illusion 
perception from 10 to 14s prior to perceptual onset, and from 6 to 14s after perceptual onset 
(p<0.05). Both of these temporal windows demonstrated higher neural pattern similarity 
centred on illusion perception compared to when the epoch was centred on a no illusion 
percept. Additionally, we found a significant interaction of these two factors between 6 and 
20s prior to perceptual onset (p<0.05). In left V5, we observed a significant effect of 
stimulation between 8 and 20s prior to perceptual onset (p<0.05). We found comparatively 
greater similarity in the neural pattern prior to ‘no illusion’ percepts during asynchronous 
stimulation, which is likely to underlie this difference. We also found effects of illusion 
perception from 6 to 16s prior to perceptual onset (p<0.05). This window showed higher 
neural pattern similarity prior to no illusion report. As no illusion reports are predominantly 
illusion offsets, this is likely to reflect pattern similarity during illusion perception. In vPMC 
we found a significant effect of illusion perception between 14 and 20s prior to perceptual 
onset (p<0.05). In the other ROIs (V1, VHand, LOC), effects did not survive multiple 
comparison corrections.  
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Figure 3.5. Single trial RSMs across time. Single trial RSMs on the BOLD % signal change across 
a 20 TR epoch centered on the perceptual onset. These figures demonstrate the evolution of similarity 
between the neural representation elicited by each stimulation and illusory percept combination, 
across time. Warm colours reflect higher similarity between multivoxel patterns of BOLD activation 
across time points. Bonferroni-adjusted significance masks (below stRSMs) display statistically 
significant effects of factors (stimulation type, illusion, or the interaction) on representational 
similarity. Colours on the significance masks indicate different sized windows of time in which there 
was a statistically significant effect of a factor, clarifying whether differences across stRSMs 
encompass a few time points or are sustained over a larger time window. 
 
3.5. Discussion  
 
We used the rubber hand illusion to demonstrate univariate and multivariate effects of 
illusory perception and multisensory (visuotactile) stimulation on cortical response in V1, 
V5, and vPMC. Participants provided instant feedback of their perception in a RHI 
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experiment, allowing us to fully study illusory state and visuotactile stimulation dissociated 
and when interacting.  
 
V1 Demonstrates Interactive Effects of Stimulation and Illusory State 
 
We found effects of stimulation type and illusory perception on early visual cortex, V1, in the 
absence of differential visual input. In support of Hohwy and Paton’s (2010) proposal that the 
illusion resolves prediction error which arises during synchronous visual and tactile 
stimulation, V1 demonstrated a univariate interaction of stimulation type and illusion 
perception in ROI analysis. This illusion sensitivity and interaction could be indicative of a 
higher prediction error in specific conditions (Alink et al., 2010; Paton, Hohwy, & Enticott, 
2012). As observed, the ‘incongruent’ stimulation and illusory perception pairings (no 
illusion during synchronous stimulation, illusion during asynchronous stimulation) should 
produce the highest activation/error, and induce the highest activation. Predictive errors have 
been demonstrated in retinotopically specific sub-regions of visual cortex and as a spatially 
diffuse effect, consistent with our findings (Alink et al., 2010; Muckli et al., 2005). In the 
subregion of V1 corresponding to the viewed rubber hand (‘VHand’), we observe increased 
response to synchronous over asynchronous stimulation, and illusion perception produces 
more BOLD activity than no illusion perception. 
 
Additionally, both V1 and VHand had significantly similar multivariate activation patterns 
between illusion conditions (SI and AI), across trials and subjects. This similarity was 
irrespective of stimulation and there was not significant similarity between illusion conditions 
and their matching stimulation non-illusion conditions, suggesting that early visual cortex 
holds a specific multivariate representation of the illusory state. Such response properties 
may seem to be out with the remit of V1 however, despite traditional conceptualisation of V1 
as a feedforward orientation detector (Hubel & Wiesel, 1959), V1 receives feedback from 
numerous cortical areas (Bullier, 2001; Muckli & Petro, 2013). Activity in V1 is modulated 
by feedback information from other sensory modalities (Molholm et al., 2002; Morrell, 1972; 
Vetter et al., 2014), imagery (Albers et al., 2013), expectation (Kok et al., 2014), and higher 
cognitive processing (Muckli & Petro, 2013). Kok et al. (2012) showed that perceptual 
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expectation enhances representational content, increasing MVPA classification accuracy in 
V1 whilst supressing V1 activation. Illusory multivariate similarity in our study therefore 
may reflect a form of representational sharpening upon the hand being coded as a body part. 
It is possible that V1 illusion representation occurs through feedback from V5. V5 has been 
shown to communicate illusory information to V1 (Seghier et al., 2000). This feedback has 
been demonstrated in the absence of feedforward stimulation in motion illusions such as 
apparent motion (Muckli et al., 2005; Muckli et al., 2002; Sterzer et al., 2006; Vetter et al., 
2013; Wibral et al., 2009). Illusory feedback to V1 still occurs in the absence of visual 
attention (Muckli et al., 2005).  
 
Another plausible cause of illusion-related univariate and multivariate activity in early visual 
cortex is the finding that multisensory interactions occur for own-body parts and objects in 
peripersonal space (Makin, Holmes, & Zohary, 2007). Feedback to early visual cortex may 
direct visual attention to such relevant items (Luck, Chelazzi, Hillyard, & Desimone, 1997; 
Ungerleider & Kastner, 2000) and, consistent with our finding of higher BOLD in illusion 
and synchronous conditions in VHand, attention increases BOLD signals in V1 (Gandhi, 
Heeger, & Boynton, 1999; Slotnick, Schwarzbach, & Yantis, 2003; Somers, Dale, Seiffert, & 
Tootell, 1999; Tootell et al., 1998; Watanabe, Harner, et al., 1998). Macaluso, Frith, and 
Driver (2000) demonstrated that touch enhances activity in early visual cortex if paired with a 
touch-relevant ipsilateral visual stimulus. This activation was driven by feedback from 
multimodal parietal regions and is likely to be a form of crossmodal attention direction.  
 
Alternatively, the consistent representational pattern during illusion perception may be 
demonstrating that the rubber hand is coded as a body part which is available for action.  
Early visual cortex receives tactile and motor information, and V1 has demonstrated effects 
of action preparation (Ban et al., 2013). V1 also receives cerebellar feedback, which is 
implicated in predicting the consequence of actions (Blakemore, Frith, & Wolpert, 2001; 
Kawato & Wolpert, 1998) and in non-modal-specific prediction (Muckli & Petro, 2013; Roth 
et al., 2013). vPMC is also strongly functionally linked with the cerebellum (Dum & Strick, 
2003).  
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V5 Demonstrates Interactive Effects of Stimulation and Illusory State 
 
We find a univariate interaction for stimulation type and illusion perception in bilateral V5. 
An incongruent percept and stimulation pairing produces the highest activation (synchronous 
stimulation with no illusion). Hohwy and Paton (2010) suggested that the prediction error 
response during synchronous stimulation triggers the RHI to ‘explain away’ the error. We 
also demonstrate a differential response to tactile stimulation conditions, in the absence of 
differential visual input, supporting the proposal that V5 may be multi- or supra-modal (Alink 
et al., 2010; Chan, Simões-Franklin, Garavan, & Newell, 2010; Hagen et al., 2002; Lewis & 
Noppeney, 2010; Ricciardi et al., 2007; Sadaghiani, Maier, & Noppeney, 2009; Sani et al., 
2010; Scheef et al., 2009; van Kemenade, Seymour, Wacker, et al., 2014; Wacker et al., 
2011). In our study V5 demonstrated an interaction even in the residual data in which 
variance due to tapping stimulation was removed. This implies that information about 
stimulation type in V5 was either conceptual or based on congruence between stimulation 
type and illusory state. Unlike V1, V5 showed no coherent multivariate response for illusion 
perception across time.  
 
The multivariate response in V5 supports suggestions that it is involved in the early 
development of the rubber hand illusion (Bekrater-Bodmann et al., 2014). In left V5, we find 
an effect of stimulation and illusion response on the multivariate pattern prior to perceptual 
response, particularly in no illusion perception during asynchronous stimulation, possibly due 
to high perceptual stability and predictability in this condition pairing (Kok et al., 2012). In 
right V5 there is an interaction in pattern inter-correlation prior to perceptual onset- coherent 
perceptual decisions and stimulation type (SI, AN) show greater correlation than other 
condition pairings. There are also effects of stimulation (greater similarity for asynchronous) 
and illusion (greater similarity for no illusion) perception separately pre-perceptual onset, and 
an effect of illusion perception on inter-correlation after perceptual onset. Lastly, in right V5 
we find significant consistency in the multivariate pattern during asynchronous stimulation 
with no illusion, a condition which should not incite any prediction error.  
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It is particularly interesting that V5 shows a multivariate response related to stimulation and 
illusion perception, as the multivariate pattern in V5 has been shown to distinguish tactile 
stimulation previously (van Kemenade, Seymour, Wacker, et al., 2014; Wacker et al., 2011), 
coding different modalities in distinct populations (van Kemenade, Seymour, Wacker, et al., 
2014). V5 is also heavily implicated in several visual illusions and in feeding information 
back to V1 to create perception (Muckli et al., 2005; Pascual-Leone & Walsh, 2001; Seghier 
et al., 2000; Silvanto et al., 2005). V5 shows involvement in hand-eye coordination 
(Beauchamp, LaConte, & Yasar, 2009), and therefore may be involved in recalibrating the 
body space after illusion induction (Tsakiris, 2010). V5 results are unlikely to be attentional 
(Treue & Maunsell, 1999), as if this was the case we would expect to observe an upregulation 
for all illusion presence, not the interaction we observe with stimulation type.  
 
We used an unusual method to locate V5, and did not use an independent localiser separate 
from main experimental runs. There is significant overlap between V5 and the extrastriate 
body area (EBA), which may play a role in RHI perception (Costantini, Urgesi, Galati, 
Romani, & Aglioti, 2011; Limanowski, Lutti, & Blankenburg, 2014; Wold, Limanowski, 
Walter, & Blankenburg, 2014). As our study did not independently localise EBA and V5, we 
cannot be completely sure that sections of EBA did not contribute to our results. However, 
V5 was localised using conditions that both did and did not have a limb present and, contrary 
to previous EBA results (Limanowski et al., 2014), we find effects in bilateral not 
contralateral V5.  
 
LOC Demonstrates Effects of Stimulation and Illusory State 
 
In addition to the visual regions discussed previously, LOC reacted preferentially to 
synchronous stimulation. Additionally RSM analysis demonstrated that LOC shows more 
consistency in its multivariate pattern for synchronous conditions across different trials of 
that condition and subjects. Ehrsson et al. (2004) found that LOC demonstrates interactive 
effects of stimulation type and limb position congruence during the RHI. Whilst traditionally 
characterised as a high level shape processing area (Kourtzi & Kanwisher, 2001). LOC is 
sensitive to tactile and haptic stimulation when it is object- or limb- specific (Amedi, 
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Jacobson, Hendler, Malach, & Zohary, 2002; Amedi, Malach, Hendler, Peled, & Zohary, 
2001; James et al., 2002; Stilla & Sathian, 2008). Additionally, LOC responds to objects in 
peripersonal space (Makin et al., 2007).  
 
vPMC Demonstrates Effects of Stimulation and Illusory State 
 
Consistent with previous research, we demonstrated a main effect of illusory state in 
contralateral ventral premotor cortex in which we observe higher BOLD signal during 
illusion perception (Ehrsson, 2007; Ehrsson et al., 2005; Ehrsson et al., 2004; Ehrsson, 
Wiech, Weiskopf, Dolan, & Passingham, 2007). Additionally, in vPMC we observed a 
particular multivariate pattern of activity related to illusion perception. This supports claims 
that vPMC activity is crucial to RHI perception. We also observe greater inter-correlation 
prior to a no illusion percept. We cannot separate effects of the previous percept so this may 
partially reflect greater inter-correlation late in illusion perception epochs. vPMC may 
function as a site for visual and somatosensory integration during the RHI (Bekrater-
Bodmann et al., 2014; Nakashita et al., 2008). We did not find an effect of stimulation type, 
however previous findings suggest that vPMC discriminates sequential from non-sequential 
processing (Schubotz & von Cramon, 2003, 2004). As a potential effect of this 
discrimination, the multivariate pattern observed in vPMC during illusion perception was not 
similar between the two stimulation types.  
 
3.6. Conclusion   
 
Our results show that the effects of multisensory stimulation and illusory states are 
represented in cortical regions traditionally associated with solely visual processing including 
in very early visual areas. We found that perception of the rubber hand illusion interacts with 
tactile stimulation to change activation in V5, supporting this area’s role in rubber hand 
illusion perception. We found this same interactive effect (of rubber hand illusion perception 
and stimulation type) on activation in V1. Furthermore the illusion produces a specific 
representative multivariate pattern in V1, and in a specific subregion of V1 corresponding to 
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the rubber hand, irrespective of the tactile stimulation type. Such effects are not supported by 
the traditional response properties of V1 and thus are likely fed back from other sensory 
areas, or from higher cortical regions. 
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4.1.1. Abstract  
 
This study investigated the effect of using oriented Gabor patches as targets, at varying 
eccentricities, on perception of the motion-induced blindness illusion. We recruited 24 
subjects over two experiments.  Firstly, we ascertained that subjects experience MIB when 
viewing targets composed of oriented Gabor patches (n=12). We varied target eccentricity 
and, using repeated-measures ANOVA, found that MIB response rate and duration were 
greatly reduced at a target eccentricity of 4.2˚ compared to 5.8˚ and 7.1˚ (n=12). We discuss 
these results in context of a successive fMRI experiment (Chapter 4.2) and of the 
relationship between target eccentricity and cortical space. We conclude that oriented Gabor 
patches function as targets in motion-induced blindness stimuli, albeit with potentially 
reduced illusion perception. Furthermore, we found that when oriented Gabor patches are 
used as targets they are subject to the same effects of eccentricity as typical MIB targets. 
 
4.1.2. Introduction  
 
The visual world is constructed from the interplay of feedforward retinal input and 
intracortical processing. Visual illusions are a powerful way to distinguish visual sensory 
input (feedforward) from the resulting perception (a combination of feedforward and 
intracortical feedback). Several visual illusions specifically demonstrate the strong effects of 
motion feedback on visual experience. For example, in the apparent motion illusion observers 
perceive an illusory token moving across the screen when two separate flashing stimuli are 
presented sequentially. This illusion infers movement across a physically empty space on the 
retina, even though no stimulation is actually occurring (Muckli et al., 2002). Through 
motion feedback from V5, the relevant previously empty space in early visual cortex is 
activated (Vetter et al., 2013; Wibral et al., 2009). Hidaka et al. (2009) showed that the 
motion prediction induced by apparent motion bars is so powerful as to silence awareness of 
motion moving in the opponent direction. Similar silencing has been demonstrated using 
rotational motion to stop awareness of large visual changes in size, shape and colour of 
objects presented on an annulus (Suchow & Alvarez, 2011). 
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Motion-induced blindness (MIB) is an illusion in which motion causes an object to 
completely disappear. A target surrounded by a coherent motion field becomes perceptually 
invisible even though the target remains physically present (Bonneh, Cooperman, & Sagi, 
2001; Bonneh, Donner, Cooperman, Heeger, & Sagi, 2014). Motion-induced blindness may 
be an effect of active completion of the motion field over the target, as suggested by 
Schölvinck and Rees (2010) who found increased V1 and V5 BOLD activity during target 
invisibility consistent with prediction error (Alink et al., 2010, in apparent motion). 
Alternatively, MIB may represent a form of perceptual suppression of target awareness 
through feedback instead of overwriting. Target representation may therefore still be present 
in early visual cortex, as suggested by retention of orientation effects (Montaser-Kouhsari, 
Moradi, Zandvakili, & Esteky, 2004), and negative afterimages (Hofstoetter, Koch, & Kiper, 
2004) of MIB targets. Top-down motion information from V5 may therefore affect the 
illusion either by filling in motion over the target or supressing awareness of the target 
without affecting target representation.  
 
These possibilities empower motion-induced blindness as an ideal tool to investigate and 
understand the underlying mechanisms of perception and the neural correlates of visual 
awareness (Bonneh et al., 2001; Mitroff & Scholl, 2005). This paper forms the basis of the 
fMRI study presented in Chapter 4.2, acting firstly as a pilot to screen individuals for the 
brain imaging experiment. Secondly, we investigate the effect of using oriented Gabor 
patches as targets on motion-induced blindness perception. Thirdly, we explore the effect of 
target retinal eccentricity on resulting MIB using oriented Gabor patches as targets. 
Additionally, we discuss the effects of such eccentricity on the successive fMRI study- as 
retinal eccentricity increases dedicated cortical space per stimulus size decreases (cortical 
magnification factor; Daniel & Whitteridge, 1961; Qiu et al., 2006; Wandell et al., 2007).  
We aim to maximise the cortical space of the target for fMRI by decreasing target orientation 
towards the fovea, whilst retaining MIB experience in a paradigm which uses oriented Gabor 
patches as targets. The fMRI study detailed in Chapter 4.2 then investigates the 
representation of the target Gabor during perceptual blindness.   
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4.1.3. Method 
 
 
4.1.3.1. Participants 
 
The study sample consisted of 25 paid healthy volunteers (mean age 21.04 years, 19, female; 
normal vision) recruited from the subject pool of the University of Glasgow Psychology 
department (n=12 per experiment). One subject was excluded due to technical difficulties. 
Subjects provided written informed consent and answered a demographic questionnaire.  
Subjects were asked if they would be willing to return for later participation in an fMRI 
experiment.  On completion of the study participants were debriefed.  
 
4.1.3.2. Design and Procedure 
 
For stimulus presentation and data collection we used NBS Presentation Programming (16.5, 
Neurobehavioral Systems, Berkeley, CA, USA). Our motion-induced blindness (MIB) 
stimulus consisted of a motion field and a target superimposed on a black background (Figure 
4.1.1.).  Subjects fixated on a central cross around which the motion field rotated. The motion 
field consisted of a grid array of green crosses (radius 12° VA, angular rotation speed 60 
deg/sec). Whilst MIB displays typically include a protective zone around the target which the 
cross array does not enter, our cross array had no such exclusion zone and passed over the 
target. A target was presented in the upper left visual field (shown to produce most robust 
MIB; Bonneh et al., 2001; Hofstoetter et al., 2004). The target was a yellow circle (RGB 255 
255 50) overlaid with a red Gabor (RGB 255 0 0; either 45° or 135°; Gaussian envelope 
standard deviation 20px, frequency 0.05 cycles/pixel), and was displayed behind the rotating 
field. The target was scaled to 0.8° in diameter and appeared at 5.8° eccentricity for 
experiment 1 (3° left and 5° above the fixation cross), and at 4.2° (3° left and 3° above 
fixation) for one run and 7.1° (5° left and 5° above fixation) for the other in experiment 2. 
Run order was counterbalanced across subjects, all other parameters remained identical. 
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Figure 4.1.1. Motion-induced blindness stimuli. Red and yellow oriented Gabor targets were placed 
behind a rotating green cross array on a black background. Gabor targets are 0.8° with oriented Gabor 
of either 45° or 135°. 
 
Subjects completed two runs of 6-8 minutes per run. In each run, subjects saw two blocks of 
‘MIB’ stimuli each lasting 3 minutes. Each MIB block was preceded and succeeded by 
instructions and 10s of fixation (fixation cross and black screen). The cross array rotated 
clockwise in one block and counter-clockwise during the other block. The orientation of the 
target changed four times per block, pseudorandomly (45s for an orientation before change).  
The target was physically removed from the display 4 times during each the first MIB block, 
at random times for an interval lasting between 5-10s. Subjects were not informed that the 
target would be removed.  
 
A chin rest was used for participant comfort and to ensure minimal head movement. The 
presentation screen was fixed 30cm from the observer at all times. Subjects fixated centrally 
throughout. Three times during each run, the fixation cross changed from white to red for 1s. 
Subjects were instructed to count colour changes and report this to the experimenter at the 
end of each run in an effort to reduce eye movement and distract attention away from the 
oriented Gabor patch target in order to minimise fluctuations in attention related to the 
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perceived target (Schölvinck & Rees, 2010). Subjects reported target invisibility with a 
button press (right index finger) and hold for the duration of invisibility (regardless of motion 
induced blindness or physical removal). We used Matlab (R2012a, MathWorks, Natick, MA, 
USA) to randomise fixation colour changes, target disappearance times, and the order of 
target presentation eccentricity. 
 
4.1.3.3. Analysis  
 
Matlab was used for behavioural analysis. The dependent variables were summed response 
rate (number of reported MIB experiences per run and block) and mean duration of MIB in 
milliseconds (total length of reported MIB experiences/number of MIB experienced in a run 
and block). For mean duration we used only MIB experiences that lasted over 500ms.  Lastly, 
the mean reaction time to report ‘MIB’ after the physical removal of the target was assessed 
per subject per run. We performed a 2x2 repeated measures ANOVA to assess the 
contribution of run and block to MIB response rate and duration in experiment 1. We also 
conducted a 2x2 repeated measures ANOVA to assess the contributions of eccentricity and 
block to outcome duration and response rate in experiment 2. All ANOVA results were 
Bonferroni corrected. Wilcoxon Signed Rank tests were used to compare subject reaction 
time to the physically removed stimulus across runs (run 1 & run 2 in experiment 1) and 
eccentricity (runs of different eccentricity in experiment 2). 
 
4.1.4. Results  
 
Our data clearly indicates robust presence of the motion-induced blindness illusion when 
oriented Gabor patches are used as targets. In experiment 1, we observe MIB with reasonable 
duration and robust response rates (see Table 4.1.1.). For experiment 2, as the peripheral 
location of the target eccentricity of visual angle increases (to 7.1˚) so too do the reported 
rates of MIB.  On the other hand when the target is positioned closer to fovea, (4.24˚ of 
eccentricity) MIB response and durations are greatly reduced, particularly in response rates. 
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Table 4.1.1. Behavioural outcomes. From each experiment and run we present mean and standard 
deviations for MIB duration, response rate and reaction time (RT) to the physically removed targets. 
 
In experiment 1, we examined the effects of run and of the block of stimulation within a run. 
As the order of cross array rotation direction was randomised per subject, block refers to the 
first and second stimulus presentation, not to two defined rotation directions. We found no 
significant effect of run (F(1,11) = 0.14, p = 0.71.), of block (F(1,11) = 0.37, p =0.56.), or of 
the interaction between run and block (F(1,11) = 3.39, p =0.09.) on MIB duration (Figure 
4.1.2.a). Additionally, we found no effects of run, block, nor any interaction, on response 
rates (F(1,11) = 0.57, p =0.47; F(1,11) = 0.74, p =0.41; F(1,11) = 0, p =0.99;  figure 4.1.2.b). 
We found no differences across runs for reaction times to the physically removed target (t = 
61, z = 1.72, p =0.84; figure 4.1.2.c). 
 
 
Figure 4.1.2. Results per run and block in Experiment 1. a) Mean duration and b) mean response 
rate; both of motion-induced blindness. In both graphs colours denote runs, and texture denotes block. 
c) Mean reaction time to physical removals per run. In all cases bars represent standard error of the 
mean. 
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In experiment 2, we examined the effects of target eccentricity and of the stimulus block. We 
found an effect of eccentricity (F(1,11) = 42.6, p≤0.001), a significant effect of block (F(1,11) 
= 7.8, p=0.017), and small but significant effect of interaction between eccentricity and block 
(F(1,11) = 5.3, p=0.041) on mean duration of MIB (Figure. 4.1.3.a). When the target is 
positioned closer to the fovea, (4.2° eccentricity) mean MIB duration is greatly reduced. MIB 
duration was reduced in block 2 for 4.2° but only marginally decreased in block 2 for 7.1°
 
(see Figure 4.1.3.a).  
 
Furthermore, we found a main effect of eccentricity (F(1,11) = 14.3, p=0.003), on response 
rates of MIB (see figure 4.1.3.b).  Response rate was much higher for 7.1° eccentricity than 
4.2°. We found no main effect of block (F(1,11) = 0.24, p =0.63.), nor for the interaction 
between eccentricity and block (F(1,11) = 2.8, p =0.12.). Lastly, we ran a Wilcoxon Signed 
Rank test to compare the mean reaction times between eccentricities, the results were non-
significant (F(1,11)=30,z= -706, p =0.48; figure 4.1.3.c) showing that eccentricity does not 
affect reaction time to physical removal of the target. 
 
Figure 4.1.3. Results per eccentricity and block in Experiment 2. a) Mean duration and b) mean 
response rate; both of motion-induced blindness. In both graphs colours denote eccentricity, and 
texture denotes block. c) Mean reaction time to physical removals per eccentricity. In all cases bars 
represent standard error of the mean.  
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4.1.5. Discussion 
  
The presented study investigated whether oriented Gabor patches can function as motion-
induced blindness targets. Furthermore, we examined the relationship between retinal 
eccentricity and MIB perception when using such target variants. In experiment 1, we found 
that MIB experience is robust in measures of both duration and response rate when oriented 
Gabor patches are used as targets at 5.8° of radial visual angle. This was unaffected by run or 
block (and therefore unaffected by rotation direction as this varied by block). Subjects were 
able to respond correctly to physically removed targets in both runs.  
 
It is crucial to note that, despite using very similar parameters, we observed lower mean 
durations of MIB than those reported by Schölvinck and Rees (2010). Using oriented Gabor 
patches as targets stimuli may therefore reduce overall MIB perception. To fully examine this 
effect, a direct comparison of plain and oriented Gabor patch targets must be made in future 
behavioural experiments with other parameters strictly controlled.  Bonneh et al. (2001) 
rigorously tested the parameters effecting motion-induced blindness, reporting 30% 
invisibility across time for a 0.2° target. Our target is much larger, allowing for cortical 
mapping in early visual cortex. Whilst our eccentricity was higher, greater target size greatly 
reduces MIB- there is a degraded illusion response that correlates with target size increase 
from 0.1-1°; when presented at an eccentricity of 1° (Bonneh et al., 2001). However, others 
have found MIB experience using similar target size, at a smaller eccentricity, than the 
parameters we present here (Mitroff & Scholl, 2005). Interestingly, both Mitroff and Scholl 
(2005) and Bonneh et al.’s (2001) stimuli include distractor targets, which may facilitate 
competition between the field and the targets and therefore facilitate MIB.   
 
In experiment 2 we found that MIB duration and rate were greatly decreased from 7.1° target 
to 4.2° target presentation eccentricity.  In duration we observed an interaction, in which the 
second block produced longer MIB duration for 7.1° but reduced duration for 4.2°. Lastly, we 
show that target eccentricity does not affect reaction time to physical removal of the target. 
These results were expected given the robust decreasing effect of reduced target stimulus 
eccentricity on MIB perception (Bonneh et al., 2001). Whilst these observations are not 
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directly comparable, results in experiment 1 showed longer MIB durations but slightly lesser 
MIB response rates than the 7.1° condition in experiment 2. The target was only physically 
removed in block 1 of each eccentricity, which may affect the block by eccentricity 
interaction observed. However, we would expect the exclusion of physical removals to 
increase MIB at either eccentricity, not decrease the illusion at specific eccentricities. 
 
Target/field contrast heavily influences MIB perception. Stronger target saliency, and 
stronger contrast between target and field, increases the amount of MIB perception in a block 
of stimulation (Bonneh et al., 2001). These parameters may interact with our oriented Gabor 
patch target, which may be less salient. We used red and yellow banded oriented Gabor 
patches as opposed to black and grey specifically to retain target/field contrast and target 
saliency. Two of our subjects did report perceived leftover ‘haze’ after the target 
disappearance. This is a novel effect, as MIB is said to operate on an ‘all or nothing’ 
principle (Bonneh et al., 2001). One potential mechanism is that the yellow bands are being 
silenced by the motion field, with red bands experiencing only perceptual fading effects, 
which tend towards higher eccentricities and happen more in cases of low contrast (Francis & 
Kim, 2012). In this case the yellow lines may function as separate ‘line’ targets, as used in 
other studies (Donner, Sagi, Bonneh, & Heeger, 2008). Other studies have successfully used 
black and grey oriented Gabor patches as targets and maintained target illusory disappearance 
(Bonneh et al., 2010).  However, Bonneh et al. (2010) used higher frequency Gabors than 
those used in our study.  In the future we may incorporate a rapidly flickering target to reduce 
adaptation or fading effects and retain target saliency (Schölvinck & Rees, 2010). Flicker 
speed has a U-shaped effect on MIB perception- no flicker and high flicker speed enables 
increased target disappearance (Bonneh et al., 2001). 
 
As in our study, targets presented to the left visual field facilitate illusion perception, with an 
increased rate of 18% disappearance for a left hemifield target as opposed to 13% for right 
hemifield (Hofstoetter et al., 2004).  Our paradigm used a rotating cross array as the coherent 
motion field. Cross arrays have been used to generate disappearance in classic MIB stimuli 
by Bonneh et al. (2010) and Harris, Barack, McMahon, Mitroff, and Woldorff (2013); and 
were used in an MIB dumbbell paradigm by Mitroff and Scholl (2005). All authors used 
crosses in dark colours or greyscale, and our cross array was dark green. Other authors have 
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used random dot motion fields- Bonneh et al. (2001) used dots to robust effect; as did 
Hofstoetter et al. (2004). Motion induced blindness literature demonstrates a massive 
variation in the rotational speed of the background motion field across paradigms. The 
rotational speed of our motion field was 60 deg/s. Other papers have used much slower field 
speeds- Schölvinck and Rees (2010) used 5.5 deg/sec. Whereas Mitroff and Scholl (2005) 
used rotational speeds as fast as 470 deg/s. This could be an avenue for further investigation. 
 
As in this study and the following fMRI study (Chapter 4.2.), the vast majority of motion-
induced blindness paradigms use self-report to determine a subject’s perception of the target. 
Such paradigms typically have subjects press or press and hold a response key to denote 
when the target is perceptually invisible (examples include Bonneh et al., 2001; Bonneh et 
al., 2014; Donner et al., 2008; Donner, Sagi, Bonneh, & Heeger, 2013; Hsieh & Peter, 2009; 
Kloosterman, Meindertsma, Hillebrand, et al., 2015; Kloosterman, Meindertsma, Loon, et al., 
2015; Mitroff & Scholl, 2005; Schölvinck & Rees, 2009; Wallis & Arnold, 2009 and many 
others). Some authors have additionally had subjects report the features of the target with a 
button press, removing the press when the target disappears (colour; Jaworska & Lages, 
2014). These paradigms produce a large amount of useable data, but have some obvious 
limitations. Responses will be subject to a lag related to the amount of time it takes to make a 
button response after the onset of a conscious percept. To correct for this, a paradigm could 
establish the response time for each subject to physical removal of a target, and correct the 
MIB onset by this mean value. Furthermore, this design means that resulting data (for 
example fMRI recordings or EEG) is confounded by activity related to the button press. 
Button presses can be decoded in fMRI (Liang et al., 2013). Furthermore, in these paradigms, 
subjects are forced to attend to the target to monitor it for disappearance and reappearance. 
Direct attention affects MIB duration – both increasing the likelihood of target disappearance 
but reducing the length of time it disappears for (Schölvinck & Rees, 2009).  
 
Other authors have probed MIB more objectively by physically removing the target and 
measuring the reaction time until it is noted, reasoning that if the target is perceptually 
invisible subjects will not notice the removal (Kramer, Massaccesi, Semenzato, Cecchetto, & 
Bressan, 2013). Dieter, Tadin, and Pearson (2015) allowed the MIB inducing stimulus to 
break through continuous flash suppression and measured the reaction time until the target 
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was seen, reasoning that if the target is perceptually invisible subjects will not see its 
reappearance. These paradigms still raise concerns around the speed of subject motor 
response after a perceptual change. Attention is also still directed to the target and subjects 
still have to physically respond with a button press, albeit at a different time point. These 
paradigms also dramatically reduce the MIB data one has to work with as the target may for 
example be perceptually invisible many more times than the probe occurs, which will go un-
noted. Kramer et al. (2013) also suggest that such a method is only successful with a reduced 
target to background contrast, which reduces MIB perception (Bonneh et al., 2001), and with 
a more eccentric target (which will be given less cortical space in visual cortex).  
 
Eye tracking could be a promising avenue to objectively determine MIB perception. 
Kloosterman, Meindertsma, Loon, et al. (2015) found that the pupil dilates when the percept 
changes during MIB stimulation, and that this dilation is larger for target disappearance than 
target reappearance. This change was independent of the length of a percept and independent 
of subject’s overt report of a change. Pupillary dilation was 61% predictive of the reported 
percept. Eye tracking may be informative of perception as microsaccades reduce just prior to 
MIB disappearance and increase prior to reappearance (Bonneh et al., 2010; Hsieh & Peter, 
2009). More investigation is needed to determine whether these variations are significantly 
predictive of the subject’s percept. We decided to use a subject self-report button press to 
maximise our data (subjects press and hold for the duration of target invisibility). This allows 
all time points where a stimulus is presented to be allocated to ‘target visible’ or ‘target 
invisible’. We use a central fixation task to partially control attention. Additionally, in our 
fMRI experiment (see chapter 4.2.) all decoding is conducted within a perceptual condition 
and therefore does not reflect a difference in button presses.  
 
As we intend to use a similar stimulus in fMRI, we aimed to maximise visual cortical target 
representation. Cortical space varies as a function of eccentricity and visual field position by 
the cortical magnification factor (measured in mm of cortex per degrees of visual angle; 
Daniel & Whitteridge, 1961; Wandell et al., 2007). As eccentricity is reduced towards the 
fovea, or target size is increased, greater cortical space is devoted to a target (Qiu et al., 
2006). There are also decreases in performance and visual acuity as eccentricity increases 
into the periphery (Qiu et al., 2006). These choices about stimulus parameters must be 
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balanced against their effects on MIB perception. MIB is reduced as a target becomes 
increasingly foveal (Bonneh et al., 2001). Larger targets also lead to reduced MIB at fixed 
eccentricities (Lages & Jaworska, 2011). In the interest of maximal cortical space we 
therefore intend to use this mid-range eccentricity of 5.8° in the following fMRI experiments. 
 
4.1.6. Conclusion 
 
In summary, oriented Gabor patches function as MIB targets; although darker band colours 
may effect complete disappearance. As with typical MIB targets, greater presentation 
eccentricity increases Motion-Induced Blindness of the oriented Gabor target.  In Chapter 
4.2 we go on to use oriented Gabor patches of 45° and 135° as targets, presented at 5.8° radial 
visual angle to the upper left visual field. We investigate whether motion-induced blindness is 
an effect of active completion of the motion field over the target representation in V1, or if it 
represents a form of perceptual suppression with maintained target representation. 
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4.2.1. Abstract 
 
When viewing visual illusions and bistable stimuli our perception deviates from 
what was presented. In motion-induced blindness (MIB) a target surrounded by a 
motion field switches between perceptually visible and invisible, even though the 
target remains physically present. These switches in perceptual awareness may be 
related to fluctuations in the pattern of V1 activity representing the stimulus. To 
address whether this is the case we recorded functional magnetic resonance imaging 
data from subjects viewing an MIB stimulus with oriented Gabor patches (45°/135°) 
as target stimuli. We used multivariate pattern analyses to clarify whether the target 
representation in V1 is or is not preserved during perceived target disappearance. 
Our results showed that target properties are present in V1 when the target is visible 
but are not present during periods of perceived invisibility. Therefore we suggest that 
the V1 target stimulus representation fluctuates with perceptual visibility during 
motion-induced blindness. We propose that this fluctuation arises from completion 
of the motion field through feedback from V5, overwriting target representation in 
V1.  
 
4.2.2. Introduction  
 
Motion-induced blindness (MIB) is a bistable visual illusion in which a salient target 
stimulus surrounded by a coherent motion field alternates between perceptually 
visible and invisible, even though the target remains physically present (Bonneh et 
al., 2001; Bonneh et al., 2014). Dieter et al. (2015) recently proposed that motion-
induced blindness occurs due to fluctuations in the pattern of activity in V1 
representing the target stimulus. Such fluctuations in the V1 ‘stimulus 
representation’ would provide neural evidence that internal cortical processing can 
overwrite sensory stimulation (which remains constant in MIB). However, no study 
has explored how the target stimulus is encoded in patterns of neural activity during 
states of perceptual awareness and blindness in MIB. This is essential for 
understanding whether the target stimulus representation fluctuates, and if this 
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correlates with perceptual outcomes. During MIB the target is either overwritten or 
is still represented in V1. Overwriting could occur either through local interactions 
within V1 or through feedback from other cortical areas. 
 
Neurophysiology and brain imaging (fMRI) findings suggest that, although higher-
level interactions in the visual system contribute to motion-induced blindness, the 
target representation might be interrupted as early as primary visual cortex during 
perceptual disappearance. Using human fMRI, Schölvinck and Rees (2010) showed 
increased BOLD activity during target invisibility in the cortical representation of 
the target stimulus in V1 and also in V5. They suggest this BOLD increase is 
consistent with local ‘overwriting’ of the target from regions of V1 representing the 
motion field. One potential mechanism for this ‘overwriting’ is filling-in by 
boundary or contrast adaptation at the intersection of the target and field (Hsu, Yeh, 
& Kramer, 2004, 2006). Surface completion of the motion field stimulus may also 
occur within early visual cortex (Graf, Adams, & Lages, 2002). 3D objects, contours, 
and edges can all complete within V1 (Bakin, Nakayama, & Gilbert, 2000; Lee, 
2001) and the independent effect of motion-induced blindness on multiple target 
objects suggests that the disappearance mechanism occurs at relatively fine spatial 
detail (Graf et al., 2002).  
 
The target could also be overwritten by top-down effects. Schölvinck and Rees 
(2010) comment that cortical feedback is causally implicated in dictating bistable 
percepts. In other motion illusions feedback from V5 ‘writes’ illusory trace 
information into V1 (Akselrod et al., 2014; Chong et al., 2015; Muckli et al., 2005; 
Sterzer et al., 2006). Feedback therefore could also overwrite target information in 
V1 during MIB. This feedback may originate in V5 - Donner et al. (2008) found that 
V5 activation increases during target invisibility, whilst target visibility upregulates 
areas of dorsal extrastriate cortex. Local overwriting, surface completion, and top-
down overwriting all suggest that target representation will be altered or even erased 
at early cortical levels; however no study has demonstrated this.  
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Alternatively, other studies suggest that target properties could be preserved in early 
visual cortex if illusory target disappearance emerges exclusively at higher cortical 
levels. For example, the illusion may arise from competition between cortical 
representations of the target and the motion field, from which only one percept can 
prevail (Bonneh et al., 2001; Donner et al., 2008; Keysers & Perrett, 2002), at 
multiple levels of the visual system (Donner et al., 2008). High level neural 
competition could result in perceptual blindness even whilst V1 continues to 
represent properties of the target. In support of this hypothesis, behavioural evidence 
suggests that the target representation in early visual cortex is preserved by 
feedforward processing during MIB. Perceptual invisibility of oriented Gabor patch 
targets does not reduce orientation adaptation, suggesting that neurons responsive to 
target orientation remain active (Montaser-Kouhsari et al., 2004). Invisible targets 
also induce negative afterimages as intense and long-lived as those created by 
perceived stimuli, again suggesting that adapting neurons are not affected by the 
illusion (Hofstoetter et al., 2004).  
 
It is not currently known whether the cortical representation of the target is disrupted 
during motion-induced blindness, even though fluctuations in stimulus strength are 
suggested to underlie the illusion. Furthermore, it is not known at what stage of the 
visual hierarchy the target stimulus representation is disrupted. If target properties 
are present in V1 during MIB, then top-down signals do not ‘overwrite’ the 
feedforward processing of the target, and target invisibility originates at higher levels 
of the visual hierarchy. If properties of the target stimulus are not present in V1, this 
would suggest that completion of the motion field distorts the representation of the 
target, via cortical feedback or through lateral interactions within V1. Using 
functional magnetic resonance imaging, we measured human observers presented 
with the motion-induced blindness illusion. We used oriented Gabor patches 
(45°/135°) as the target stimuli, and employed multivariate pattern analyses to clarify 
whether target representation in V1 is preserved or distorted by overwriting during 
perceived target disappearance. We specifically examine how features of the target 
are represented during MIB, as opposed to examining a change in the associated 
BOLD signal (Donner et al., 2008; Schölvinck & Rees, 2010), or in a secondary 
perceptual effect (Hofstoetter et al., 2004; Montaser-Kouhsari et al., 2004). We 
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provide evidence for feedforward processing of target orientation during target 
visibility but not during motion-induced blindness, even though the target remains 
present. Our data suggest that fluctuations in the strength of the feedforward target 
stimulus representation are correlated to perceptual outcome. This may be caused by 
cortical feedback from motion-sensitive area V5 overwriting feedforward processing 
in V1, consistent with the idea that feedback causes perceptual switches during 
bistable percepts (Blake & Logothetis, 2002; Hohwy et al., 2008).  
 
4.2.3. Method 
 
4.2.3.1. Participants 
 
We recruited 18 subjects for experiment 1 (mean age 23.05, range 18-30; 11 female) 
and 3 subjects for experiment 2 (mean age 24.6, range 23-26; 2 female). Subjects 
had normal vision and were right-handed. One subject completed both experiments. 
We recruited subjects through the University of Glasgow Psychology department 
subject pool. Subjects provided written informed consent, underwent MRI safety 
screening and were paid for participation. The University of Glasgow ethics board 
approved the procedure (#300140042). 
 
4.2.3.2. Stimuli 
 
During ‘motion-induced blindness’ (MIB) stimulation subjects fixated on a central 
cross around which a circular full-field array of green crosses rotated radially (radius 
9.5° VA; angular rotation speed 60 deg/sec in experiment 1 and 120 deg/sec in 
experiment 2.). A target was presented in the upper left visual field, which is the 
location shown to produce most robust MIB (Bonneh et al., 2001). The target was a 
yellow circle overlaid with a red Gabor (either 45° or 135°; Gaussian envelope 
standard deviation 20px, frequency 0.05 cycles/pixel), and was displayed behind the 
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rotating field. The target flickered at 15Hz for two subjects in experiment 1 (subjects 
12 and 13). This change was implemented as our preliminary results showed that 
there was large hemodynamic onset when the target was physically removed from 
the image. We reasoned that this may occur because LGN and V1 respond not only 
to stimulus onsets but also to the offsets of stimuli that have been present for long 
intervals. We thus wanted to record data where the target presence was in constant 
fluctuation. As anticipated, this hemodynamic onset was not present when the target 
constantly flickered. The target was 1° visual angle in diameter and appeared at 5.8° 
eccentricity (3° left and 5° above the fixation cross).  
 
 
Figure 4.2.1. Stimulus, retinotopic mapping and target mapping. a) Motion-induced 
blindness stimuli with target in upper left, central fixation cross, and rotating circular array 
of crosses. We ask if we can decode the orientation of the Gabor presented on the target 
during motion-induced blindness. b) From left to right – inflated cortical mesh showing 
retinotopic and target mapping (yellow target region, light green V1, darker green V2v and 
V2d, darkest green V3v and V3d); retinotopic mapping (showing phase-encoded colour 
bands at the boundaries of early visual cortical lines V1, V2, V3); and eccentricity mapping 
(pink fovea, purple periphery, blue far periphery).  
 
4.2.3.3. Procedure 
 
Prior to fMRI participation, subjects completed two runs of a behavioural experiment 
to ensure they perceived the motion-induced blindness illusion (see Chapter 4.1). In 
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each run, they observed two 3 minute blocks of MIB stimuli, each followed by a 
fixation block of 12s. The MIB stimulation was presented at 30cm viewing distance, 
but otherwise had identical parameters to the stimuli used in the fMRI experiments. 
We confirmed that they regularly perceived MIB for over 1 second prior to the fMRI 
experiments.  
 
In two fMRI experiments, we presented visual stimulation via a head-coil-mounted 
mirror which allowed subjects to view stimuli projected to a screen at the end of the 
MRI bore. Visual stimulation was presented using Presentation software 
(Neurobehavioural Systems). In Experiment 1 subjects completed five 8 minute runs. 
During a run subjects viewed two blocks of ‘MIB’ stimuli, each lasting 3 minutes, 
and two blocks of ‘target mapping’ each lasting 12s.  In Experiment 2 subjects 
completed twelve 14 minute runs across three days (4 runs per session). Each run 
contained four blocks of 3 minute ‘MIB’ stimuli, and two blocks of ‘target 
mapping’. ‘Target mapping’ blocks were presented at the beginning and end of each 
run, and consisted of contrast-reversing checkerboards shown for 12s each at the 
same location that the target appeared during MIB stimulation. In both experiments, 
all blocks were preceded and succeeded by 12s of fixation (white fixation cross and 
black screen).  
 
The orientation of the target switched between 45° and 135° four times per block in 
experiment 1 and eight times per block in experiment 2.  Subjects were instructed to 
report the disappearance of the target by holding a right index finger button for the 
duration of disappearance. The task served to draw attention away from the target 
orientation, as we did not want subjects to focus on or notice the changes in 
orientation of the Gabor patch. Task can influence V1 activity, and higher task 
demands can make visual stimulation harder to decode (Woolgar, Williams, & Rich, 
2015). Furthermore, we did not want a subject response to differentiate the oriented 
Gabors presented as tactile stimuli such as button presses can be decoded in visual 
cortex (Liang et al., 2013). The target disappeared from perceptual awareness either 
because subjects perceived motion-induced blindness, or because we removed the 
target. During experiment 1, the target was removed 4 times per MIB block, for an 
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interval of between 5-10s. Subjects were not informed that target removal would 
occur. The targets were never removed in Experiment 2 so target disappearance here 
was always attributed to motion-induced blindness. There were 3 possible resulting 
perceptual conditions for the target: No Target (not present, not visible; Experiment 
1 only), Target (present and visible), and MIB (present, not visible). We required 
subjects to maintain central fixation so the fixation cross changed from white to red 
for 1s, four times during each run. Subjects responded to this colour change with a 
right middle finger button press. 
 
We recorded polar angle and eccentricity retinotopic mapping (Figure 4.2.1.b). We 
used wedge-shaped, phase-encoded polar angle stimuli and radial phase-encoded 
eccentricity stimuli. During polar angle stimulation, a flickering checkerboard wedge 
(0.42 rad) appeared at the right horizontal meridian and rotated counter-clockwise, 
completing 12 full cycles of 360°. Each cycle lasted 28 TRs. During eccentricity 
stimulation, a flickering checkerboard annulus appeared at the centre field and 
moved outwards in eccentricity, for 12 full cycles. Each cycle lasted 64 TRs. 
Retinotopic mapping stimulation was presented using custom-made Matlab code 
(version R2012a, MathWorks, Natick, MA, USA; http://www.mathworks.co.uk). 
Two subjects in experiment 1 and all three subjects in experiment 2 completed 
retinotopic mapping in a separate session to their experimental runs. During the 
retinotopic mapping runs, subjects reported fixation colour changes with a button 
press (right index finger).  
 
4.2.3.4. fMRI Parameters 
 
We measured blood oxygen level-dependent (BOLD) signals using an echo-planar 
imaging sequence on a 3T Siemens Tim Trio scanner with a 32-channel head coil. In 
experiment 1, five runs of 500 volumes were recorded at voxel size of 2×2×2.5mm 
(15 axial slices, TE: 30ms, TR: 1000ms, FA: 62°, FOV: 192mm
2
, inter-slice time: 
66ms, gap thickness: 0.25mm). In experiment 2, twelve runs of 828 volumes were 
recorded at identical parameters. A high-resolution, 192-volume, 3D anatomical scan 
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(T1 ADNI, 1mm
3
 voxel size; TE: 2.96ms, TR: 2300ms, TI: 900ms, FA: 9°, matrix: 
256 x 256) was also recorded for each subject. This T1 is similar to an MPRAGE 
sequence but with sharpened grey/white matter contrast, improving its suitability for 
cortical segmentation (Jack et al., 2008). Polar angle retinotopic mapping (792 
volumes) and eccentricity mapping (536 volumes) were recorded using the same 
parameters. 
 
4.2.3.5. fMRI Pre-Processing 
 
In Brainvoyager QX, anatomical images were normalised to Talairach space. 
Functional data for each subject and run (including retinotopic mapping) were 
corrected for slice time with cubic spline interpolation and were temporally filtered 
(high-pass filter with linear de-trending). The first 2 volumes were skipped to avoid 
saturation effects. Experimental runs were 3D motion-corrected to the first 
functional volume of the first run using trilinear/sinc interpolation then aligned to 
each subject’s T1-weighted structural image and spatially normalized into Talairach 
space (VTCs). Retinotopic mapping runs were separately aligned to the anatomical. 
We examined inter-subject alignment between functional data runs based on 
correlations of pixel intensity in early visual cortex. In experiment 1, the average 
alignment across runs was r=0.9502 and never fell below r=0.9193. In experiment 2, 
the mean alignment score of functional runs across subjects was r=0.9361, with a 
minimum value of r=0.9092. 
 
4.2.3.6. Behavioural Analysis  
 
To characterise each subjects’ illusion perception we calculated the mean length of 
MIB perception in milliseconds per run. For each subject, we extracted the data for 
the condition of MIB, computed the length of time each percept occurred for, 
counted the number of instances of MIB, calculated the mean length within the run, 
and then averaged across runs. We bootstrapped a 95% confidence interval for the 
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group mean length of MIB experience. First we calculated the mean length of MIB 
for each subject, and then sampled the mean of this group 1000 times with 
replacement. The 1000 resulting sample means were sorted. An overall mean and the 
upper and lower values of the 95% confidence interval were calculated. To learn 
how frequently subjects perceived the illusion, we counted the number of MIB 
occurrences for each subject in each run and calculated a mean across runs. We 
bootstrapped (n=1000) a 95% confidence interval for the group mean number of 
MIB experiences in the same manner used to sample the mean length.  Behavioural 
analysis was performed individually per subject prior to scanning to ensure that they 
perceived the illusion. The same analysis was used for behavioural and fMRI 
experiments, using Matlab (R2012a, MathWorks, Natick, MA, USA). 
 
Each fMRI volume was allocated to whichever perceptual state was the dominant 
percept during each TR (i.e. Target, MIB, or No Target). This was accomplished by 
comparing the millisecond-resolution perceptual response data to the 1000ms period 
corresponding to each TR, and allocating the recorded volume to whichever percept 
occupied the majority of that 1000ms (e.g. if the subject perceived the illusion for 
800ms of that TR, the TR was allocated to the illusion condition). In experiment 1, 
three subjects had less than 5 volumes of illusion perception (for an orientation of the 
Gabor patch) and were discarded from further MIB analyses. In Experiment 2 we 
recruited three high-experiencing subjects who reported illusion presence of over 
25% of time in a behavioural experiment prior to scanning. For each subject and run 
we calculated the percentage of volumes within a run that belonged to each 
perceptual state.  
 
4.2.3.7. fMRI Analysis 
 
fMRI Analysis: Univariate 
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General Linear Model (GLM) analysis and data preparation was carried out in 
BrainVoyager QX (Version 2.8.4, Brain Innovation, Maastricht, Netherlands, 
http://www.brainvoyager.com). We used two general linear models (GLM) in the 
univariate analysis. The first GLM modelled the 45° and 135° target MIB stimuli, 
fixation, and mapping blocks for each run and subject. This GLM was used to 
identify voxels that respond to the target (Figure 4.2.1.b). The second multi-subject 
(n=15 in Exp.1., n=3 in exp.2.), multi-run (MSMR) Random Effects (RFX) GLM 
modelled the subjects’ percept: Target, MIB, or No Target-, fixation, and mapping 
blocks. For the flicker paradigm, we used two fixed effects GLMs, one per subject.  
 
fMRI Analysis: Region of interest (ROI)  
 
We defined two regions of interest (ROI) in each subject: motion-sensitive area V5 
in the right hemisphere, and the region of V1 that responded to the target stimulus. 
We located right V5 by comparing BOLD activity during conditions that contained 
the motion field (regardless of target orientation and perceptual experience) against 
the condition of fixation (using a GLM contrast of ‘motion field’ > ‘fixation’). This 
V5 ROI was visually inspected on each subject’s folded cortical mesh to ensure that 
the chosen ROI was on the medial temporal gyrus, posterior to the lower bank of the 
dorsal superior temporal sulcus (consistent with its definition in the literature; 
Tootell et al., 1995; Tootell & Taylor, 1995; Watson et al., 1993; Zeki et al., 1991). 
We identified the region of V1 that responded to the target stimulus (henceforth the 
Target ROI) by measuring increased activity to the target mapping stimulus 
compared to fixation (using a GLM contrast of ‘target mapping > fixation’). Target 
ROIs were visually inspected using the boundaries of early visual cortical areas and 
their eccentricity bands (figure 4.2.1.b), to ensure they were within right peripheral 
ventral V1. See Appendix 4.2. for TAL coordinates and voxel numbers for all ROIs. 
We entered the voxels from V5 and the target ROIs into a Multi-Subject, Multi-Run 
GLM to study the univariate responses to each perceptual condition (Target, MIB, or 
No Target).   
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fMRI Analysis: Multivariate Pattern Classification 
 
In this fMRI study we used linear SVM classification to assess the information about 
the oriented Gabor target contained in the multivariate activation pattern. Linear 
SVM classification is a well-established multivariate analysis method (Haxby et al., 
2001), which is highly popular for use in fMRI. In the region of V1 that responded to 
the target location, for each subject and run, we transformed each voxel’s raw time 
course to percent signal change. The perceptual conditions (Target, MIB, and No 
Target) were used to index volumes corresponding to these conditions from the time 
course, with a time shift to account for the lag in the hemodynamic response 
function. We trained a linear support vector machine (SVM) to learn the multivariate 
activity patterns associated with the presentation of 45° and 135° oriented Gabor 
patches within each perceptual condition. To account for the unequal data available 
for each orientation during each percept (for example during times the target was 
visible, it may have more often been the 45° rather than 135°oriented Gabor), we 
extracted the orientation with the least volumes in that percept (MIB or target 
visible) and run, then randomly sampled an equal subset of volumes from the other 
orientation. Classification between 45° and 135° was performed on this equal subset.  
This was repeated 10 times, providing us with 10 sets of classification results based 
on the iterated comparison datasets of the same size.  
 
Each of the 10 iterated samples was compared to the subset from the other 
orientation. For average trial classification, the classifier was trained to discriminate 
target orientation on the labelled activity patterns from trials in n-1 runs (the training 
dataset), and the resulting model was tested on the average activity patterns of the 
remaining run (the testing dataset which did not contribute to training the classifier). 
For single trial classification, the classifier was trained to discriminate target 
orientation on the labelled activity patterns from n-1 trials available, and the 
resulting model was tested on the remaining trial. This was repeated until each 
possible run, and each possible trial had been the testing dataset. Using this ‘leave-
one-run/trial-out’ method, the classifier is always generalising its learnt 
discrimination of the two orientation conditions to a dataset not used to constructed 
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the discriminant function. Final classification results for average analysis and single 
trial analysis were created by averaging across all the accuracies from train-test 
iterations of that type. The two different types of classification training reflect 
slightly different aspects of the multivariate pattern, which is why both are reported.  
 
An additional control classification was run which trained and tested on target 
mapping stimulation versus oriented Gabor patch (45° orientation), using iterative 
samples to match the number of volumes of the oriented Gabor patch to those of 
mapping stimulation (as this condition always had less volumes). We then completed 
leave-one-run/trial-out classification, as above.  
 
In both fMRI experiments, subjects reported the target to be visible more frequently 
than they reported the target to have disappeared. In experiment 1, subjects perceived 
motion-induced blindness for an average of 16.3 volumes per run (range 3 - 44.6), 
and perceived the target to be visible for an average of 122.3 volumes per run (range 
92.6 – 143.1). The longer experiment 2 had an average 137.2 volumes in which 
subjects reported target disappearance (range 67 - 224) and 222.8 volumes in which 
the target was visible (range 156 – 307). This was a concern, as linear SVM 
classifiers typically show enhanced performance with larger training and testing 
datasets. Thus, if we found that we could not classify during MIB but could classify 
when the target was visible, we would be concerned that this was only an effect of a 
smaller training dataset for MIB not an effect of the perceptual condition. To 
examine the effects of the smaller dataset, we sampled a subset of volumes from the 
‘target visible’ data for each Gabor patch orientation equal to the maximal number of 
volumes available in the condition of MIB. We sampled 10 times per subject and 
across runs, providing us with 10 comparison datasets for each orientation of the 
same size. We could then enter this data into a classifier analysis, repeating the 
orientation discrimination classification as above, and obtaining results for when the 
target was visible but with the training dataset size of the MIB classification. 
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To determine statistical significance at the group level for each classifer (target 
visible, target invisible (MIB), target removed, target visible (restricted dataset)) a 
bootstrapped (n=1000) 95% confidence interval was calculated for each comparison 
by sampling with replacement from individual subject means. This was performed 
across all subjects for a visible target; however 3 subjects were excluded from the 
MIB analysis in experiment 1. Classification during perceptual states (Target, MIB, 
and No Target) was considered significantly above chance if the 95% CI did not 
include 50%. To determine statistical significance at individual subject level, a 
condition-label permutation (n=1000) was performed on classification values for 
each iteration and comparison. P-values were calculated as the probability of 
observing a value as large as the true performance in the distribution of permuted 
observations.   
 
Despite its popularity, classification has several drawbacks as an analysis technique 
for assessing pattern information. Although linear SVM uses distance measures to 
assess which condition the testing dataset belongs to (linear SVM estimates the 
support vectors by maximizing the minimum distance to the boundaries of the 
training examples), the result of classification is a binary value (successful or 
unsuccessful). On each classification, for each set of training and testing data, the 
model either correctly guessed the condition label of the novel dataset or it did not. 
Thus the outcome dataset is an accuracy value (% of attempts correct) based on 
binary not continuous data. Relationships between successful percentages of 
classification are therefore not meaningful. In this study, for example, we cannot 
state whether classification during one perceptual condition performs more highly 
than during another, we can only say whether or not the classifier could decode. 
Other groups have used representational similarity analysis (RSA, Kriegeskorte et 
al., 2008), such as that used in Chapter 3. This method examines activation patterns 
in terms of their similarity, typically using Pearson’s correlations. In RSA, similarity 
can be measured by the percentage of correct pairwise classifications (accuracy), but 
also by Pearson correlational distance, Euclidean distance, and Mahalanobis 
distance. Distances provide advantages over classification accuracy as they are 
continuous data and thus directly comparable. Additionally, they have a meaningful 
zero, allowing researchers to draw conclusions about proportional relationships (for 
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example that activation patterns during condition A are twice as similar as in 
condition B, Kriegeskorte, 2015). Kriegskorte favours Euclidean and Mahalanobis 
distance as the outcome of these analyses is clearer to understand, and is not affected 
by outliers in small datasets as correlation is. Classifiers are additionally subject to 
ceiling and floor effects and run-specific shifts in activation patterns due to 
alignment of fMRI data. 
 
With classifier data it is possible to use the shape of a receiving operator curve 
(ROC), and the empirical area under the curve (eAUC) to determine the success and 
accuracy of the model. ROC curves typically plot model sensitivity against 1-
specificity, or true positive classifications against false positive classifications, whilst 
the classifier discrimination threshold is varied. The area under a curve can be of any 
value between 0 and 1, with higher values describing greater probability of 
successful classification and fit of the classification model. Chance is an AUC of 0.5. 
The initial problem with this is that the binary values that a classifier with two 
choices outputs does not provide false positive rates. As our classifier only ever 
chooses one of two options it cannot falsely positively identify a condition, only 
falsely allocate the activation pattern it to the other condition. Thus, instead the 
classifier can be asked to output distance of each outcome to the model hyperplane 
and this can be transformed into a predicted probability by using a binary logistic 
model (Platt, 1999). Probability can then be plotted for each model of the train/test 
data and area under a probability curve can be examined. eAUC is typically used 
with Linear Discriminant Analysis (LDA) classifiers and often assume a parametric 
distribution. Thus, the analysis is often unsuitable for use with SVM outputs as SVM 
output does not follow a parametric binomial distribution. However, it is possible to 
use non-parametric estimates of eAUC. 
 
4.2.4. Results 
 
4.2.4.1. Behavioural Analysis  
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Experiment 1 
 
The mean length of an MIB experience was 1.3 seconds (bootstrapped 95% 
confidence interval, CI, [1.04 , 1.62s], figure 4.2.2.a.). The mean number of MIB 
experiences per run was 14.68 (95% CI, [10.8, 19.9], figure 4.2.2.b.). Subjects 
experienced the illusion for a bootstrapped mean of 8.5% of run time (95% CI, [6.3, 
11.4], figure 4.2.2.c.) as compared to 67.9% visible time (95% CI, [65, 70.6]) and 
23.4% removed (95% CI, [22.4, 24]).   
 
Experiment 2 
 
The mean length of an MIB experience was 1.9 seconds (bootstrapped 95% 
confidence interval, CI, [1.3 , 2.4], figure 4.2.2.b.). The mean number of MIB 
experiences per run was 159.1 (95% CI, [145.8, 172.5], figure 4.2.2.b.). Subjects 
experienced the illusion for a bootstrapped mean of 38.1% of run time (95% CI, [30, 
46.3], figure 4.2.2.c.) as compared to 61.9% visible time (95% CI, [53.7, 70]).   
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Figure 4.2.2. Behavioural results. Experiment 1: a) Mean length of MIB experience. b) 
Mean number of MIB experiences per run. c) Mean percent of overall time per run spent 
experiencing MIB against other percepts. Experiment 2: d) Mean length of MIB experience. 
e) Mean number of MIB experiences per run. f) Mean percent of overall time per run spent 
experiencing MIB against other percepts. In all cases circles represent single subjects and 
bars indicate bootstrapped (n=1000) 95% confidence interval.  
 
4.2.4.2. ROI GLM Analysis 
 
Experiment 1 
 
In the group of 15 subjects who were presented with the static target, we investigated 
if BOLD activity in the region of V1 responding to the target differed across the 
perceptual conditions. We found no univariate difference in the Target ROI between 
perceptual experiences (MIB vs. Target, t(RFX)=0.233, p=0.8; MIB vs. No Target, 
t(RFX)= 0.69, p=0.5; Visible vs. No Target, t(RFX)=1.26, p= 0.23). V5 was 
significantly more activated when subjects perceived motion-induced blindness than 
when the target was visible (t(RFX)= 2.32, p=0.038). Additionally in V5, activation 
during MIB and when the target was visible was significantly greater than when the 
target was removed (t(RFX)=5.564, p=0.00012; t(RFX)=5.179, p=0.0002 
respectively).   
 
Two subjects were presented with a flickering target to more accurately replicate 
Schölvinck and Rees (2010). In the V1Target ROIs there were no significant 
differences between visible target and MIB activation (S1 t(FFX)=0.5, p=0.61; S2 
t(FFX)=0.24, p=0.81). One of these subjects showed no significant activation 
differences between conditions in V1Target (Visible vs No Target t(FFX)=1.13, 
p=0.26; MIB vs No Target t(FFX)=0.73, p=0.47). In the other subject, V1Target was 
significantly more activated during MIB (t(FFX)=3.79, p=0.00015) and when the 
target was visible (t(FFX)=12.43, p<0.000001) than when the target was removed. In 
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the V5 ROIs there were no significant differences between visible target and MIB 
activation (S1 t(FFX)=0.07, p=0.94; S2 t(FFX)=1.34, p=0.18). For both subjects V5 
was significantly more activated when the target was visible (S1 t(FFX)=2.5, 
p<0.01; S2 t(FFX)=17.1, p<0.000001) than when the target was removed. For the 
second subject V5 was also more activated during MIB than when the target was 
removed (S1 t(FFX)=0.4, p=0.69; S2 t(FFX)=6.93, p<0.000001). 
 
Experiment 2 
 
No univariate difference was found between perceptual experiences in V1Target 
(MIB vs. Target, t(RFX)=0.198, p=0.96) or in V5 (t(RFX)= -0.065, p=0.95). In 2/3 
individual subjects MIB produced significantly less signal in V5 than visible targets 
(S1 t(FFX)= 13.4, p<0.00001; S3 t(FFX)= 7.4, p<0.00001), and 1/3 subjects had 
more signal for MIB (S2 t(FFX)= 12.1, p<0.00001). In V1 Target 2/3 individual 
subjects showed significantly more activation for MIB than visible targets (S2 
t(FFX)= 10.1, p<0.00001; S3 t(FFX)= 6.5, p<0.00001), and the opposite was true in 
1/3 subjects (S1 t(FFX)= 20.3, p<0.00001). 
 
There is a notable difference in activation between the two experiments. In the target 
region of V1, no group analysis found a significant difference between activation 
when the target was visible and activation during MIB. However, the activation is 
descriptively higher for MIB in experiment 1 and for visible targets in experiment 2. 
In V5 in experiment 1 there is significantly higher activation during MIB than when 
the target is visible. In experiment 2 there is no significant difference and the 
descriptive beta weights for the two conditions are reversed. More interestingly, the 
activation for all conditions in the target region of V1 is lower in experiment 2 than 
experiment 1, but the activation for all conditions in V5 is higher in experiment 2. 
The stimuli were identical in both experiments, but experiment 2 had longer runs 
with additional stimulation blocks. We would expect this to improve the estimation 
model for beta weights. We would also expect increased repetitions to reduce 
activation due to adaptation. However, subjects recruited for experiment 2 were all 
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highly experienced fMRI participants and therefore may have superior attention, 
upregulating their BOLD activation. 
  
Figure 4.2.3. GLM results in our ROIs. a) Experiment 1: Univariate response in V1 Target 
space and V5 to each perceptual state (Target, MIB, No Target) during motion-induced 
blindness stimuli. Horizontal striped bars show each subject’s result for the ‘flicker 
paradigm’. b) Experiment 2: Univariate response in V1 Target and V5 to each perceptual 
state (Target, MIB) during motion-induced blindness stimuli. In both cases stars indicate 
significant differences as determined by testing contrasts in Linear GLM. Black vertical 
lines indicate standard error of the beta means. 
 
4.2.4.3. Multivariate Pattern Classification 
 
Classification aimed to decode whether the 45° or 135° oriented Gabor patch target 
was presented during perceptual conditions of MIB, Target and No Target. This was 
conducted by training and testing the classifier either on averaged patterns of activity 
for a whole run of each orientation (average or AVG classification analysis) or by 
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training and testing the classifier on single trial patterns of activity for each 
orientation (single trial or ST).  
 
Experiment 1 
 
We could decode target orientation in at least one analysis when the target was 
visible to subjects in 12 of 18 subjects (bootstrapped mean accuracies when using 
single trial and average analyses were 53.3% and 70.9% respectively; Figure 4.2.4.a. 
shows single subjects data in blue- only those with MIB decoding). However, during 
MIB, we were only able to decode target orientation in 2 of 15 subjects 
(bootstrapped mean accuracies when using single trial and average accuracies were 
51.3% and 57.2% respectively, Figure 4.2.4.a shows single subject data in green), 
although the targets remained onscreen. At the group level, we could decode 
orientation when the targets were visible (Group 95% CI [52.1 , 54.5] for single trial 
analyses and 95% CI [64.1 , 77.2] for the average, Figure 4.2.4.b.). Again, we could 
decode orientation at the group level during motion-induced blindness in only one 
analysis (Group 95% CI [48,54.9] for single trial, and 95% CI [51.7, 62.2] for 
average, Figure 4.2.4.b).  
 
We conducted three control analyses. To check that we were decoding target 
information, we ascertained that we could not decode when there was no target (see 
Figure 4.2.4.b mean 50.1% ST, Group 95% CI [48.4, 51.7], 49.1% AVG, Group 
95% CI [43.7 , 53.9]; we can significantly decode in 1/16 individual subjects, on ST 
only). We also tested a classification that should decode easily- asking the classifier 
to decode between the target and the checkerboard mapping condition (bootstrapped 
mean 71.2% ST, Group 95% CI [68.7 , 73.8], 97.3% AVG, Group 95% CI [95.7 , 
98.8]; we can significantly decode in 18/18 individual subjects in both analyses; not 
shown on graph). 
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Our third control analysis was to decode visible target orientation when we restricted 
train and test volumes to the number of volumes used to decode during MIB. This 
was crucial to ensure that our effects (able to decode when the target was visible but 
not during MIB) were not merely due to the restricted number of train and test 
volumes during MIB compared to when the target was visible. With these data 
restrictions we were able to decode the target orientation when the target was visible 
at the group level (bootstrapped mean 51.6 % ST, Group 95% CI [50.5 , 52.7], and 
57.9% AVG, Group 95% CI [53.9 , 61.6]; Figure 4.2.6.a). However we could not 
decode the orientation in any single subject (0/18 subjects significant; Figure 
4.2.6.a). We therefore could not truly ascertain whether the disrupted decoding 
observed during MIB is an effect of the illusion or of reduced train and test volumes.  
Experiment 2 aimed to solve this concern.  
 
 
Figure 4.2.4. Multivariate classification results decoding 45° vs 135° Gabor patch 
orientation for Experiment 1. a) Single subject classification results when the target was 
visible (blue bars) and during MIB (green) demonstrate that we can decode orientation in 
most subjects when the target was visible to them but not when it was perceptually invisible. 
Vertical black lines indicate standard error of the single subject means. b) Group mean 
classification results when the target was visible (blue), during MIB (green), and when the 
target was physically removed (purple) demonstrate that at the group level we can decode 
orientation when the target was visible to subjects, when it was perceptually invisible, but 
cannot decode when it was physically removed from the image. Vertical lines indicate 95% 
bootstrapped (n=1000) confidence intervals on the group means. Horizontal lines indicate 
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standard error of the group means. In both graphs) Chance classification performance is 0.5. 
Light colours indicate single trial classification method; dark colours indicate average 
classification method.  Stars indicate single subject p-value * p< 0.05 ** p<0.01 *** 
p<0.005.  
 
Experiment 2 
 
In all three subjects we could decode target orientation when the target was visible 
(Figure 4.2.5., blue bars). Mean classification accuracy was 52.6% using single trial 
analysis (single subjects: 51.8%, p=0.023; 54.5%, p=0.006; 51.6%, p=0.027) and 
81.3% using average trials (single subjects: 74.2%, p=0.016; 95.8%, p=0.010; 
73.8%, p=0.019). In contrast, decoding was disrupted during MIB although the 
targets remained onscreen. Mean classification accuracy was 50.8% using single trial 
(single subjects: 50.4%, p=0.30; 50.6%, p=0.32; 51.3%, p=0.12) and 63.1% using 
average trials (67.5%, p=0.037; 61.7%, p=0.16; 60%, p=0.15). We were able to 
decode target orientation in 1 of 3 subjects, only using average trial decoding (Figure 
4.2.5., green bars). As a control we could easily classify between the target 
checkerboard mapping condition and a present target with mean 83% ST (85.1%, 
p=0.006; 85.5%, p=0.004; 78.3%, p=0.006) and 99.7% AVG (100%, p=0.01; 100%, 
p=0.01; 99.2%, p=0.008). We can significantly decode in 3/3 individual subjects in 
all cases. 
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Figure 4.2.5. Multivariate classification results decoding 45° vs 135° Gabor patch 
orientation for Experiment 2. Single subject classification results when the target was 
visible (blue bars) and during MIB (green) demonstrate that for all subjects we can decode 
the orientation when the target was visible, however we could only decode when the target 
was perceptually invisible in one subject. Vertical lines indicate standard error of the single 
subject means. Chance classification performance is 0.5. Light colours indicate single block 
classification method; dark colours indicate average classification method. Stars indicate 
single subject p-value * p< 0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.005.  
 
Lastly, we ensured that visible target orientation could still be decoded when we 
restricted the train and test volumes to the number used to decode during MIB. We 
were able to significantly decode the visible target orientation. Mean accuracies 
when using single trial and average analyses were 52.6% (52.1%, p=0.012; 53.9%, 
p=0.003; 51.8%, p=0.033), and 75.7% (70.8%, p=0.037; 86.3%, p=0.006; 70%, 
p=0.053) respectively (see Figure 4.2.6.b.). 
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Figure 4.2.6. Control analysis equating volumes. Multivariate classification results 
decoding 45° vs 135° Gabor patch orientation when the target was visible. Analysis used 
only the number of volumes available for MIB decoding. a) In experiment 1- decoding is not 
possible in single subjects when only the number of volumes used for MIB classification is 
allowed. b) In experiment 2 classification is possible in single subjects using only the 
number of volumes available for MIB decoding. In both graphs) Vertical lines indicate 
standard error of the single subject means. Light colours indicate single trial analysis, dark 
colours indicate averaged analysis. Stars indicate single p-value * p< 0.05 ** p<0.01 *** 
p<0.005.  
 
4.2.5. Discussion 
 
Previously it was unclear whether targets were represented in V1 during perceptual 
blindness. We provide evidence that changes in conscious perception during a 
bistable visual illusion are paired with changes in the stimulus representation at the 
level of V1, in the absence of any change in the feedforward visual input. Using 
fMRI, we recorded subjects viewing MIB stimuli with targets which had orientation 
properties. We examined the representation of this feedforward target orientation 
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during perceived target visibility and invisibility.  Our findings confirm that the 
target representation in early visual cortex is distorted when the target becomes 
invisible through motion-induced blindness, but not when the target remains visible.  
 
Cortical Feedback during Motion-Induced Blindness 
 
We propose that target representation during motion-induced blindness is distorted 
through cortical feedback from V5, as opposed to purely through lateral 
connectivity. Cortical feedback from diverse extrastriate areas is implicated in other 
illusions where effects are observed at the level of V1 (Fang, Boyaci, Kersten, & 
Murray, 2008; Jancke et al., 2004; Kok et al., 2014; Muckli et al., 2005; Murray, 
Boyaci, & Kersten, 2006). Extrastriate visual motion area MT/V5 is a likely 
candidate region for feedback to V1 during MIB- it is important in determining a 
global motion percept (Muckli et al., 2005), and is a causal feedback pathway in 
other motion illusions such as apparent motion (Akselrod et al., 2014; Chong et al., 
2015; Muckli et al., 2005; Muckli et al., 2002; Sterzer et al., 2006; Vetter et al., 
2013; Wibral et al., 2009). V5 neuron receptive fields span dimensions far greater 
than the separation of our target and field stimuli, and back-projections from this 
region span the same dimensions or further, allowing V5 feedback to affect a wide 
region of early visual cortex (Stettler, Das, Bennett, & Gilbert, 2002). Crucially, V5 
feedback is capable of ‘filling-in’ responses in V1, spurring V1 activation with 
particular features (Muckli et al., 2005). This includes information with specific 
temporal and orientation features (Chong et al., 2015). These properties would allow 
such feedback to ‘fill in’ information about the motion field in to V1, across the 
same space as the target representation, overwriting the feedforward signal.  
 
We find increased activation in V5 during MIB in comparison to when the target is 
visible (also observed by Schölvinck & Rees, 2010). Nuruki, Oliver, Campana, 
Walsh, and Rothwell (2013)found that disrupting V5 using theta burst TMS 
stimulation reduces the frequency and duration of target disappearances; supporting 
a top-down role of V5 in inducing MIB. These findings are consistent with Donner 
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et al’s (2008) results and accompanying proposal that top-down influence from 
ventral stream representations of the motion field cause target disappearance, whilst 
influence from target representations in the dorsal stream enable visibility. 
Additionally, Sterzer, Kleinschmidt, and Rees (2009) propose that MIB arises as the 
result of top-down feedback which dictates the ‘winning’ percept between the field 
and target, and supresses feedforward information which is inconsistent with this 
percept. In this conceptualisation, top-down communication determines the 
perceptual outcome but also has neural effects in early visual cortex consistent with 
our observations. Previous neurophysiological results demonstrate that the presence 
of a motion field reduces neural responses to the physical removal and reinstatement 
of a target in macaque V1 (Libedinsky, Savage, & Livingstone, 2009). The authors 
propose that weakening of the bottom-up target response increases noise in the 
feedforward signal and therefore better enables disappearance to be imposed in a 
top-down manner. We demonstrate distortion of a still-present feedforward 
orientation stimulus during perceptual invisibility in MIB. We therefore support the 
proposition that MIB and other bistable percepts are driven by cortical competition 
between the neural representations of the static target and the moving mask at 
multiple levels of cortical visual processing (Blake & Logothetis, 2002; Bonneh et 
al., 2001; Donner et al., 2008; Graf et al., 2002). 
 
Low level Mechanisms Cannot Adequately Explain MIB 
 
Several investigations have suggested that target overwriting could occur entirely 
within early visual cortex through boundary or contrast adaptation (Hsu et al., 2004, 
2006), or surface completion (Graf et al., 2002). Whilst MIB is subject to boundary 
adaptation and depth ordering, and occurs more at increasing eccentricities from 
fixation (Graf et al., 2002; Martinez-Conde, Macknik, Troncoso, & Dyar, 2006), 
MIB demonstrates some important behaviours which make low level overwriting an 
insufficient explanation (Hsu et al., 2006). MIB is perceived for greater percentages 
of time with higher contrast and higher saliency targets, whilst adaptations like 
perceptual fading occur predominantly at low contrast (Bonneh et al., 2001; Hsu et 
al., 2004). MIB persists with the target as close as 1° from central fixation, and MIB 
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targets protected by static masks do not disappear (Bonneh et al., 2001). Motion 
fields therefore appear to be necessary for MIB, whilst not necessary for boundary or 
contrast adaptation, or for surface completion (Graf et al., 2002). Additionally, MIB 
can occur with targets which slowly move, even across into the other visual 
hemifield (Bonneh et al., 2001). Thus the mechanism that causes MIB cannot be 
solely local. Multiple MIB targets disappear separately, or in a grouped manner 
depending on their higher-level properties- adaptations would predict that all targets 
disappear similarly (Bonneh et al., 2001). MIB also still occurs when the target is 
placed in front of the motion field, suggesting that surface completion alone is 
inadequate in explaining the effect (Graf et al., 2002). Hsieh and Peter (2009) 
demonstrated that microsaccades increase prior to target reappearance and decrease 
before disappearance, suggesting that MIB disappearance was an effect of adaptation 
and explainable solely by low level visual processes. However, Bonneh et al. (2010) 
demonstrated that microsaccadic change actually occurs in response to perceptual 
change during MIB, supported by a literature that demonstrates microsaccade rate 
and direction modulation in response to sensory and cognitive events (Engbert, 
2006; Rolfs, 2009).  
 
Motion-induced blindness can also be induced using illusory figure motion fields, 
therefore without any real feedforward stimulus (Graf et al., 2002). In this case 
lateral connectivity within V1 would contain no feedforward motion field 
information in the absence of feedback about the illusory figure (Kok et al., 2016; 
Kok & de Lange, 2014). Whilst it is still possible that our effects are partially driven 
by long-range lateral connections (Stettler et al., 2002), low level processing fails to 
provide a comprehensive explanation for the target distortion we observe. 
Furthermore, interactions of lateral connections are themselves driven partially by 
feedback (Ramalingam, McManus, Li, & Gilbert, 2013).  
 
Retained Target Representations 
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We demonstrate distorted target representation in V1 in the majority of subjects 
during MIB; however we find that target orientation information is retained in a few 
subjects. Additionally, behavioural evidence suggests that target representation is 
preserved (Hofstoetter et al., 2004; Meital-Kfir, Bonneh, & Sagi, 2015; Mitroff & 
Scholl, 2005; Montaser-Kouhsari et al., 2004). Preserved target properties during 
invisibility suggest that MIB originates in extrastriate, not early, visual cortex. 
Cortical layer specificity may clarify why some preservation of target representation 
is seen in our, and others’, data. The neocortex is sub-divided into six horizontal 
layers, which are distinct in their anatomy and connections to other sites. Feedback, 
feedforward, and lateral connections terminate in distinct layers of early visual 
cortex (Larkum, 2013; Markov et al., 2014; Sillito, Cudeiro, & Jones, 2006). 
Feedforward information is delivered to the mid-layers (Felleman & Van Essen, 
1991). As feedforward information is always present during MIB stimulation, mid-
layer representation of the target should be consistently present. Feedback terminates 
in the superficial (Muckli et al., 2015; Rockland & Pandya, 1979) and potentially in 
the deepest layers of V1 (Kok et al., 2016; Rockland & Pandya, 1979; Self et al., 
2013). Feedback may terminate in deep layers when feedforward information is 
present and in superficial layers when it is not (Kok et al., 2016). Alternatively, long-
range feedback from distal origins may arrive in deep layers (Markov et al., 2013). 
We hypothesise that fed-back motion field information may be therefore present in 
superficial and/or deep cortical layers during MIB, disrupting decoding of the target 
representation. During target visibility these obscuring signals are not present. Our 
proposal therefore allows for a retained target representation in some cortical layers 
whilst other layers represent the motion field through feedback.  Furthermore, the 
BOLD signal we recorded in 3T fMRI reflects the contribution of all cortical layers 
and thus our data will reflect both feedback and the preserved feedforward 
information in mid-layers (Uludağ, Müller-Bierl, & Uğurbil, 2009). Studies of 
motion-induced blindness using high-field fMRI would allow layer separation and 
permit us to clarify whether orientation representation is preserved in mid-layers 
during MIB.  
 
V1 Activity Correlates with Perception 
4.2. STIMULUS REPRESENTATIONS IN V1 FLUCTUATE WITH PERCEPTUAL VISIBILITY 
DURING MOTION-INDUCED BLINDNESS 
136 
 
 
Our results contribute to a growing body of literature demonstrating that activity in 
early visual cortex can reflect conscious perception, as opposed to passively 
representing  feedforward visual input (Rees, 2013; Rees, Kreiman, & Koch, 2002; 
Tong, 2003). In our paradigm we observe disruption of the target representation in 
V1 when it is invisible, despite ongoing feedforward stimulation. Activity in early 
visual cortical areas varies with perceptual awareness during other bistable percepts, 
for example in binocular rivalry (Lee, Blake, & Heeger, 2007; Polonsky, Blake, 
Braun, & Heeger, 2000; Tong, 2003; Tong & Engel, 2001), during figure/ground 
segregation (Lamme, 2003; Super, Spekreijse, & Lamme, 2003; Supèr, Spekreijse, 
& Lamme, 2001; Supèr, van der Togt, Spekreijse, & Lamme, 2003), and in the line-
motion illusion (Jancke et al., 2004). However these changes in early visual cortex 
almost certainly occur in concert with feedback effects from higher level areas which 
may dictate the percept (Muckli et al., 2002; Murray et al., 2002; Sterzer, Russ, 
Preibisch, & Kleinschmidt, 2002). Crucially, several prominent theorists suggest that 
interactions between feedback and feedforward information dictate what reaches 
consciousness (Bachmann, 2015; Lamme, 2014; Rees, 2013) as fluctuations in early 
visual cortical areas can occur without accompanying perceptual change (Rees, 
2013). Therefore in motion-induced blindness the fluctuation in feedforward 
stimulus representation may interact with alternating top-down representations of the 
motion field or target (Donner et al., 2008) to produce either target visibility or 
illusory blindness.  
 
4.2.6. Conclusion 
 
In conclusion, we present evidence that the cortical representation of the target is 
disrupted when the target is invisible during motion-induced blindness. Despite 
ongoing feedforward target input this disruption is apparent at the level of V1. 
Internal processing related to an illusory state therefore disturbs the feedforward 
processing of target properties. Our data additionally demonstrates a further link 
between V1 representation and resulting perception. We suggest that the observed 
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low level distortion occurs through cortical feedback from extrastriate visual area 
V5. We propose that top-down motion field information from V5 overwrites 
feedforward target processing in V1, in line with propositions that top-down cortical 
competition drives motion-induced blindness and other bistable percepts.
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5.1. Abstract 
 
The flashed face distortion (FFD, Tangen et al., 2011) is a new illusion in which faces 
presented briefly and sequentially in the visual periphery appear monstrously distorted. In 
this study, two experiments explored parameters of FFD which have yet to be systematically 
investigated: the effect of presentation timing on perceived distortion, and the reliance of the 
FFD effect on face-specific processing mechanisms. In the first experiment, subjects rated the 
magnitude of perceived distortion across different presentation durations and race of face 
stimuli (Western Caucasian, WC; Eastern Asian, EA). In the second experiment two groups 
of subjects (WC, EA) were required to judge on which side of the visual field the distortion 
was greater. Contrary to previous studies, the results of both experiments suggest that FFD is 
not strongly affected by the timing of successive stimuli presentations. Beyond this, 
perceived distortions did not vary as a function of subject/stimulus race, or visual field, 
indicating that the FFD illusion may not be mediated by face-specific mechanisms. We 
propose that the illusion is the result of a domain-general predictive network that compares 
successive objects when they rapidly replace one another in the same retinotopic space, 
emphasizing differences between successive stimuli.  
 
5.2. Introduction 
 
The human visual system has developed to rapidly form representations of the external 
sensory world. Adaptive behaviour relies on our ability to integrate novel incoming 
information to update these sensory representations and perceive our changing environment. 
Visual illusions can be utilized to study the mechanisms underlying this adaptive process, as 
they exploit the difference between perceived and actual visual stimulation. For example, 
during apparent motion observers perceive motion when individual stimuli are presented 
briefly at rapidly alternating locations. Illusions have been suggested to reflect the outcome of 
a constructive cortical system which perceives the most likely stimuli based on the sensory 
input it receives (Weiss et al., 2002). In the case of motion illusions, quick alternating inputs 
at two locations are most likely the effect of an item moving between two locations, and thus 
this is perceived.  
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One prominent explanatory model of visual perception, Predictive Coding theory (Clark, 
2013; Friston, 2010; Lee & Mumford, 2003; Rao & Ballard, 1999) is founded in the idea of 
constructive perception. It posits that our brains form predictions about the sensory 
environment based on complex internal models. Such internal models are fed back down the 
cortical hierarchy, all the way to early sensory areas. Relative to the initially formed 
representation, differences in the actual incoming feedforward stimulation can be considered 
as ‘violations’ of expectations. These so-called prediction errors signal the need for an 
updated representation, and are fed forward up the hierarchy to inform higher models 
(Friston, 2010; Muckli & Petro, 2013). Representations are therefore continuously updated 
following comparison with new visual input (Friston, 2010). Feedback enables integration of 
these representations across greater distances of the visual field, and allows feedforward 
visual information to be combined with information from higher visual and non-visual 
cortical areas (Muckli & Petro, 2013). 
 
Illusions are of particular interest in studying predictive feedback within the visual system, as 
they provide a unique opportunity to dissociate perceived (a combination of feedforward and 
feedback information) and actual (feedforward) stimulation. In this manner we can also 
examine the confluence of feedback and feedforward effects, as compared to purely 
feedforward effects. The aforementioned perception of apparent motion is considered to 
demonstrate the role of predictive coding as a general mechanism involved in perceptual 
processing. Under this conceptualization, prediction error arises due to the lack of 
feedforward stimulation in the parts of visual cortical space in which apparent motion is 
subjectively perceived. Motion feedback from V5 activates that space and thus reduces the 
prediction error (Muckli et al., 2005; Vetter et al., 2013; Wibral et al., 2009). Predictive 
coding is also implicated in other illusory phenomena. Murray et al. (2006) established that 
retinotopic maps of proximally and distally located objects in V1 represent perceived, as 
opposed to veridical size in the visual field. Objects perceived to be further away were 
represented by larger proportions of V1 and V2 than the same objects perceived more 
closely, despite V1 and V2 typically representing the veridical size of an object in the 
retinotopic visual field. In the hollow mask illusion (Gregory, 1997; Króliczak, Heard, 
Goodale, & Gregory, 2006) strong prior expectations dictate that faces should be convex, 
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based on experience with human faces. These priors force viewers to always perceive the 
face as convex (Dima et al., 2009). 
 
Recently, Tangen et al. (2011) reported the ‘Flashed Face Distortion’ (FFD) illusion. In this 
visual illusion faces presented rapidly in the visual periphery are perceived as monstrously 
distorted. The faces observed were eye-aligned Slavic faces, which were reported to become 
highly distorted after approximately one minute. The authors suggested that, “Relative 
encoding seems to drive the effect. That is, forcing the observer to encode each face in light 
of the others” (Tangen et al., 2011, p. 628). As the authors’ aim was to describe a novel 
illusion, only few experimental details and no analyses were provided. Since this seminal 
report, only one other study has further investigated FFD (Wen & Kung, 2014). Focusing on 
the relationship between perceived distortion and neural activation within early visual cortex 
and two posterior face-preferential regions (occipital and fusiform face area, OFA and FFA), 
Wen and Kung (2014) reported that activation within these regions positively correlated with 
perceived distortion. 
 
Given the scarcity of investigations of FFD, a number of questions remain unanswered. First, 
both Tangen et al. (2011) and Wen and Kung (2014) posit a relationship between the degree 
of perceived distortion and the timing at which faces are presented. Tangen et al. (2011) 
stated that a timing of 200-250ms per face presented was optimal, whilst Wen and Kung 
(2014) reported that 200-500ms was optimal, and Utz and Carbon (2015) reported 
preliminary results suggesting that the illusion decays at a presentation time of 100ms 
compared to 250ms. As the timing parameter was not varied parametrically in any study, the 
precise temporal limits of FFD remain currently unspecified. 
 
A second question concerns the degree to which FFD relies on general object perception 
mechanisms, or those specific to faces. As mentioned above, Wen and Kung (2014) 
addressed the involvement of face-preferential areas in the FFD illusion. Given the use of 
faces as stimuli, at the surface the involvement of such regions may seem plausible. 
However, if the FFD effect arises due to a domain-general process, their approach and 
resulting conclusions may not be ideal. Tangen et al. (2011) reported that FFD is readily 
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perceived when stimuli are presented upright or inverted (although see Utz & Carbon, 2015, 
who suggest inversion lessens the illusion). In face processing literature, the dependency on 
canonical (i.e., upright) stimulus presentation is an indicator of the involvement of a face-
specific mechanism—holistic processing (for reviews see Rossion, 2008, 2009). For instance, 
humans’ ability to process facial information relevant for processing of identity is highly 
orientation-dependent, i.e., is reduced by stimulus inversion (Barton, Keenan, & Bass, 2001; 
Busigny & Rossion, 2010; Crookes & Hayward, 2012; Goffaux & Dakin, 2010; Pachai, 
Sekuler, & Bennett, 2013; Ramon, 2015; Sekunova & Barton, 2008; Tanaka & Gordon, 
2011; Van Belle, De Graef, Verfaillie, Rossion, & Lefèvre, 2010; Yin, 1969). In stark 
contrast, processing of non-face objects of comparable inter-stimulus similarity is 
significantly less affected by changes in orientation (Haxby et al., 1999; Valentine, 1988). 
 
We believe that the FFD illusion may represent a powerful tool to study the aforementioned 
predictive coding model on a behavioural and neural level. Under the assumptions of this 
theoretical model, FFD arises as internal representations of face stimuli are formed and 
compared to the continuously changing visual information as the stimuli are replaced by 
other faces. Given the likely atypical frequency with which different identities are perceived 
in the same retinotopic location, prediction error arises where there are comparative 
deviations between individual faces. These deviations are emphasized retinotopically by error 
signals and the internal model is updated with the details of the new face. Emphasis by 
retinotopically specific error is consistent with increases in activation observed by Wen and 
Kung (2014). This account of the illusion does not require the stimuli to be face-specific, as 
similar prediction error should occur for objects that occur in the same visual space. 
 
We reasoned that prior to determining the neural correlates of FFD, the questions regarding 
time-dependency and face-specificity should first be systematically addressed. While the 
former can be tested through variations of presentation timing parameters, the question of 
face-specificity can be addressed in different ways. One approach is to test subjects’ 
performance for faces and non-face objects under the same task constraints, (Hershler, Golan, 
Bentin, & Hochstein, 2010; McKone & Robbins, 2011; Rezlescu, Barton, Pitcher, & 
Duchaine, 2014; Sun et al., 2012). However, we suggest that for non-face objects it would be 
challenging—if not impossible—to elicit subjective impressions of grotesqueness (see 
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discussion). An alternative approach, adopted here, involves designing an experimental 
paradigm which incorporates well-established markers of face-specific processing 
mechanisms. In the present study we implemented two aspects to address face-specificity: 
race processing and visual field presentation. 
 
Firstly, we used face stimuli derived from the same, or a different ethnic background relative 
to the observers’. Previous research suggests that the perceptual illusion that other-race faces 
‘all […] look alike’ (Anthony, Copper, & Mullen, 1992; Feingold, 1914; Hugenberg, Young, 
Sacco, & Bernstein, 2011; Malpass & Kravitz, 1969; Tanaka, Kiefer, & Bukach, 2004) is 
related to less efficient engagement of face-specific mechanisms for other-race faces (Michel, 
Corneille, & Rossion, 2007; Michel, Rossion, Han, Chung, & Caldara, 2006; Valentine, 
1991; Vizioli, Rousselet, & Caldara, 2010). Therefore, we reasoned that, if FFD relies on 
face-specific mechanisms, it should be more pronounced for same, as compared to other-race 
faces. Secondly, we varied the location at which same- and other-race faces were presented. 
Previous research suggests that perceptual processing of faces is associated with left visual 
field (LVF) superiority (Ellis & Young, 1983; Levine, Banich, & Koch-Weser, 1988; Levy, 
Heller, Banich, & Burton, 1983; Rhodes, 1985; Sergent & Bindra, 1981; Yovel, Levy, 
Grabowecky, & Paller, 2003). We reasoned that face-specificity of FFD should therefore 
manifest in terms of more pronounced perceived grotesqueness for faces presented within the 
LVF. 
 
To summarize, in the present study we sought to determine the temporal boundaries of the 
FFD illusion, as well as its face-specificity. To this end we parametrically varied the 
frequency with which face stimuli were replaced by the next face. Moreover, we used faces 
of same- and other-race individuals presented to groups of observers from two different 
ethnic backgrounds (Western Caucasian, WC; Eastern Asian, EA
1
). Varying the duration of 
stimulus presentation, as well as stimulus race across visual fields, subjects indicated where 
faces were perceived as most grotesque. If face-specific mechanism(s) are at play, the 
observed FFD should be most pronounced for same-race faces presented at short durations 
                                                          
1
 Here, ‘Western Caucasian’ refers to white European subjects, while ‘Eastern Asian’ refers 
to subjects from the eastern subregion of the Asian continent (China, Macau, Japan, North 
Korea, South Korea, Mongolia, and Taiwan). 
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within the left visual field. Our findings indicate, however, that neither of these variables was 
associated with differences in perceived distortion magnitude, supporting the idea that a 
domain-general predictive coding account may best explain the FFD effect. 
 
5.3. Method 
 
5.3.1. Participants 
 
Subjects with normal or corrected-to-normal vision were recruited through the University of 
Glasgow. All subjects received course credit or financial compensation for participation. 
Three independent groups of subjects were tested: the first (n=10, 7 female, mean age: 22.6 
years, 9 right-handed) completed the first experiment. Two further groups of subjects from 
different ethnic backgrounds completed the second experiment (WC: n=15, 8 female, mean 
age: 21.7 years, 14 right-handed; EA: n=15, 8 female, mean age: 22.6 years, 15 right-
handed). Subjects participated in only one of the experiments. 
 
5.3.2. Stimuli 
 
The stimuli used had been created for a previous study (Ramon et al., 2016), and contained 
individual identities belonging to two ethnic groups. Each stimulus set (WC, EA) consisted of 
faces of 25 young males and 25 young females (100 total identities). The stimuli represented 
full frontal 2D images rendered from 3D face models captured with 3D Studio Max 
(http://www.autodesk.co.uk/, 2008). The images were devoid of non-facial and external cues 
and were aligned for bilateral pupil position and mouth centre (warped so that all 3 landmarks 
were at the same position in subjects’ visual field for every face). Sequences of stimuli were 
presented peripherally, offset by 5° of visual angle to either side of a central fixation cross 
(distance from fixation to the centre of the stimulus: 8° of visual angle). Face stimuli 
comprised 6° and 9° of visual angle in width and height, respectively. Figure 5.1.a illustrates 
examples of stimuli presented (consent for publication obtained for individuals depicted); 
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Figure 5.1.b illustrates the predicted observation of larger FFD under the assumption that the 
illusion reflects a face-specific mechanism. 
 
Figure 5.1. Experimental procedure and expected results. a. Examples of stimuli presented 
bilaterally to a central fixation. The number of faces presented per second was varied parametrically 
(see Methods). b. Expected outcome if FFD is face-specific: Perceived distortion and proportional 
distortion difference score (distortion score/total possible distortion score; for own-for other) should 
be greater for same- than for other-race faces (Experiment 1). Own-race faces should be perceived as 
more distorted than other-race faces in a forced choice decision paradigm, and thus proportional own-
race choice (# of own race-choices/# of possible own-race choices) should be above 0.5 (Experiment 
2). 
 
5.3.3. Procedure 
 
Prior to participation all subjects provided informed written consent. All subjects were tested 
on the same desktop computer screen (1920x1080 resolution); viewing distance (60cm) was 
kept constant using a chin rest. Subjects were instructed to maintain fixation and respond 
according to the instructions as provided by the experimenter. 
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Experiment 1. The first experiment served to establish whether timing had a significant effect 
on the perceived distortion of either own-race, or other-race face stimuli. The variables of 
interest in this experiment were presentation duration, and stimulus race. Subjects were 
presented with sets of faces displaying the same race across visual fields (WC/WC or 
EA/EA); presentation order for the 50 identities per race was randomised. Subjects saw 4 
blocks of the experimental stimuli, with 16 trials per block and a break in between each 
block. Trials lasted between 6.25 and 25s depending on presentation timing of face stimuli 
(250ms, 500ms, 750ms, or 1000ms duration before replacement with next face). Each 
timing/stimulus race pairing was presented 8 times, in randomized order. Following each 
trial, subjects used the ‘1-7’ number keys on the keyboard to indicate the perceived strength 
of the effect on a Likert scale shown on screen, 1 indicating ‘no distortion’ and 7 indicating 
‘extremely distorted’. Subjects completed a test trial of WC/EA faces at all four different 
timings to familiarise them with the experimental procedure, although two different race 
faces were never presented together in Experiment 1.  The entire experiment lasted ~30min. 
 
Experiment 2. The second experiment served to extend the findings of Experiment 1 to a 
scenario in which subjects performed forced-choice decisions, while manipulating observer 
race and visual field of stimulus presentation. The variables of interest in this experiment 
were visual field, presentation duration, as well as subject and stimulus race, respectively. In 
this experiment subjects were presented with sets of faces of the same or different races 
across both hemifields (WC/WC, EA/EA, WC/EA, or EA/WC); presentation order for the 50 
identities per race was randomised. Each subject completed a total of 128 trials. Trial 
duration varied between 6.25s and 25s, depending on presentation duration (250ms, 500ms, 
750ms and 1000ms), which varied in a quasi-randomized manner. Each of these visual field 
pairings (WC/WC, EA/EA, WC/EA, or EA/WC) as a given trial occurred eight times per 
presentation duration (250ms, 500ms, 750ms or 1000ms). At the end of each individual trial, 
subjects were instructed to indicate on which side the faces appeared to be more distorted, 
using a button press. Prior to the actual experiment, each subject completed one practice trial 
per timing (WC-WC pairing) to demonstrate the procedure. The entire experiment lasted 
~45min. 
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5.3.4. Analysis 
 
Experiment 1. For each subject, stimulus race, and presentation timing we calculated a 
proportionally-adjusted mean distortion score by averaging across trials for a given condition 
and dividing by the possible highest score (7). We then computed a difference score for each 
subject per timing as [own-race proportional distortion] – [other-race proportional distortion] 
(see also Figure 5.1.a); a difference score of zero therefore reflects no effect of stimulus race. 
For each presentation timing the difference scores were bootstrapped (number of bootstrap 
samples: 1000) to obtain 95% confidence intervals (btCIs) around the group mean. 
Differences were considered significant if btCIs did not include zero (no rated distortion 
difference between own- and other-race faces). 
 
Experiment 2. For each subject, each visual field containing own-race stimulus, and 
presentation timing we calculated a score reflecting the proportional choice of own-race 
faces. This was calculated by extracting trials in which subjects had a choice of own- and 
other-race faces, and defining as [number of own-race choices]/[total possible number of 
own-race choices] to create a score reflecting the proportion of own-race choices. A 
proportional choice score of 0.5 therefore reflects own- and other-race faces being chosen 
equally. For each presentation timing and per visual field, proportional own-race choice 
values were bootstrapped (number of bootstrap samples: 1000) to obtain 95% confidence 
intervals (btCIs) around the group mean separately for each subject race group. Differences 
were considered significant if btCIs did not include 0.5 (an equal choice of own- and other-
race faces). 
 
5.4. Results 
 
Experiment 1: Stimulus race and timing do not affect perceived distortion ratings 
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Mean distortion scores for WC and EA faces as a function of stimulus timing are provided in 
Table 5.1. These scores were similar across presentation timings, and differed slightly 
depending on stimulus race.  
 
Timing 250ms 500ms 750ms 1000ms 
SR WC EA WC EA WC EA WC EA 
         
Mean ± 
SD 
5.41 ± 
.84 
4.97 ± 
.92 
5.83 ± 
.86 
5.12 ± 
1.11 
5.58 ± 
.92 
5.02 ± 
.89 
5.59 ± 
1.16 
4.77 ± 
1.15 
Table 5.1. Distortion rating by stimulus race (SR) and presentation timing. Mean distortion 
ratings were extracted from a Likert scale of 1-7. Means are presented with standard deviations. 
 
As illustrated in Figure 5.2. the bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals computed on the 
difference score of proportional distortion ratings between own- and other-race faces 
included zero at all stimulus timings. Therefore, subjects’ ratings of perceived distortion did 
not significantly differ between own- and other-race face stimuli, regardless of presentation 
timing. 
 
Figure 5.2. Proportional distortion difference between own- and other-race faces. 95% 
bootstrapped CIs around the proportional distortion rating (distortion rating/total possible distortion 
rating) for own-race - proportional distortion rating for other-race stimuli. All intervals include 0, 
5. OF MONSTERS AND MEN- THE FLASHED FACE DISTORTION ILLUSION AS A 
DEMONSTRATION OF OBJECT-GENERAL VISUAL PREDICTIVE CODING 
149 
 
indicating no significant difference in perceived distortion due to stimulus race, at any presentation 
timing. 
 
Experiment 2: Stimulus and subject race, presentation timing, and visual field do not affect 
distortion choice 
 
Mean proportional own-race choices are provided in Table 2.; there were no obvious 
differences across presentation timings, visual field, or subjects’ race.  
 
Table 5.2. Proportional own-race choice as a function of stimulus and subject race, visual field, 
and presentation timing. 
 
The 95% confidence intervals computed on the proportional score of most distorted choices 
between own- and other-race faces included 0.5 (equal choice) at all stimulus timings for 
both groups of subjects (Figure 5.3.). This was true irrespective of the visual field within 
which own-race stimuli were presented. Therefore, in both groups of observers perceived 
distortion did not significantly differ between own- and other-race faces, at any stimulus 
timing or visual field. 
Timing
SubR
OwnSide Left Right Left Right Left Right Left Right
Mean ± SD 0.56 ± 0.26 0.58 ± 0.35 0.55 ± 0.3 0.43 ± 0.32 0.55 ± 0.37 0.58 ± 0.34 0.54 ± 0.24 0.53 ± 0.34
Timing
SubR
OwnSide Left Right Left Right Left Right Left Right
Mean ± SD 0.51 ± 0.35 0.54 ± 0.33 0.6 ± 0.27 0.54 ± 0.26 0.53 ± 0.35 0.55 ± 0.37 0.55 ± 0.3 0.59 ± 0.26
WC EA
250ms
WC EA
500ms
WC EA
750ms
WC EA
1000ms
5. OF MONSTERS AND MEN- THE FLASHED FACE DISTORTION ILLUSION AS A 
DEMONSTRATION OF OBJECT-GENERAL VISUAL PREDICTIVE CODING 
150 
 
 
Figure 5.3. Proportional own-race choice as a function of stimulus and subject race, visual field, 
and presentation timing. 95% bootstrapped CIs around the mean proportion of own-race choices 
(proportional own-race choice = # of own-race choices/# of total possible own-race choices). Across 
both observer groups all intervals include 0.5, indicating no significant differences in choice of side 
due to stimulus race, in either visual field or at any presentation timing. 
 
5.5. Discussion 
 
In the present study we aimed to provide the first in-depth investigation into the temporal 
boundaries of the FFD effect, as well as the extent to which this illusion is driven by face-
specific mechanisms. To this end, groups of observers from different ethnic backgrounds 
were presented with individual faces of same- or other-race faces that alternated with varying 
frequency. Following the initially reported presentation regime, the stimuli were presented 
bilaterally to both visual fields, and subjects indicated on which side FFD was perceived as 
most pronounced. Using a bootstrapping analysis technique with a 95% confidence interval, 
we found no significant effects of presentation duration, visual field presentation, or race of 
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subject/stimulus on the perceived distortion. In retrospect, a linear mixed effects model may 
have been more appropriately used to ensure our testing was adequately powered. However, 
we believe that our results are robust as they stand.  
 
Presentation timing does not affect perceived distortion magnitude 
 
Tangen et al. (2011) reported that presentation durations of 200-250ms per face gave rise to 
the strongest effects. Along the same line, Wen and Kung (2014) stated that presentation 
durations of between 250-500ms were optimal for eliciting FFD. Contrary to both studies, in 
independent groups of observers we discerned no effect of timing—irrespective of whether 
subjective distortion ratings were provided or subjects had to provide forced-choice 
decisions.  
 
While further replication of this lack of time-dependency is required, two aspects regarding 
the previous reports of FFD should be considered. Firstly, the methodological details and 
rigor provided by Tangen et al. (2011) are limited—their goal was to provide a brief report of 
a novel visual illusion. Therefore, the presentation durations they state as being optimal are 
anecdotal not formally investigated. Secondly, Wen and Kung (2014) indicate that the 
perceived FFD strength was compromised when the number of faces was small. Wen and 
Kung’s work demonstrates a conflation of the importance of many varied face stimuli and the 
importance of timing parameters—they varied number of faces presented and therefore can 
only imply that more individual faces produce greater distortion. Our work supports recent 
preliminary findings from Utz and Carbon (2015) that there is no significant difference in 
perceived distortion between presentation durations of 250ms and 1000ms. Additionally, Utz 
and Carbon (2015) found that perceived distortion does significantly decrease when faces are 
presented for only 100ms, suggesting that the presentation duration for each face cannot be 
too brief.  
 
Other-race effects do not influence perceived distortion 
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Another issue concerns the stimuli used in the previously reported studies of the FFD 
illusion. Tangen et al. (2011) used a homogenous sample of Slovakian (Western Caucasian) 
faces presented to the Western Caucasian experimenters who acted as participants. Wen and 
Kung (2014) used the same set of faces in their study, and used a predominantly East Asian 
subject group (n=13 East Asian, 1 Central American; personal communication with Dr. 
Wen). Therefore, we assume that the effects are observed independently of the relationship 
between observer and stimulus race. However, it is possible that Wen and Kung’s (2014) 
study contained an aspect of other-race processing that the original study did not. 
Interestingly, it is precisely the demonstration of increased encoding efficiency for, and 
subsequently discrimination between own-race faces along with the relative impairment for 
processing other-race faces that is considered an indication of face-specific mechanisms. 
 
Therefore, we furthermore aimed to ascertain the extent to which FFD relies on face-specific 
mechanisms. Previous work observed that FFD is robust to orientation changes (i.e., it is also 
perceived when faces are presented in a non-canonical (inverted) orientation; Tangen et al., 
2011). This provided preliminary evidence that face specific mechanisms may have only a 
partial role in the illusion. To address this question we manipulated the race of faces 
observed, i.e., both WC and EA observers judged FFD in same- and other-race faces. Under 
the assumption of reliance on a face-specific mechanism we reasoned that FFD should vary 
with the subjectively perceived similarity between individual faces, and therefore should be 
larger for own-, as compared to other-race faces. Other-race face similarity was suggested to 
be due to a smaller face-space model for other-race faces, based on reduced experience in 
differentiating other-race faces (Valentine, 1991). We found no indication that the FFD effect 
relies on face-specific mechanism(s), as perceived distortion did not vary as a function of 
stimulus/observer race. One other study has observed a reduction in FFD in other-race faces 
and also in ape faces (Utz & Carbon, 2015).  
 
Visual Field Presentation does not Affect Perceived Distortion 
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Lastly, we investigated whether the FFD would differ across visual fields. Some illusions 
show a left visual field bias, including the Muller-Lyer illusion (Clem & Pollack, 1975; 
Houlard, Fraisse, & Hecaen, 1976); the Oppel-Kundt illusion (Rothwell & Zaidel, 1990); and 
the herringbone illusion (Rasmjou, Hausmann, & Güntürkün, 1999). Additionally, Michel et 
al. (2006) suggest that own-race faces are perceived more holistically than other-race faces, 
and Ramon and Rossion (2012) demonstrated that in early perceptual processing stages, 
holistic face processing is more prominent for stimuli presented in the left visual field. This is 
supported by the long standing left visual field bias (Gilbert & Bakan, 1973; Yovel, Tambini, 
& Brandman, 2008), which posits preferential and more efficient processing of visual 
information presented in the left as compared to the right visual field. Across subject groups, 
and independent of presentation timing, we found no difference in perceived distortion 
between left and right visual fields for own-, nor other-race faces. 
 
Flashed face distortion is not face-specific 
 
Based on the present and previous findings we argue that FFD depends on a general, i.e., 
non-face-specific mechanism. It bears similarities to both the Face Distortion After Effect 
(FDAE, Webster & Maclin, 1999) and shape-contrast effects. In the FDAE, prolonged 
adaptation to faces distorted on a single dimension creates perceived distortion in a 
successive normal face, in the opposite direction from the distortion of the training stimulus. 
There are three notable differences between the FDAE and FFD. Firstly, the FDAE only 
occurs with long adaptation periods (up to several minutes, Hills, Holland, & Lewis, 2010), 
whereas the FFD illusion is robust at 200ms per stimulus (100ms may be a lower limit, Utz & 
Carbon, 2015). Secondly, the FFD effect creates distortion in any contrasting dimension or 
feature, not a singular dimension. Lastly, the FDAE requires an unnaturally distorted 
adaptation image, whereas FFD occurs when all stimuli are non-distorted. A more relevant 
finding is that adaption to a normal face over 5 seconds biases subsequent face perception in 
the opposite direction (Leopold, O'Toole, Vetter, & Blanz, 2001). Later investigation by the 
same group found that the length of adaptation strengthens perceived distortion (Leopold, 
Rhodes, Müller, & Jeffery, 2005), whereas FFD occurs on a much shorter timescale. Suzuki 
and Cavanagh (1998) demonstrated shape contrast effects, in which rapidly presented shapes 
bias the perception of an existing shape. However, FFD operates when images are replaced 
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by one another, whereas in shape contrast effects interacting shapes are interspersed. Shape 
contrast effects also occur at much shorter latencies (for as little as 60ms presentation 
duration). 
 
As stated before, a comparative illusion for non-face objects would be difficult to produce. It 
may be difficult to source objects in which all individual stimuli have diverse features that 
occupy similar retinotopic space in the manner that faces do, and that are aligned on a 
singular sensible dimension without recruiting artificial, and therefore unnatural objects (e.g., 
Greebles; Gauthier & Tarr, 1997). In such artificially-produced non-face objects distortions 
may be less obvious; i.e., potentially only Greeble experts could determine whether their 
dimensions appeared in any way distorted (Gauthier & Tarr, 1997; Tangen et al., 2011). We 
suggest that the perceived grotesqueness in FFD may be partially driven by the likelihood of 
noticing distortions in faces and saliency of these distortions even if the basic illusory effect 
originates from non-face-specific processing mechanisms. 
 
Predictive coding in the flashed face distortion illusion 
 
We suggest that cortical predictive coding mechanisms may underlie FFD. Specifically, 
based on our extensive experience through real-life scenarios, we create a model for 
perceiving objects or people in which they have constancy. An object or face must move, or 
be occluded, to be completely replaced by another. Our top-down prediction would therefore 
anticipate temporal consistency of the face or object identity occurring at a specific 
retinotopic location in the visual field. In the FFD paradigm, faces are quasi instantaneously 
and continuously replaced by others. Given a change of stimulus, the comparative differences 
between the new face and a prior one would create prediction error in early visual cortex  
(Alink et al., 2010). At locations of prediction error, the inconsistent new features are 
emphasized, creating the perceived distortion that represents the FFD illusion. Importantly, 
the conceptualization of FFD as a result of predictive coding introduces testable hypotheses- 
for example that faces which are more retinotopically similar should create less perceived 
distortion upon change. Secondly, we can hypothesize that learned face sequences should 
induce less perceived distortion than unlearned sequences. 
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Neural correlates of the flashed face distortion 
 
Cortical prediction involvement in FFD is supported by Wen and Kung’s (2014) findings. 
These authors reported a correlation between the magnitude of the perceived distortion and 
BOLD response in early visual cortex and posterior face selective regions (OFA, Gauthier & 
Tarr, 1997; and FFA, Kanwisher, McDermott, & Chun, 1997). We would suggest that on a 
neural level FFD results from feedback from higher visual areas to the early visual cortex. 
Leopold et al. (2001) note that the comparative face distortions they observe occur across 
different positioning and size of adapting and test stimuli, and are therefore unlikely to occur 
within early visual cortex. In the previously described FFD paradigms, the FFA and OFA 
may indeed be involved due to the use of face stimuli (Andrews et al., 2002; Haxby, 
Hoffman, & Gobbini, 2000; Kanwisher, Tong, & Nakayama, 1998). The lateral fusiform face 
area is particularly implicated in facial identity processing (George et al., 1999; Haxby et al., 
2000; Hoffman & Haxby, 2000) and therefore may code when multiple facial identities 
replace one another at a single retinotopic location. However, FFA activation is reduced for 
inverted faces (Kanwisher et al., 1998), whilst FFD still occurs for inverted faces. FFA 
involvement alone cannot drive FFD. Therefore, we would suggest that effects comparable (if 
not larger) to those observed in the OFA and FFA may also be observed within object-
preferential areas of the lateral occipital complex if objects were used (LOC, Grill-Spector, 
2003; Malach, Levy, & Hasson, 2002). This region, as well as other extrastriate ventral 
occipito-temporal areas (e.g., Aguirre, Zarahn, & D’esposito, 1998; Epstein & Kanwisher, 
1998; Ishai, Ungerleider, Martin, Schouten, & Haxby, 1999; Tanaka, 1993, 1996) represent 
objects across variations of luminance, motion, and texture and may therefore represent 
object ‘gist’  (Gilaie‐Dotan, Ullman, Kushnir, & Malach, 2002; Grill-Spector et al., 1998; 
Ishai, Ungerleider, & Haxby, 2000; Kastner, De Weerd, & Ungerleider, 2000; Kourtzi & 
Kanwisher, 2000). Additionally, these regions show activation correlated with perception of 
an object and not low level feature attributes (Bar et al., 2001; Dolan et al., 1997; Doniger et 
al., 2000; Grill-Spector, Kushnir, Hendler, & Malach, 2000; Hasson et al., 2001; James, 
Humphrey, Gati, Menon, & Goodale, 2000; Kleinschmidt, Büchel, Zeki, & Frackowiak, 
1998; Kleinschmidt et al., 2002; Kourtzi & Kanwisher, 2000; Moutoussis & Zeki, 2002; 
Tong, Nakayama, Vaughan, & Kanwisher, 1998; Vanni, Revonsuo, Saarinen, & Hari, 1996).  
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5.6. Conclusions 
 
Our findings provide evidence that in the flashed face distortion illusion the presentation 
duration of successive stimuli does not significantly affect perceived distortion (when each 
stimulus is presented for a duration between 250 and 1000ms). Furthermore, the illusion does 
not appear to rely on face-specific processing mechanisms, as neither variations of stimulus 
race, nor visual field produced differences in the FFD. Based on our findings we propose that 
FFD is mediated by object-general predictive coding mechanisms, the neural basis of which 
will be addressed in the future. 
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6. DISCUSSION 
 
  
This thesis investigated whether perceived reality, specifically during visual and multisensory 
illusions, is modulated by cortical feedback. Illusions present a valuable tool to probe the 
dissociation between sensory stimulation and resulting perception, and to understand the 
interactions between feedforward sensory input and fed back information. However, the 
effects of top-down and bottom-up information in illusion perception are not fully 
understood, and many illusions remain to be exploited to investigate cortical processing. In 
this thesis, we focused on how illusion-related feedback can modulate activity in early visual 
cortical area V1, either as a mechanism that induces the illusion or as an effect of the illusion 
at higher cortical levels. Secondly, we investigated the relationship between subject’s scores 
on schizotypy scales and illusion perception. We discuss the potential for developing illusory 
paradigms in clinical subject groups as a method for exploring top-down feedback in 
schizophrenia. This thesis argues that feedback occupies a key role in illusion generation, 
contributes to illusory effects in V1, and is potentially important in understanding the 
schizophrenic response to illusory stimuli.  
 
6.1. Chapter Summaries 
 
We conducted four studies to investigate cortical feedback during visual illusions. In 
Chapter 2 we investigated the crossmodal boundaries of the rubber hand illusion (RHI; 
Botvinick & Cohen, 1998) in subjects scoring more or less highly on the Prodromal 
Questionnaire (Loewy et al., 2011). We varied the synchronicity of visual and tactile 
stimulation to determine whether high-scoring subjects experienced different strengths of 
RHI perception than low scoring subjects. In Chapter 3 we conducted an RHI fMRI study 
which used visuotactile stimulation to investigate tactile and proprioceptive crossmodal 
feedback to V1, and to examine the effects of illusory perception in V1. In Chapter 4 we 
used the motion-induced blindness illusion (MIB; Bonneh et al., 2001) to probe the role of 
feedback to V1 in illusions. We first determined with behavioural experiments whether 
oriented Gabor patches can act as MIB targets, and at which eccentricity and size (Chapter 
4.1). We then presented an fMRI study which examined whether the features (orientation) of 
a target which is not perceived are still represented in V1, or whether this representation is 
overwritten by motion feedback (Chapter 4.2). In Chapter 5 we tested whether a new visual 
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illusion, flashed face distortion (FFD; Tangen et al., 2011), relies on face-specific 
mechanisms, or can be explained by an object-general predictive coding framework. We now 
emphasize the key conclusions from each chapter, and then combine these findings to discuss 
their implications with respect to the current literature. Additionally, we discuss remaining 
challenges in the field, and potential for future studies. 
 
Chapter 2: Crossmodal Boundaries of the RHI in Prodromal Subjects  
 
In Chapter 2 we performed a psychophysical experiment investigating rubber hand illusion 
perception in a group who obtained floor scores on the Prodromal Questionnaire (PQ; Loewy 
et al., 2011), and another who scored in the medium to high range. The PQ measures a 
subject’s level of risk of psychosis. We varied the strength of the evidence for the illusory 
percept (that the hand was a body part) by changing the consistency of visual stimulation to 
the rubber hand and tactile stimulation to the real hand. Increased visuotactile asynchronicity 
has previously been shown to reduce illusion perception (Shimada et al., 2009). Following 
each stimulation period, subjects described their experiential outcomes using Likert scale 
statements. We anticipated that with increased visuotactile asynchronicity, the top-down 
evidence for the rubber hand as a body part would decrease and therefore illusion strength 
would decrease (Shimada et al., 2009). Additionally, we predicted that subjects scoring 
higher on the Prodromal Questionnaire would experience a stronger illusion, as previous 
evidence in schizophrenic subject groups would suggest (Germine et al., 2013; Peled et al., 
2003; Thakkar et al., 2011). We expected the higher Prodromal scoring group to maintain 
illusion perception at higher asynchronicities (Parsons et al., 2013), whereas typical subjects 
experience illusion cessation at 300ms visuotactile asynchronicity (Shimada et al., 2009).   
 
In both subject groups, increased visuotactile asynchronicity decreased the response to all 
Likert statements, replicating Shimada et al’s (2009) finding in typical subjects. Above 
300ms asynchronicity the illusion was significantly lessened. We propose that coherent visual 
and tactile feedforward information signalling a touch to one’s own hand causes conflict 
between different multisensory inputs inferring the origin of sensation as part of the body or 
as the viewed rubber hand. The illusion arises to explain away this conflict. The sensation of 
body ownership is in this case top-down, and so the RHI demonstrates a case where high 
level information is affected by feedforward sensory inputs to form an illusion. When the 
visual and tactile touches are instead asynchronous, there is no modulation of the higher level 
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body schema. We did not find any effects of PQ scoring group on illusion perception, nor any 
interaction between PQ group and visuotactile synchronicity. This is in contrast to our 
expectation that higher PQ scorers would experience a stronger RHI and experience the 
illusion at higher visuotactile asynchronicities (Germine et al., 2013; Parsons et al., 2013). It 
is possible that the medium to high scoring group are simply not meaningfully different from 
the low scoring group. Alternatively, high-risk subjects as measured by the PQ may not show 
different effects during the RHI, and/or effects may not be observed until symptom onset. 
Importantly, the lack of a group difference in illusion perception suggests no difference in the 
change in top-down body schema. These results do not support a ‘spectrum’ of 
schizophrenia-proneness in illusion perception nor in effects on cortical feedback.  
 
Chapter 3: Visuotactile Illusion Perception in Early Visual Cortex  
  
Concurrent to the behavioural investigation of the rubber hand illusion, in Chapter 3 we 
developed a fMRI paradigm for the rubber hand illusion in typical subjects. We investigated 
whether effects of the RHI are manifested in early visual cortices and/or affect neural 
processing in extrastriate cortex. Illusion-related feedback has been demonstrated in early 
visual cortex (Muckli et al., 2005; Seghier et al., 2000; Sterzer et al., 2006) but not in the case 
of multimodal illusions. The rubber hand illusion is traditionally associated with increased 
activation in the ventral premotor cortical areas and other motor and integration regions 
(Ehrsson et al., 2005; Ehrsson et al., 2004; Tsakiris & Haggard, 2005). However, several 
authors suggest that the illusion is also mediated by visual motion area V5 (Bekrater-
Bodmann et al., 2014). In the RHI, vision appears to ‘win’ over existing body schema, 
suggesting that visual stimuli are influential enough to bring about high level cognitive 
changes in body schema. Subjects experienced two stimulation types (synchronous and 
asynchronous) and indicated their perception of illusion onset or absence. This allowed us to 
dissociate the effects of illusion perception and the stimulation condition. Importantly, visual 
input was consistent (regardless of stimulation or illusion perception), whilst tactile input and 
perceptual experience varied. We analysed the associated univariate and multivariate activity 
in vPMC, V5, LOC, V1 and the subregion of V1 corresponding to the retinotopic 
representation of the rubber hand.  
 
We found that both tactile stimulation and illusion perception have effects on BOLD 
activation in multiple regions of visual cortex- V5, LOC and V1. We found V5 reacted in an 
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interactive manner to illusion presence and stimulation, as did global V1. We also found 
increased activation in vPMC and the rubber-hand-specific area in V1 for illusion perception 
irrespective of tactile stimulation type. Additionally we found a specific pattern of activation 
for illusory experience in early visual cortex (global V1 and hand-specific subregion of V1) 
irrespective of tactile stimulation type. Our results demonstrate firstly that tactile stimulation 
has effects even in the early sensory cortices of other modalities. We also observed that V5 
and V1 react to the consistency between the current body schema and the stimulus inputs. 
That V5 and global V1 react most strongly to ‘inconsistent’ percept and stimulation pairings 
is consistent with ideas of ‘prediction error’ in reaction to unexpected stimuli (Alink et al., 
2010, see discussion on cortical predictive coding theories in chapters 1.5 and 6.8) and 
demonstrates an interaction between the illusion-related feedback and tactile feedback to 
visual cortex. Furthermore, illusion perception induces a specific pattern in early visual 
cortex, irrespective of which stimulation condition was experienced. The pattern of activation 
is different when the illusion was not experienced, even when both tactile and visual 
stimulation were identical. The multisensory rubber hand illusion therefore seems to induce a 
unique representative pattern in V1.  
 
Chapter 4: Orientation Decoding in Early Visual Cortex during Perceptual Blindness  
 
In Chapter 4 we probe whether changes in early visual cortex occur when an illusion erases 
awareness of visual stimuli. Previously Schölvinck and Rees (2010) recorded increased 
activation in early visual cortex and V5 for blinded targets compared to visible or removed 
targets. This finding is consistent with a change in the target representation. We used motion-
induced blindness stimuli with 45° or 135° oriented Gabor patches as targets to probe 
whether the multivariate target pattern is still represented in V1 during perceptual blindness. 
During apparent motion we know that motion feedback from V5 can ‘write’ information into 
V1 (Muckli et al., 2005; Sterzer et al., 2006). We therefore hypothesised that motion-induced 
blindness occurs when motion field information is fed back from V5 to early visual cortex, 
overwriting target pattern information in V1.  
 
We observe increased activation in V5 during perceptual blindness, but not when the target is 
physically removed. Additionally, we find that orientation can no longer be decoded from V1 
during motion-induced blindness, implying that target pattern representation is in some 
manner overwritten. We therefore present a case where identical feedforward input does not 
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produce an identical representation in early visual cortex. The representation is instead 
overwritten, likely by feedback from V5 regarding the surrounding motion field. Paired with 
the findings from Chapter 3, we also contribute to theories in which V1 activity is more 
closely related to perception than previously thought (Rees, 2013; Rees et al., 2002; Tong, 
2003) – in this case disappearance of the target perceptually is paired with distortion of the 
target pattern representation in V1. 
 
Chapter 5: Object-General Visual Predictive Coding 
 
In Chapter 5 we conducted a psychophysical experiment which probed a relatively newly 
discovered illusion- flashed face distortion (Tangen et al., 2011). We asked whether the 
illusion arises from face-specific mechanisms as previously speculated or object-general 
mechanisms. We proposed that the illusion could result from predictive comparisons within 
the same visual space, which are not necessarily face-specific. Subjects of two ethnicities 
observed 25 faces from two ethnic groups, of each gender, presented rapidly in the periphery 
of both visual hemifields. Subjects then reported their perception of distortion. In one 
experiment subjects were required to rate overall perceived distortion on a Likert scale, in the 
other they answered with a forced choice of which visual field presentation was more 
distorted. We varied race of the stimulus faces (same as subject or not) as the main item of 
interest, in addition to the visual field in which the same-race images appeared, and duration 
of each face presentation. Own-race and other-race effects are considered a marker of face-
specific processing in psychophysical tasks (Michel et al., 2007; Michel et al., 2006; Vizioli 
et al., 2010). Additionally, face processing is associated with left visual field dominance 
(Yovel et al., 2003). These two variables therefore allowed us to test whether the illusion 
arises from face-specific mechanisms- if so, it should be enhanced for same-race faces and 
when presented to the left visual field.  
 
We found that FFD is not sensitive to race differences, does not show a visual field bias, and 
does not show a timing difference. The illusion is therefore likely to reflect an object-general 
comparison process as opposed to a face-specific mechanism. These results reject the 
assumption in existing FFD studies that because the illusion involves faces it is necessarily 
face-specific. Additionally we propose this new illusion for consideration which may be an 
effect of top-down comparison processes. We propose opportunities for future research, 
including artificially manipulating the similarity between faces, or using objects as opposed 
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to faces to probe an object version of the illusion. If the distortions do arise from comparative 
processes, then perceived distortion should vary by how physically similar successive faces 
are (with less similar faces inducing greater distortion). Such a manipulation could also be 
used to confirm that FFD is not face-specific. If FFD is object-general then distortion should 
increase linearly with increased dissimilarity between successive faces. If however FFD 
induces some face-specific mechanisms one would expect significant increases in distortion 
when facial differences induce a new/different perceived identity across successive presented 
faces (Rhodes & Jeffery, 2006). Comparison during FFD may be underlined by a mechanism 
that says objects cannot rapidly replace one another in the same retinotopic space without 
movement. Thus another interesting variant on the illusion would be to study whether 
distortion arises if the next face stimulus moved into the space of the previous stimulus, 
instead of instantaneously replacing the previous face. 
 
Through the four experimental chapters (Chapters 2-5) recurring themes have emerged- 
vision is constructive; the effects of illusions are observed at the level of early visual cortex; 
differences at low cortical levels are closely related to subjective perception, not merely to 
feedforward stimulus input; illusion effects may occur through predictive mechanisms in the 
cortex; and these paradigms may allow investigation into neural processing in schizophrenia. 
We now discuss these themes, the impact of our results on outstanding research questions, 
and the potential for future investigations in the field. 
 
6.2. Vision is Constructive 
 
Throughout the thesis we observe cases where subjective experience of the world does not 
match actual sensory input and does not reflect the veridical stimulus. In Chapters 2 and 3 
the rubber hand illusion induces false ownership of a rubber hand. Whilst tactile, visual, and 
proprioceptive inputs must be relatively similar between real and rubber hands in order to 
elicit the illusion, subjects are always aware that their own hand is merely hidden. 
Additionally, there are still tactile, proprioceptive and visual incongruities between real and 
rubber hands (for example the real hand being under the table, whilst a rubber hand sits on 
the table; rubber hand can be other-race; the illusion can be elicited with a non-hand object; 
subjects are still receiving tactile and proprioceptive information from their own hand). 
Nonetheless, the subject experience arising from multisensory inputs integrates the rubber 
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hand as a body part, replacing their real hand. In Chapter 4 motion-induced blindness causes 
the complete disappearance of a target which is constantly present, even though the target is 
highly salient, and even if the target is flickering or moving slowly (Bonneh et al., 2001). In 
this illusion feedforward visual input (of the target) seems to be discarded from the resulting 
percept, whilst the motion field and other feedforward components (for example a fixation 
point) are always perceived. Lastly in Chapter 5 flashed face distortion causes ‘monstrous’ 
alterations when perceiving normal face stimuli presented sequentially to the peripheral 
visual field. If visual perception resulted from a direct translation of feedforward sensory 
input, subjects should perceive only typical faces.   
 
Illusions initially seem to reflect relatively unusual cases of perception, and therefore appear 
uninformative for typical visual processing. However, many authors consider illusions a 
demonstration of how the perceived world is constructed by the cortex (as opposed to sensory 
stimulation veridically reaching consciousness; Gregory, 1997). Perception arises as a result 
of recurrent cortical signalling at multiple levels (Bullier, 2001; Muckli & Petro, 2013). Fed 
back information from other senses, higher level sensory computation, knowledge, and 
context is combined with feedforward visual input at every level of the cortical hierarchy. 
Local visual information is typically ambiguous, and integration into a global sensory context 
through feedback greatly aids understanding and processing speed (Bullier, 2001; Olshausen 
& Field, 2005). Higher visual areas can also integrate stimuli across much larger physical 
spaces due to much larger receptive fields. Together feedback, feedforward, and lateral 
interactions dictate resulting visual awareness. Illusion perception can therefore allow 
researchers to elucidate the constructive mechanisms behind vision as we are aware of the 
true sensory input, and of the difference between veridical world state and resulting 
perception.  
 
6.3. Illusory Effects are Observed at the Lowest Levels of the Traditional Cortical 
Hierarchy  
 
Crucially, the fMRI studies detailed in Chapters 3 and 4 demonstrate cases where, despite 
identical feedforward stimulation (visuotactile in Chapter 3, visual in Chapter 4), V1 
activity is strikingly different during illusory experience. This evidence exists in contrast to 
traditional conceptions of early visual cortex which paint V1 as exclusively a feedforward 
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feature processor (Brewer et al., 2005; Wandell et al., 2007). Furthermore our data opposes 
models that propose solely higher-level origins of illusions and bistable percepts (Crick & 
Koch, 1995). In Chapter 3 the pattern of activity in V1, and the retinotopically specific hand 
patch in V1, is similar when subjects perceive the rubber hand illusion, irrespective of the 
tactile stimulation. There is no corresponding coherent pattern for a lack of illusion 
perception suggesting that this a top-down effect only during illusory perception and no 
similarity between stimulation types when the illusion was and was not perceived despite 
identical feedforward input. Illusory experience therefore affects the multivariate pattern in 
early visual cortex in a consistent way, whilst tactile stimulation does not. However tactile 
stimulation does affect activation in V1- early visual cortex was more active if the perception 
of illusion or no illusion was incoherent with the visuotactile stimulation (e.g. illusion during 
asynchronous stimulation), than if these were coherent (e.g. illusion during synchronous 
stimulation). During the RHI we therefore find that V1 represents information about the 
illusion, and about the coherence between the illusion and sensory inputs. As there is no 
differential visual stimulation, this nonvisual information likely arises from feedback 
pathways originating in far cortical regions. In primates, there are feedback connections 
between prefrontal cortex and the traditional ‘seat’ of the RHI- premotor cortex. Premotor 
cortex then has feedback connections to extrastriate dorsal visual regions, including V5; 
which then projects back to V1 (Gilbert & Li, 2013). Additionally, primary visual cortex is 
suggested to respond to sensorimotor expectations (Keller et al., 2012).  One remaining 
research question is how exactly different feedback sources (in this illusion tactile and 
illusion information) are ‘integrated’ to produce increases or decreases in early visual cortex 
activation (see Chapter 6.6 for further discussion of this).  
 
In Chapter 4 we observe distortion of specific features of the target pattern (orientation) in 
V1 during illusory target disappearance, despite constant and unchanging feedforward 
stimulation. This appears to be a strong demonstration of illusory perception distorting or 
destroying information representation in V1. Importantly, this likely reflects an addition of 
fed back motion information from V5, not necessarily reduction of the feedforward signal 
(Muckli et al., 2005; Sterzer et al., 2006; see also Chapter 4). Under this conceptualisation, 
the feedforward signal of both the target and the motion field are passed up the cortical 
hierarchy. In V5 the motion field is processed and is imposed down the hierarchy as the 
dominant percept (Sterzer et al., 2009). As receptive fields in this higher region are larger, the 
fed back motion field signal occludes the target in V1, perceptually blinding the target. It is 
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possible that feedback to early visual cortex occurs only whilst the target is blinded, or that 
the feedback is present during both target visibility and invisibility but is communicating 
different aspects of the stimulus (likely from different cortical areas; Donner et al., 2008). 
 
MIB does not promote a change in spiking in target space compared to a visible target 
(Libedinsky et al., 2009; Maier et al., 2008; Wilke, Logothetis, & Leopold, 2006) but does 
promote a hemodynamic difference (Donner et al., 2008; Maier et al., 2008; Schölvinck & 
Rees, 2010). This suggests that MIB effects are partially fed back as fMRI reflects 
subthreshold activity far more than spiking activity (Logothetis, Pauls, Augath, Trinath, & 
Oeltermann, 2001). Additionally beta band modulation which is thought to carry feedback 
(Wang, 2010) occurs in V1 just prior to target disappearance, and the amplitude of this 
oscillatory activity correlates with target disappearance duration (Kloosterman, Meindertsma, 
Hillebrand, et al., 2015). Whilst Donner et al’s (2008) data suggests V5 is causally involved 
in producing target disappearance; this could be better confirmed using dynamic causal 
modelling (in a similar manner to Sterzer et al., 2006). DCM is a widely-used analysis 
approach which infers effective connectivity between two regions i.e. infers one brain area’s 
influence over the BOLD activity of another brain area. DCM analysis can only be successful 
with accurate knowledge about the coupling between neuronal activity and blood flow which 
forms the BOLD signal. The standard models, which have been used for over a decade 
(Friston, Harrison, & Penny, 2003; Stephan et al., 2008; Stephan, Weiskopf, Drysdale, 
Robinson, & Friston, 2007) are outdated and overly simplistic, with large unsupported 
inherent assumptions about neurovascular coupling (Havlicek et al., 2015).  Havlicek et al. 
(2015) present a new model with increased complexity and updated assumptions. If one 
intends to use DCM at high field, it is also crucial that the underlying model is specialised for 
use in cortical layers. Heinzle, Koopmans, den Ouden, Raman, and Stephan (2016) have 
produced a DCM for layer data, which respects the influence of blood drain from lower to 
upper cortical layers (Friston et al., 2017).   
 
It would also be informative to use our paradigm and analysis to investigate MIB’s temporal 
evolution - does the cortical pattern representation of the target start to decay before the 
perceptual switch to target blindness, or afterwards? Investigations at higher field fMRI could 
elucidate feedback and feedforward contributions in MIB through high field fMRI recording 
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from distinct cortical layers, as feedback and feedforward are though to arrive at different 
layers (see Chapter 6.6).  
 
Whilst we did not investigate neural correlates of the flashed face distortion (FFD, Chapter 
5), we can hypothesise about effects we may observe in V1. Firstly, we would expect an 
activation increase when the faces seem distorted, compared to when they do not (see Wen & 
Kung, 2014). We propose that FFD is driven by comparison between successive faces, and if 
so we would expect a graded increase in V1 activation in correspondence with perceived 
distortion (Alink et al., 2010; Kok et al., 2012; Petro, Smith, Schyns, & Muckli, 2013). 
Furthermore we would expect that specific feature distortion would be accompanied by 
activation in those sub-regions of V1, as contextual feedback effects can be retinotopically 
specific (Petro et al., 2013). Existing evidence supports our suggestion that V1 may react to 
perceived distortion despite normal feedforward stimuli- early visual cortex reacts to the 
subjective perception of faces, not to their low level features (Ayzenshtat, Gilad, Zurawel, & 
Slovin, 2012). Additionally, V1 contains information about visual expectation (Kastner, 
Pinsk, De Weerd, Desimone, & Ungerleider, 1999). During the FFD, V1 therefore likely 
reacts to the stimulus presented, anticipates information about the next face, and then also 
reacts with extra activation when a face is perceived as distorted. Feedback is a potential 
mechanism for comparing successive faces. Face-related feedback is sent from face areas in 
superior temporal sulcus to early visual cortex (Haxby et al., 2000; Rockland & Van Hoesen, 
1994), both directly and via the occipital face areas (Gschwind, Pourtois, Schwartz, Van De 
Ville, & Vuilleumier, 2012). As the FFD is not necessarily face-specific, it may also be 
mediated by object related feedback from areas such as the lateral occipital complex. 
Additionally, the subjective emotional experience of monstrous faces may implicate 
pathways from the amygdala to V1 (Gschwind et al., 2012; Vuilleumier & Driver, 2007). 
This same pathway may not be implicated if FFD were extended to a paradigm using object 
stimuli as perceived object distortion seems unlikely to elicit a strong emotional response.  
 
6.4. The Influence of Lateral Connectivity 
 
Our fMRI results demonstrate illusion-induced effects in early visual cortex and extrastriate 
visual areas, particularly V5. V1 processing changes with perception, in the absence of any 
difference in feedforward visual stimulation. Lateral connectivity within early visual cortex is 
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not capable of explaining the tactile and illusory effects observed during the rubber hand 
illusion, as there was no feedforward visual difference between illusory and non-illusory time 
points (Chapter 3). However, in our motion-induced blindness paradigm (Chapter 4) lateral 
connections within V1 from areas representing the motion-field into areas representing the 
target may contribute to target invisibility (Jancke et al., 2004; Stettler et al., 2002).  
 
During MIB we observe distortion of the feedforward oriented Gabor patch target stimulus 
when the target perceptually blinded but not when it is visible to subjects. We suggest that 
cortical feedback from V5 containing motion-field information ‘overwrites’ the target space 
in superficial cortical layers, thus distorting the feedforward target representation that remains 
present in mid-layers (see Chapter 6.6). We therefore are not implying that the 
representation necessarily disappears; only that it is distorted by additional information and 
cannot be decoded. Whilst low level explanations like adaptation (Gorea & Caetta, 2009), 
motion streak suppression (Wallis & Arnold, 2009), and filling-in (Hsu et al., 2006) may 
contribute to MIB, short range lateral connections in the retina or early visual cortex are 
unlikely to fully account for target disappearance. Targets still disappear when protected by a 
few visual degrees with no motion field (Bonneh & Donner, 2011). Common low level 
explanations such as adaptation or perceptual filling-in also provide no reason for the percept 
to alternate between visible and invisible. 
 
It is possible that our effects are partially driven by long-range lateral connections such as 
those associated with contour integration (Stettler et al., 2002), however they fail to provide a 
comprehensive explanation for the target distortion we observe. If the illusion represented 
merely a low level lateral spread of information then the field should be equally effective 
whether it were moving or stationary (Graf et al., 2002). MIB can also be elicited using 
illusory motion fields that contain no feedforward stimulus (Graf et al., 2002). Additionally, 
slow-moving MIB targets can disappear through MIB and re-appear in opposite hemifields, 
demonstrating a motion-field dominance that exists across retinotopic space which lateral 
connections are not capable of covering (Bonneh & Donner, 2011). Additionally, if lateral 
connectivity is a primary causal mechanism, the highly salient orientation features of the 
target should also spread. Recent evidence also demonstrates that MIB continues under 
invisibility of both the target and motion field (through continuous flash suppression, Dieter 
et al., 2015) whilst lateral perceptual filling-in of contours does not (Meng, Ferneyhough, & 
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Tong, 2007). Continuous flash suppression does however allow for higher level processing to 
continue (Gayet, Van der Stigchel, & Paffen, 2014; Stein & Sterzer, 2014). 
 
MIB is mediated by strong top-down effects such as higher order grouping (Bonneh et al., 
2001). Targets also experience property updating during perceptual blindness, demonstrating 
that they are still being processed (Bonneh et al., 2001; Mitroff & Scholl, 2005). Perceptual 
alternation is therefore more likely to result from top-down switches in perceptual 
competition (Donner et al., 2008; Hohwy et al., 2008; Sterzer et al., 2009). That target 
salience increases disappearances (Bonneh et al., 2001) supports competition theories. 
However, the effects of top-down feedback may incite target disappearance partially through 
lateral connectivity - feedback can modulate lateral connections and the spread of information 
(Gilbert & Li, 2013). For example, feedback affects gain in V1 during contour integration, in 
a manner that is modulated by task dependency (Piëch, Li, Reeke, & Gilbert, 2013). 
Realistically, MIB is likely to reflect aspects of both top-down and lateral effects at the level 
of V1. Top-down motion field information is imposed onto the target space through 
feedback, combined with an influence of feedback on lateral connections into the target 
space, and potentially also fluctuations in the feedforward stimulus representation (Dieter et 
al., 2015; Donner et al., 2013). 
 
6.5. Attention in Illusory Paradigms  
 
Attention acts in a top-down manner to direct and drive visual processing through cortical 
feedback (Noesselt et al., 2002; Saalmann, Pigarev, & Vidyasagar, 2007). Attention increases 
local BOLD activation in V1 with or without a stimulus (Kastner et al., 1999; Slotnick et al., 
2003; Tootell et al., 1998; Watanabe, Sasaki, et al., 1998), and strengthens the cortical 
representation of attended stimuli (Li et al., 2006). Additionally, fed back context and 
attention interact to enhance or suppress visual stimuli (Flevaris & Murray, 2015).   
 
During the rubber hand illusion, attention may partially explain some of the neural effects we 
observe. Accounts of bodily processing suggest that stimuli in peripersonal space (space 
surrounding the body) engage a dedicated network (Makin et al., 2007; Rizzolatti, Fadiga, 
Fogassi, & Gallese, 1997; Rizzolatti, Scandolara, Matelli, & Gentilucci, 1981) and that 
greater visual processing is dedicated to objects in the peripersonal space (Makin, Holmes, & 
Ehrsson, 2008). Multisensory integration in the peripersonal space is required for RHI onset 
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(Ehrsson et al., 2004; Makin et al., 2008). Additionally, general attention to objects in the 
visual field, including the rubber hand in this case, increases BOLD activity in that 
retinotopic subsection of V1 (Macaluso et al., 2000; Tootell & Hadjikhani, 2000). This is 
consistent with BOLD increases we recorded during illusion perception in the hand-specific 
retinotopic space (Makin et al., 2008). The coherent pattern representation present in V1 
during illusion perception is also consistent with attentional effects - when the rubber hand is 
perceived as a part of the body there is a strengthening of its cortical representation (Li et al., 
2006). The interactive activation results in V1 and V5 are more difficult to interpret in 
relationship to attention. 
 
Motion induced blindness is subject to some attentional effects. Directing attention to the 
target increases the tendency for perceptual disappearance (Geng, Song, Li, Xu, & Zhu, 2007; 
Schölvinck & Rees, 2010), however reduced attention to the stimulus also slows perceptual 
switching (thus increasing the length of disappearance periods, Schölvinck & Rees, 2010). 
Attention is not required for MIB to occur and it can occur out with awareness (Dieter et al., 
2015). In our MIB paradigm (Chapter 4) major attentional components are controlled using 
a central fixation task. However, subjects must still attend to the target to report illusion on 
and offset. We cannot therefore completely disqualify covert attentional effects (for example 
subjects may monitor the space where they last saw the target in order to accurately report 
reappearances). These effects are unlikely to account for the V5 and V1 BOLD increases we 
observe during target disappearance, although they may mediate the top-down mechanisms of 
MIB. Neural competition accounts of MIB propose attention as one causal top-down factor, 
where the motion field and target compete for attention in a winner-takes-all manner (Bonneh 
et al., 2001; Donner et al., 2008). Since attention ought to be identical between the two target 
orientations, there is no impact on our decoding results as classification was always 
performed within a perceptual condition. Our experiment could be repeated with the addition 
of a distracter task to further reduce attentional effects, however this is likely to also reduce 
the time spent perceiving the illusion.   
 
Whilst we did not study FFD in fMRI, attention is likely necessary for the illusion to occur. 
Perceived ‘monstrousness’ will also certainly attract attention to the face stimulus. This 
attention modulation may partially underlie the increased BOLD signal seen by other authors 
for increased distortion (Wen & Kung, 2014; although note that the authors increased the 
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number of facial identies to increase perceived distortion and therefore cannot seperate 
effects of a larger stimulus set, attention, and perceived distortion). 
 
6.6. Layer Specificity and Neurobiology 
 
The neurobiological specificities of feedback modulation are only partially resolved. 
Feedforward and feedback integration, and resulting perception, may be organised and 
orchestrated through layer-specificity. The visual cortex is organised canonically in six 
distinct layers (although subdivisions are also apparent), each of which contains distinct cell 
types (Bastos et al., 2012; Douglas & Martin, 2007). Several investigations have shown that 
long-range feedback and feedforward information are projected to discrete layers in any 
given region of the human cortical hierarchy (see Figure 6.1.a.; Markov et al., 2013). This 
separation is similar to layer-specific contributions observed in the macaque, where feedback 
from V2 to V1 branches in supragranular layers I and II, and in infragranular layer V 
(Rockland & Virga, 1989). In rodents, long range cortical feedback connections terminate in 
supragranular layer I, and account for up to 90% of synaptic input to layer I with the 
remaining 10% originating locally (Larkum, 2013; Markov et al., 2014). In monkeys 
performing figure-ground segregation, feedback arrives to layers I and V (Self et al., 2013). 
In humans, feedback processing streams stem from deep pyramidal cells and arrive at 
superficial layer I and potentially at deep layer V, whilst feedforward signals originate in 
superficial pyramidal cells and arrive in the mid-layers (III/IV; Felleman & Van Essen, 1991; 
Shipp, 2007; see Figure. 6.1.a). 
 
Muckli et al. (2015) used MVPA in 7T fMRI data to decode feedback information to an 
occluded quadrant of V1 whilst the other ¾ of V1 received feedforward natural scene 
information (for a similar investigation at 3T see Smith & Muckli, 2010). They demonstrated 
that contextual feedback in the occluded quadrant was projected specifically to superficial 
layers, whilst feedforward scene information in non-occluded V1 was also available in the 
mid layers (see Figure 6.1.c). Other authors have demonstrated feedback to the deepest layers 
(Kok et al., 2016). The same layer-specificity is also true of connections to the thalamus, 
which serves as a central relay for feedback communication between cortical regions (Llinás, 
Leznik, & Urbano, 2002; Muckli et al., 2015; Rubio-Garrido, Pérez-de-Manzo, Porrero, 
Galazo, & Clascá, 2009; Wimmer, Bruno, De Kock, Kuner, & Sakmann, 2010). Whilst we 
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describe only the basic layer architecture and connectivity, there are two types of feedforward 
and feedback connections sent to supragranular and infragranular cortical layers (Markov & 
Kennedy, 2013). It is unclear what the functional differences are between these two types, 
how they contribute to the complexities of feedback, and therefore how they contribute to 
feedforward and feedback integration. 
 
 
Figure 6.1. Layer specificity of feedback. a) Likely termination layers of feedforward and feedback 
connections in V1 showing feedback to outer and inner layers and feedforward to mid-layers, image 
created based on Felleman and Van Essen (1991) and Shipp (2007). b) Superimposition of a model 
layer V pyramidal neuron on the layer diagram, based on an illustration in Larkum (2013). c) Cortical 
layer separation in human fMRI in V1 displayed on the cortical mesh, from Muckli et al. (2015).  
 
Critically, this layer specificity is consistent with the neuronal-scale architecture. At the 
neural level, pyramidal cells may be the crucial computational units in theories of 
bidirectional cortical function. These multipolar neurons have a pyramid-shaped cell body 
and long apical dendrites which extend through the cortical layers to layer I. Pyramidal cells 
dominate the human neocortex (Nieuwenhuys, 1994), which itself is ~80% of human brain 
mass (Geschwind & Rakic, 2013). An influential paper by Larkum (2013) proposed that in 
rodents feedback and feedforward inputs are integrated through back-propagation-activated 
calcium signalling (BAC) within L5 pyramidal neurons (see also Major, Larkum, & Schiller, 
2013). Specifically, the proposal states that the dendritic trees of these pyramidal neurons link 
feedforward and feedback processing in an associative manner (Larkum, 2013; Larkum, 
Senn, & Lüscher, 2004; Larkum, Zhu, & Sakmann, 1999). Cortical feedback streams target 
inhibitory interneurons and the distal tufts of apical dendrites of layer V pyramidal neurons in 
layer I (Markram et al., 2004), whereas feedforward information arrives to the basal dendrites 
of level V pyramidal neurons (Chang, 1951; LaBerge & Kasevich, 2007; Larkum, 2013; 
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Llinás et al., 2002; Siegel, Körding, & König, 2000; Spratling, 2002). These pyramidal 
dendritic components are located in different layers of cortex (Douglas & Martin, 2007; see 
Figure 6.1.b. for a model LV pyramidal neuron; Larkum, 2013).  
 
Cortical feedback does not only modulate feedforward activity, it can also drive cell firing 
(Bastos et al., 2012; De Pasquale & Sherman, 2011). As feedback input is proximal to a 
second spike initiation zone near the neurons’ apical tufts (Larkum & Zhu, 2002), feedback is 
capable of creating robust action potentials through broad calcium spiking (Ca2+ spiking, 
secondary to the primary axonal initiation zone) if in conjunction with a sodium spike 
propagated from the soma (BAC; Larkum et al., 2004; Larkum et al., 1999). This trigger can 
actually drive more action potentials than direct feedforward input alone to the cell body 
(Larkum et al., 2004; Larkum & Zhu, 2002; Larkum, Zhu, & Sakmann, 2001). Distal apical 
tuft input is insufficient to drive neuronal firing alone (Larkum & Zhu, 2002; Williams & 
Stuart, 2002). However, feedforward inputs to the soma Na+ initiation zone and feedback 
inputs to the secondary Ca2+ initiation zones interact (Larkum et al., 2004; Larkum et al., 
1999). This allows feedforward and feedback activity to interact with one another as input to 
one initiation zone lowers the threshold for spiking at the other (Larkum, 2013). If inputs to 
the two initiation zones are temporally linked then the threshold for Ca2+ spiking is halved 
(Larkum et al., 1999). Feedforward input therefore leaves pyramidal cells very sensitive to 
feedback inputs at the apical dendrite, resulting in apical amplification of feedforward inputs 
when paired with feedback inputs (Larkum, 2013). Additionally, differing feedback input to 
the apical site can affect cell output, even with the same feedforward stimulus to the soma in 
each case (Phillips, Clark, & Silverstein, 2015; Phillips, 2015; Roelfsema, 2006). This intra-
cellular integration mechanism therefore provides one way that illusions may result from 
modulations of the feedforward input. In this manner, ‘inhibitory’ feedback connections can 
also amplify feedforward inputs through intracellular NMDA receptor mechanisms (Larkum, 
2013).     
 
Contextual feedback modulations may also amplify pyramidal neuron responses through 
intercellular connections to other pyramidal neurons (Phillips et al., 2015). These ubiquitous 
modulatory connections are likely to be NMDA receptor-mediated (Phillips et al., 2015; 
Phillips & Singer, 1997; Self, Kooijmans, Supèr, Lamme, & Roelfsema, 2012). The calcium 
spiking central to apical amplification is also reliant on NMDA receptor activity (Larkum, 
2013; Larkum, Nevian, Sandler, Polsky, & Schiller, 2009) therefore suggesting that NMDA 
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receptor function is crucial for contextual modulation (Phillips et al., 2015). NMDA receptors 
are associated with feedback processing, as they have a high concentration in supragranular 
layers (Rosier, Arckens, Orban, & Vandesande, 1993), are known cortical modulators 
(Collingridge & Bliss, 1987) and are crucial for the recurrent interactions involved in figure-
ground segregation (Self et al., 2012). 
 
What an individual perceives is formed by a combination of feedforward and feedback 
activity, arising as the result of not only intracellular integration, but also the activity of 
cortical microcircuits and of the interactions between cortical areas (Phillips et al., 2015). 
Computational biological models of feedback and feedforward interactions are constrained 
not only by the neural anatomy described above but also by the interactions of local 
GABAergic inhibitory interneurons, long-range glutamatergic excitatory neurons, and 
synaptic physiology (Larkum, 2013; Petro, Vizioli, et al., 2015). Oscillatory mechanisms also 
contribute to the integration of feedback and feedforward mechanisms (Engel, Fries, & 
Singer, 2001). Different frequency oscillations may also be restricted to different cortical 
layers and thus facilitate either feedback or feedforward processing (Maier, Aura, & Leopold, 
2011; Roopun et al., 2008; Wang, 2010; Xing et al., 2012). Fully elucidating the 
computational biology is out with the remit of this thesis, however it is clear that the 
integration of feedforward and feedback activity occurs throughout the cortex and is a crucial 
mechanism for perception.  
 
In the rubber hand illusion the effects we observe of illusion perception and tactile 
stimulation type must be feedback effects, as no differential feedforward visual stimulation is 
provided to subjects. We can therefore predict that these effects would predominantly be 
found in outer or inner cortical layers (Kok et al., 2012; Muckli et al., 2015), whilst midlayers 
would similarly represent mainly the feedforward visual stimulation. Interestingly, during 
illusion perception we find a univariate increase in the subregion of V1 retinotopically 
corresponding to the rubber hand. This could theoretically arise from apical amplification 
with fed back illusory information, in concordance with feedforward visual stimulation from 
the rubber hand. The activity in this region of V1, and in global V1, also becomes more 
coherent when there is illusion perception (across trials and subjects) suggesting that illusory 
feedback, coding the rubber hand as a body part or directing attention to the rubber hand, 
could act on many neurons across the population. As stated in Chapter 6.3. it is unclear how 
the combined effects of tactile and illusory feedback interact to produce different activation 
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in global V1 and V5. Either the two feedback sources are integrated across the population of 
pyramidal neurons in early visual cortex, or they are united at higher cortical levels (such as 
frontal regions) and fed back as a unified concept which characterises coherent or incoherent 
body schema and tactile input pairings.   
 
The method we used in Chapter 4 lacked the resolution to separate cortical layers, however 
we proposed that when the target is invisible it is still represented in midlayers of early visual 
cortex through feedforward (somatic) processing (Muckli et al., 2015). There is evidence for 
effects of feedforward activity even during target blindness (e.g. adaptation to orientation still 
occurs; Montaser-Kouhsari et al., 2004). The motion field feedback from V5 likely 
terminates in superficial layer I and/or inner layer VI during perceptual blindness (Kok et al., 
2016; Muckli et al., 2015; Rockland & Knutson, 2000) and therefore causes the lack of 
decoding ability we observe during target invisibility in our 3T experiment (which records 
activity equally from all cortical layers). Therefore during MIB, decoding of target features 
should be possible in mid but not outer cortical layers. As driving feedforward inputs are 
always available to layer V pyramidal neurons in the target space, apical amplification may 
amplify the fed back ‘choice’ of percept delivered to the apical dendrite; depressing the 
alternative percept (Phillips, 2015; personal communication with W Phillips, 2016). The 
motion field dominates during target invisibility and the target features dominate during 
target visibility (chapter 4; Donner et al., 2008). There are no spiking differences recorded 
between visible and invisible targets in V1 (Maier et al., 2008), however if both perceptual 
states (visible and invisible targets) arise from a combination of feedforward and feedback 
activity then this is consistent with the effects of apical amplification.  
 
Greater development of illusion studies into layer-specific recording using high field fMRI 
would help elucidate the integration of the feedforward stimulus with feedback and lateral 
contributions to produce perception. MIB presents a good candidate, as we have specific 
hypotheses for layer content during perceptual visibility and invisibility. Investigating layer 
specificity with illusions is of significant interest, as some previous studies (Muckli et al., 
2015) have isolated feedback to investigate feedback layers, whereas MIB allows us to 
investigate a case where there is continuous feedforward input. In high-field fMRI, improved 
spatial resolution allows layer separation (Duyn, 2012). However this vastly superior voxel 
resolution (up to ~0.8mm
3
 at 7T), comes with significant considerations in terms of 
acquisition, artefacts, and technological requirements. Head motion presents a much greater 
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problem at high field, causing greater distortion in the data. Subjects experience higher levels 
of muscle stimulation and heating through a higher specific absorption rate (SAR). Stronger 
artifacts, including greater inhomogeneity of the magnetic field, require more intensive 
preprocessing and more normalisation of the data. Data at 7T is difficult to align between 
runs, adding noise to the data that originates in the preprocessing in addition to the noise in 
the BOLD signal. Additionally, separation of the cortical layers is by hand and is time-
intensive and is subject to human error. Whilst some groups have used automated software 
(Kok et al., 2016) these methods are not yet validated nor in universal use. Furthermore, 
fMRI resolution cannot be endlessly refined. Without significant improvements in gradient 
and detector technology, we cannot image at a higher resolution irrespective of the magnetic 
field strength (van der Kolk, Hendrikse, Zwanenburg, Visser, & Luijten, 2013). A parallel 
evolution of gradients, coils, and magnetic field strength is required. As fMRI is a measure of 
blood flow, imaging resolution is inherently limited to the point spread function of the BOLD 
signal; although micro-scale detail can nonetheless leave an  imprint, for example in the use 
of adaptation paradigms to image orientation columns (Yacoub et al., 2008). This can be 
improved by using models of hemodynamic function specifically designed for use in laminar 
layers (Uludağ & Blinder, 2017). 
 
6.7. Does Early Visual Cortex Represent Visual Awareness? 
 
Our results are consistent with a growing body of literature demonstrating that visual cortex 
represents what subjects perceive, as opposed to acting as a passive receiver of exact 
feedforward retinal stimulation (Rees, 2013; Rees et al., 2002; Tong, 2003). Historically, 
electrophysiological results demonstrate little support for V1 involvement in visual 
awareness. fMRI results, however, confirm the role of V1 in perceptual suppression (Maier et 
al., 2008; Wilke et al., 2006). V1 activity co-varies with perceived stimuli during binocular 
rivalry (Haynes & Rees, 2005a, 2006; Lee et al., 2007; Norman, Polyn, Detre, & Haxby, 
2006; Polonsky et al., 2000; Tong, 2003; Tong & Engel, 2001; Tong, Meng, & Blake, 2006). 
In bistable percepts, both higher extrastriate areas and early visual cortical regions can 
represent the perceived stimulus (Kleinschmidt et al., 1998; Muckli et al., 2002; Murray et 
al., 2002; Sterzer et al., 2002). 
 
Although the concepts of consciousness and visual awareness remain controversial (Lamme, 
2014; Rees et al., 2002), our fMRI data demonstrate two cases where changes in neural 
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processing at early sensory levels are related to changes in sensory awareness and the 
corresponding perceptual report, despite unchanging veridical feedforward input (Chapters 3 
and 4). In the case of the multimodal rubber hand illusion (Chapter 3) this sensory awareness 
includes information about tactile stimuli and higher-level body schema, which are 
represented in V1. The RHI suggests that perceived reality is fragile, even when it pertains to 
one’s own body. Additionally, during the RHI V1 even represents perceptions of non-visual 
realities. Body schema in this illusion occurs as a temporary result of coherent feedforward 
inputs, which is then easily modulated by new sensory inputs (Hohwy & Paton, 2010). The 
now-changed body schema representation at higher cortical levels, and the fed-back 
modulations that we observe within V1, may change how ongoing feedforward information is 
processed- after a successful RHI more extreme modulations of body schema become 
possible (such as perceiving a box as part of the body; Hohwy & Paton, 2010). 
 
Multistable percepts provide an excellent opportunity to study the relationship between visual 
awareness and cortical representation (Crick & Koch, 1990). In the case of motion-induced 
blindness (Chapter 4), previous behavioural results suggest that the content of information in 
V1 did not reflect visual awareness, as target properties were retained (including orientation; 
Hofstoetter et al., 2004; Montaser-Kouhsari et al., 2004). Orientation aftereffects in general 
are not perceived despite their effects in V1 (Haynes & Rees, 2005a; He & MacLeod, 2001; 
Kamitani & Tong, 2005), showing some independence between awareness and V1 
representation. However, in our study we find that visual cortical activity during the illusion 
reflects the subject’s perception of the target- when it is invisible the target is not represented 
in V1, when it is visible it is represented. The target is therefore rendered subliminal during 
MIB- not merely unattended but also reduced in feedforward information (Dehaene, 
Changeux, Naccache, Sackur, & Sergent, 2006; Hesselmann, 2013).  
 
We find mixed results of target activation in V1, although others find increases and decreases 
associated with illusory disappearance (Donner et al., 2008; Schölvinck & Rees, 2010).  In 
our main experimental group we found higher BOLD activation in V5 during MIB compared 
to when the target was visible. However, we did not find significant differences between V1 
activity during MIB and when the target was visible. Donner et al. (2008) found opposite 
activation effects during motion-induced blindness for subregions of visual cortex 
corresponding to the target and to the moving cross array. During MIB the activation of their 
target subregion in V4 decreased quickly after perceptual report. Conversely, mask sub-
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regions in dorsal areas V3AB and pIPS, showed increased BOLD activity at this same time. 
Additionally, they demonstrated a general not spatially specific decrease in V1-V3 during 
MIB.  This suggests that perhaps, in terms of studying BOLD activation, our analyses were 
too specific in their restriction to the target subregion of V1 and V5. Scholvinck and Rees 
(2010) also found an increase in V5 BOLD activity but in contrast with Donner et al (2008) 
they show an increase in V1 activity during MIB. This activation change has also been 
reported in early visual cortex during other bistable percepts (Lee et al., 2007; Polonsky et al., 
2000; Tong & Engel, 2001). As described in chapter 4.1. our paradigm is based on their 
stimuli. Hsieh and Peter (2009) found that reappearance of the target on cessation of MIB 
induced BOLD increase in V1v and V2v, in contrast with the previously described results. 
They also demonstrate decreased BOLD activation in V5 when the target reappears. 
Unusually, target used by Hsieh and Peter (2009) was the same colour as the cross array 
surrounding it, and was very small at a relatively high eccentricity. Wells and Leber (2014) 
suggest that the discrepancy between Scholvinck and Rees (2010) and Donner et al’s (2008) 
results could be accounted for by a difference in the coherence of the cross array. In one 
study this was a 2D mask (Schölvinck & Rees, 2010) and in the other a 3D a random dot 
cloud (Donner et al., 2008). This aligns our paradigm and results more closely with that of 
Schölvinck and Rees (2010).   
 
One outstanding question, particularly in MIB, is the direction of the relationship between 
conscious perception and stimulus representation in early sensory cortices (Sterzer & Rees, 
2006). Does top-down perception produce perceived target blindness and modulate V1 
representation, or is disruption in V1 necessary for subjects to perceive target disappearance? 
Conscious access to stimuli varies as a function of expectation and prior information, 
suggesting that top-down modulations have a large effect on visual awareness (Melloni, 
2014). Furthermore, V1 change alone is insufficient to cause consciousness changes (Lamme, 
2006; Lamme, Supèr, Landman, Roelfsema, & Spekreijse, 2000; Rees et al., 2002; Tong, 
2003). However representation in the early visual cortices may be a prerequisite for 
information to reach higher-level consciousness (Lamme & Roelfsema, 2000; Tong, 2003). 
Sensory percepts are influenced by top-down information before and after stimulus inputs 
(Rees, 2013), suggesting that a reciprocal relationship between top-down and bottom-up 
representations of the stimulus are required for stimulus awareness. Lamme (2014) also 
proposed that recurrent communication is important for differentiating conscious and 
unconscious perception (see also Bullier, 2001; Lamme & Roelfsema, 2000). At the level of 
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V1, it is also possible that during MIB dominant subpopulations of cells represent perceived 
stimuli, whilst other subpopulations represent alternative/feedforward input (as is the case 
during perceptual rivalry, Leopold & Logothetis, 1996). Lastly Bachmann and Hudetz (2015) 
suggest that apical amplification itself may determine whether content is conscious, further 
supporting that feedback to layer V pyramidal neurons in V1 may allow amplification of the 
target stimulus when it is visible and the field stimulus during target invisibility (see also 
Phillips et al., 2015). Layer specific recording could address questions about perceptual 
awareness by testing whether the representational layer profile of a stimulus in V1 is different 
for stimuli with and without awareness. 
 
MIB can also arise completely out with visual awareness when the inducer stimulus is 
concealed by continuous flash suppression (CFS; Dieter et al., 2015). Whilst Dieter et al. 
(2015) suggest this is indicative of low level feedforward stimulus fluctuations underlying 
MIB, this finding does not mean that high level processing does not occur during MIB. 
Whilst MIB may not require consciousness awareness, lateral low level contour filling in  
does (Meng et al., 2007). High level computation can occur outside awareness (Lamme, 
2014), contextual stimuli break through CFS faster than other stimuli (Stein, Hebart, & 
Sterzer, 2011; Stein & Sterzer, 2014; Wang, Weng, & He, 2012), and CFS breakthrough is 
modulated by expectation (Pinto, van Gaal, de Lange, Lamme, & Seth, 2015; e.g. during 
perceptual blindness there is nonetheless unconscious processing of higher level 
information). Motion integration also occurs during CFS (Faivre & Koch, 2014). This 
integration could be one mechanism by which motion-induced target blindness occurs during 
CFS. However, Kanzisa illusory figures do not complete when under CFS, therefore context 
illusions may require conscious awareness (Harris, Schwarzkopf, Song, Bahrami, & Rees, 
2011). Crucially, recent evidence suggests that higher level processing may still occur due to 
significant limitations of the suppressive effects of CFS. Low level details may still be 
consciously perceived during CFS (for example location, Zadbood, Lee, & Blake, 2011). 
Recent work by Gelbard-Sagiv, Faivre, Mudrik, and Koch (2016) demonstrated that high 
level facial priming effects only happen during CFS if one low level feature is perceivable. 
Thus, here MIB features may still be visible even if they are not consciously perceived.  
 
Our data cannot comment on V1 representation during FFD, however previous work has 
demonstrated increased activation with increased perceived distortion (Wen & Kung, 2014). 
Future studies using TMS could determine whether V1 upregulation promotes perceived 
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distortion and/or if V1 disruption reduces the perception of distortion, thus clarifying the 
causal contribution of V1 to distortion. Further work would be required using MVPA to 
determine whether facial identities are represented differently depending on perceived 
distortion, although the temporal dynamics required to elicit the illusion make FFD a poor 
choice for fMRI investigation into the link between representation and awareness.  
 
It is important to note that we rely on correlations between fMRI data and behavioural report 
to study the effects of visual awareness in these illusions (Hesselmann, 2013; Overgaard, 
Rote, Mouridsen, & Ramsøy, 2006). The results we observe are therefore conflated with the 
effects of responding (Aru, Bachmann, Singer, & Melloni, 2012; De Graaf, Hsieh, & Sack, 
2012) and do not allow us to separate conscious perception from a report of conscious 
perception (Fahrenfort & Lamme, 2012; Lamme, 2014). Additionally, we differentiate 
perceptual state through subjective, not objective, reports (Hesselmann, 2013). Future 
motion-induced blindness paradigms may better study the relationship between visual 
awareness and V1 representation if a single classifier model is applied at each time point. The 
decoding accuracy could then be correlated with the perceptual reports (Tsuchiya, Wilke, 
Frässle, & Lamme, 2015). Frässle, Sommer, Jansen, Naber, and Einhäuser (2014) note that a 
reliance on perceptual report as the only measure of perceptual state can be a crucial 
conceptual constraint when interpreting data. Whilst perceptual report matches objective 
measures like pupilometry in binocular rivalry, neural activity is affected by subjects 
reporting their perception (Frässle et al., 2014). Thus, we cannot ascertain whether asking 
participants to report changes in illusory percept has had an effect on the BOLD activation 
results we report in either Chapter 3 or Chapter 4.2. This is of particular concern for 
Chapter 3 as perceptual choice can be represented in the pattern of multivariate activity. 
Given the multitude of ways that feedback can impact on V1 activity (chapter 1.2) it is not 
unlikely that this would include perceptual choice. It is important to note that in Chapter 4.2 
we never decode between perceptual choices. As an alternative to perceptual report, the use 
pupilometry in MIB is promising (Kloosterman, Meindertsma, Loon, et al., 2015; as 
described in chapter 4.1.). 
 
6.8. Illusions May be an Effect of Cortical Prediction 
 
We have argued that the cortex produces perception from the interplay of feedforward 
sensory data, fed back context and lateral connectivity. However, this mechanistic approach 
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explains how but not why vision and other senses are constructed and not veridical. Why is 
feedback integrated into true sensory data to produce perception? One potential function of 
cortical feedback is hierarchical predictive coding. As described in chapter 1.5., hierarchical 
predictive coding theories hypothesise that the cortex aims to predict incoming sensory 
information using top-down modelled expectations, which are based on its history of learnt 
associations (Clark, 2013; Friston, 2010; Mumford, 1992; Rao & Ballard, 1999). It compares 
these to real incoming stimulation and updates the high level model using predictive errors 
which highlight the inconsistency between the model and actual incoming stimulation. The 
model for incoming stimulation is communicated through feedback connections, whilst the 
error and representation of the incoming stimulus is communicated through the feedforward 
processing stream. The comparison of these signals occurs at every cortical level, and the 
results of these computations inform neighbouring levels of the cortical hierarchy.  
 
Whilst predictive coding offers an elegant theoretical proposal for global cortical function, 
and explanation for many pre-existing findings, we must also consider its biological 
realisation. The functional possibilities of feedback and feedforward interactions, described 
above, are relatively consistent with predictive coding hypotheses. In predictive coding terms, 
integrative properties and diverse anatomical connectivity of layer V pyramidal cells provide 
a mechanism for fed back predictive models of the world to be integrated with feedforward 
sensory information within the neuronal dendritic tree at each level of the cortical hierarchy 
(Larkum, 2013; Larkum et al., 2009; Larkum et al., 1999):  
 
“the main function of the cortex – to associate external data with an internal representation of 
the world – could in theory be achieved without the need for complex circuitry, and instead 
use a single, essentially 2D sheet of vertically aligned pyramidal neurons”.   
(Larkum, 2013, p 145). 
 
Intracellular integration and apical amplification mean that the firing pattern formed by 
feedforward inputs (prediction errors in predictive coding theories) would be strongly 
mediated by feedback inputs to the dendrite (Bastos et al., 2012; Larkum, 2013). This allows 
the predictive brain to select the likely sensory interpretation given the top-down predictive 
model and sensory data (Douglas & Martin, 2007). The flexibility inherent in the system 
allows feedforward inputs that best match top-down predictions to have more influence as 
when a neuronal population is predicted by the top-down model, it will be easier to drive 
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spiking and therefore cortical representation (Bastos et al., 2012; Friston, 2002; Larkum, 
2013). If the top-down prediction of selected input is strong enough, feedback can be 
influential enough to drive a response to stimuli that a cortical area is not selective for. For 
example, Egner, Monti, and Summerfield (2010) show that face areas will respond to houses 
under strong face expectations. Petro, Vizioli, et al. (2015) therefore term these pyramidal 
neurons ‘prediction units’. Predictive coding theories also predict the inhibitory effects of 
feedback connections (Bastos et al., 2012). Feedback to cortical microcircuits is largely 
inhibitory, consistent with a predictive brain which aims to suppress all which it has predicted 
(Bastos et al., 2012). Layer I, the target of feedback, is dominated by inhibitory cells (Chu, 
Galarreta, & Hestrin, 2003) which act upon computations in the midlayers (feedforward 
sensory information; Chu et al., 2003; Wozny & Williams, 2011). 
 
One challenge for predictive coding accounts lies in how matches or mismatches between 
predictions and sensory data are realised. BAC signalling suggests that pyramidal neuron 
response will be amplified and spiking increased when the top-down prediction received at 
the apical tuft dendrite matches bottom-up sensory input to the basal dendrite (Larkum, 2013; 
Phillips, 2015). This supports theories such as Active Resonance (ART; Grossberg, 2013), 
however the central dogma of many predictive coding accounts is that activation should be 
reduced for predicted stimuli, thus justifying the economy of the system (Alink et al., 2010; 
Friston, 2009, 2010; Olsen, Bortone, Adesnik, & Scanziani, 2012; Petro, Vizioli, et al., 2015). 
One potential explanation for this contradiction is that BAC and apical amplification act 
within a single pyramidal neuron, whilst predictive coding may be implicated by the entire 
cortical column (Petro, Vizioli, et al., 2015; Phillips, 2015). The sum of a cortical column’s 
computation could silence predicted information, even if it is amplified at the level of an 
individual layer V neuron (Bastos et al., 2012; Petro, Vizioli, et al., 2015). Predicted stimuli 
could for example be disamplified through the inhibition of apical amplification (Phillips et 
al., 2015). It is therefore an outstanding question how amplification in Layer V could be 
coherent with inhibition in layers II/III. Although many details of intracellular and 
intercellular computation remain unknown, known properties of intracellular computation 
and the cortical microcircuit could allow predictive coding to function in the cortex.  
 
Cortical prediction may play a role in the studies presented in this thesis. In the rubber hand 
illusion, the illusion may arise because the rubber hand belonging to the body is the most 
coherent explanation of inputs from vision, proprioception and tactile stimulation during 
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synchronous stimulation  (Hohwy & Paton, 2010; Limanowski et al., 2014; Seth, 2013). In 
typical experience, consistent inputs from these senses would identify a correct limb, and that 
high level body schema model would be propagated down the cortical hierarchy. Several 
known variations of the RHI support this proposition, as if any of the inputs are reduced or 
incoherent then the illusion is reduced- asynchronous visuotactile stimulation reduces illusion 
perception (Botvinick & Cohen, 1998; Ehrsson et al., 2005; Ehrsson et al., 2004) and 
increased proprioceptive disparity leads to reduced illusion (Costantini & Haggard, 2007). 
Conversely adding a fourth piece of evidence in the form of agency dramatically increases 
the illusion strength (Kalckert & Ehrsson, 2012). The RHI paradigm challenges the idea of 
top-down body image as a robust phenomenon. Instead the illusion suggests that it results 
from ongoing computation, which bottom-up visuotactile and proprioceptive information can 
direct (Hohwy & Paton, 2010). Interestingly, making body image malleable leaves it open to 
more variation- after a successful illusion, one can easily generalise to even less likely cases 
of non-hand objects (Armel & Ramachandran, 2003; Hohwy & Paton, 2010). The top-down 
body image model is less reliable, so it is more easily updated by new feedforward input.  
 
We observe univariate differences in activation between illusory conditions in Chapter 3. In 
concordance with prediction error theory the ‘inconsistent’ conditions- illusion perception 
during asynchronous stimulation and no illusion perception during synchronous stimulation- 
are those which elicit the most activation in visual cortical areas during RHI stimulation. We 
also observe significant representational similarity in V1 during illusion perception across 
trials and subjects. At each cortical level, error remains distinct from representational units 
(Clark, 2013). Representations can therefore be sharpened by feedback influences (producing 
less variability among representations of the same stimulus/condition), whilst feedforward 
activation is reduced as a result of lessened prediction error  (Friston, 2005; Kok et al., 2012). 
Prediction in the brain is therefore consistent with both the sharpening of multivariate pattern 
and reduction of activation in early visual cortical response (Kok et al., 2012; Spratling, 
2008b). This conceptualisation requires functional distinction in the neuroanatomy for 
subpopulations encoding perceptual causes (the predictive model) and prediction error 
(Friston, 2005). This may be realised through the separation of feedback to the apical dendrite 
and feedforward input to the basal dendrites of pyramidal neurons (Larkum, 2013; Phillips, 
2015).  
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Predictive mechanisms may also apply during MIB. Target disappearance may occur partially 
because the target is unchanging, inconsistent with the moving object, and therefore 
uninformative about the motion of the field (Sterzer et al., 2009). The top-down model of the 
stimulus therefore becomes dominated by the motion field and the target disappears as 
motion feedback distorts its feedforward representation. Alternatively, when the target is 
invisible to subjects the observed distortion in feedforward stimulus representation could 
induce additional noise in the feedforward signal. This would give the feedforward 
information less weighting and therefore less influence on the perceptual outcome  (Hohwy, 
2012). However, this suggestion is in contrast to results showing that increased attention 
increases target disappearance, as attention also boosts the precision of sensory inputs. Future 
investigations could probe whether MIB relies on prediction mechanisms by altering the 
coherence (‘precision’ in predictive coding terms) of the motion field- less coherent motion 
fields should produce less robust illusion perception. In terms of neurobiology (see Chapter 
6.6), MIB is a case where a driving signal is always present for modulatory activity to act 
upon. My intuition is that therefore the modulatory presynaptic (feedback or lateral) input in 
MIB represents a chosen percept and therefore dictates the resulting conscious percept. This 
suggests that any stimulus change would increase the likelihood of perceptual reappearance 
of the target, which has been demonstrated by Wu, Busch, Fabre-Thorpe, and VanRullen 
(2009) (a nearby flash causes target reappearance during MIB). In our study (Chapter 4.2) 
two subjects reported that the red fixation colour change caused target reappearance. 
 
Hohwy et al. (2008) propose a predictive coding model for bistable stimuli with two 
representations in competition, which allows for switches between the perceptual options, as 
observed during MIB (Hohwy et al., 2008; Sterzer et al., 2009). Although perceptually 
invisible, the suppressed stimulus (for example the target) is still present and is unexplained 
by the top-down predictive model which suppresses it (the motion field). The prediction error 
associated with the unexplained stimulus increases (expressed as BOLD) and rises up the 
cortical hierarchy until the supressed stimulus regains awareness. The same pattern of 
escalating error will then occur with the other competing perception. This conceptualisation 
may explain why MIB literature has shown both activation increases and decreases in V1 
during MIB as the activation would start low then increase across time when the target is 
supressed (Donner et al., 2008; Schölvinck & Rees, 2010). In support of this idea, MIB works 
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best under conditions of high perceptual competition- extremely salient targets surrounded by 
very coherently moving items drastically increase the length of target disappearance in the 
MIB illusion (Bonneh et al., 2001). Biased competition theories such as those proposed by 
Donner et al. are highly compatible with inferential brain theories such as Bayesian brain 
theories and predictive coding (Feldman & Friston, 2010). Prediction may also interact with 
attention during MIB. Attention is thought to adjust prediction error weightings (Kok et al., 
2012) and reduced attention to the stimulus array slows perceptual switches for MIB 
(Schölvinck & Rees, 2009). However, attention directed away from the target also reduces 
disappearance whilst the effects of attention on prediction error weightings would predict 
increased disappearance (Geng et al., 2007; Schölvinck & Rees, 2009). 
 
In Chapter 5 we hypothesise that predictive mechanisms may underlie FFD. Under non-
experimental stimulus conditions faces do not rapidly change in the same retinotopic space 
without moving. Therefore relatively quick changes between stimuli without interspersed 
masking causes distortion when the new face is compared to previous faces in retinotopic 
space. Wen and Kung (2014)’s demonstration of increased early visual cortical activation 
paired with increased perceived distortion is consistent with the idea that increased prediction 
error is related to distortion (Alink et al., 2010). This account of FFD makes some specific 
predictions for ongoing experiments; for example less low level visual differences between 
successive faces should induce less activation in V1 and less accompanying perceived 
distortion. It would therefore be highly informative to study the illusion using fMRI and face 
stimuli which are more or less dissimilar in their feedforward visual information. 
 
Whilst it is tempting to accept that cortical prediction can explain our data, and many other 
existing results, predictive coding theories still attract significant controversy. In Clark’s view 
(2013) action-oriented predictive coding models (Friston, 2009, 2010) come close to creating 
a unified theory of cortical function; encompassing perception, attention, and action. He 
praises their basis in previous theoretical work; including their relationship to Bayesian 
theories of inference, computational approaches to data, and their close correspondence with 
modern knowledge of neuronal behaviour. He additionally praises the breadth of predictive 
coding’s applications.  
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However, it is this breadth that dilutes the impact of such theories. Predictive coding theories 
are currently so broad as to be unfalsifiable. Predictive coding is not concretely formulated, 
nor does it make precise predictions about data (Kogo & Trengove, 2015). The breadth of the 
theory also makes it difficult to test in a rational fashion. As cortical prediction is proposed to 
be embedded in all senses, a research paradigm that exemplified this theory and tested 
specific hypotheses would be impossible to design. Alternatively, one could review 
thousands of experiments across many years in order to determine their coherence with a 
fully realised pre-determined concept. However, simply reviewing existing 
phenomenological data using phrasing taken from outlines of predictive coding theory is not 
sufficient (Kogo & Trengove, 2015). Predictive coding theories therefore currently represent 
more a thematic framework from which to consider cortical processing behaviour than a 
specified and testable theory (Bubic et al., 2010). 
 
Spratling’s (2013) commentary on Clark (2013) raises an important concern; specific 
implementations of predictive coding theory are often mistaken for the overarching theory. 
The variance between implementations of predictive coding theories also leaves room for 
aspects to remain unspecified. As the term applies to a group of theories, not to a singular 
dogma, there is variation to allow for one implementation of the expansive theory to explain 
one result and another implementation to explain a contrasting result (for example the 
differing views on prediction error and resulting cortical actvity espoused by Grossberg, 
2013; Muckli & Petro, 2013; Spratling, 2010). For example, Rao and Ballard (1999) 
proposed that endstopping cells express prediction error about the discontinuation of an 
otherwise consistent line, whilst data  demonstrated that this activation increases when there 
are collinear lines outside the receptive field of the cell (Kapadia et al., 1998; Kapadia, 
Westheimer, & Gilbert, 2000). This suggests that in fact feedback amplifies the activation, 
characterising this as a match to a prediction. This finding is consistent with theories by 
Grossberg (2013); Phillips (2015); or Spratling (2010), but not with existing theories arising 
from Muckli and Petro (2013); or Rao and Ballard (1999). Furthermore, the proposed 
mechanism for predictive coding within pyramidal neurons- in which the feedforward 
cascade carries error and representation and the feedback cascade carries predictions (above) 
is only one theoretical way that neuronal mechanisms can be grouped. The feedforward 
cascade could equally carry predictions (Spratling, 2008a; Spratling, 2013).  
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The complexity of predictions across temporal scales has not been clarified (Bubic et al., 
2010). One could have long-term predictions based on a lifetime of experience and also short 
term predications based on recent learning with near-immediate consequence (Schubotz, 
2007). These are difficult to conceptualise and integrate in the current theory, which contains 
suggestions for spatially disparate as compared to spatially local predictions, but not for 
temporally disparate as compared to temporally local predictions. Despite some attempt by 
Larkum (2013), predictive coding theory is not well reconciled with neuronal computation at 
varying scales. As mentioned, there is significant ongoing debate about whether unexpected 
stimuli and prediction error should incur activation or deactivation in fMRI or 
electrophysiological recordings. Controversy also surrounds whether activation implies only 
error or also representational updating (Kogo & Trengove, 2015). This query makes the 
interpretation of data difficult. We previously mentioned data from Kok et al. (2016) showing 
that in Kanizsa triangles (Kanizsa, 1976) BOLD activity is upregulated for the illusory 
shapes. Is this BOLD activity indicative of prediction error or does it denote modification of 
the representation to match predictions of a shape? All fMRI data demonstrating error for 
unexpected stimuli shares this concern- is this representational updating or predictive error? 
Can the two be distinguished? Additionally, even the clearest propositions of Bayesian and 
predictive coding theories illuminate only the most well-defined cases of visual perception 
and action and fail to fully conceptualise highly cognitive processes such as imagination 
(Bubic et al., 2010).  
 
Even if the neuronal mechanisms of predictive coding were completely clarified, testing 
methods are not currently advanced enough to examine these hypotheses. Current theories of 
neural computation specify that prediction, error, and representation occur interactively 
within the same cortical microcircuit (Larkum, 2013; Phillips, 2015). These neurons would 
be impossible to differentiate with coarser spatial methods like fMRI and EEG, and highly 
difficult even with single unit recording (Kogo & Trengove, 2015), particularly as feedback 
is thought to be better revealed by energy use at the synapse, blood flow, and therefore 
through fMRI (Logothetis, 2003, 2008).  
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Although much human psychophysical and neural data approximates the computation 
proposed in Bayesian brain theories and predictive coding theories, this does not serve as 
proof that this is what the cortex is doing. It is possible that cortical processing merely 
resembles Bayesian inference and prediction (Kogo & Trengove, 2015). The massive 
generalisability of cortical predictive coding means that few current theories of cortical 
function specifically challenge the overarching theory; that the brain uses priors to infer the 
state of the world. Furthermore, it is important to note that inferential processing has been a 
dominant idea in considerations of the human mind for centuries (see Chapter 1.3.). 
Hawkins and Ahmad (2016) have recently expanded predictive and inferential brain theories 
to integrate the function of memory as a basis for prediction, spread across layers of neurons 
in the neocortex. This theory first appears in Hawkins 2004 book, On Intelligence (Hawkins 
& Blakeslee, 2004). As mentioned in Chapter 1.5. Grossberg has proposed a similar theory in 
Adaptive Resonance Theory (ART) – suggesting that feedback directs attention to expected 
stimuli, providing resonant similarity to learned expectations, which drive learning 
(Grossberg, 2013). As attention is directed to expected stimuli, this theory does not support 
the concept of predictive error. In adaptive resonance theory, unexpected stimuli (not 
predicted by top down modelling) force the brain to conduct hypotheses and learn how to 
predict the world better. Given the similarities between predictive coding and ART, the 
neuronal architecture described in chapter 6.6 is also entirely consistent with ART as insofar 
known.  
 
We currently still do not know how the brain reacts to specific illusions like those covered in 
this thesis. Whilst it is important to consider overarching theory, it is premature to assign the 
results regarding BOLD activity and the pattern of BOLD activity described in this thesis to 
any aspects of predictive coding theory. Whilst these theories are seductive in their ubiquity, 
we must be cautious in fully endorsing them. It is clear that the brain communicates in 
several different directions – feedforward, feedback, and laterally within cortical areas. 
However, until the mathematical theory is translated into highly specific neurophysiological 
predictions for the data, and until we are equipped with the method to study these exact 
predictions, there remains a gulf between theory and concrete neural mechanisms. There is a 
theoretical possibility that Bayesian brain theories and predictive coding theories could be 
one day be specified concretely and precisely enough that they would be directly testable. 
However, cognitive neuroscience is not currently in that place.  
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6.9. Illusion Studies may Elucidate Deficits in Schizophrenia 
 
Several illusory phenomenon, including the illusions presented in this thesis, are prime tools 
for investigation into clinical populations (Notredame et al., 2015; White & Shergill, 2012). 
Normal constructive perception, illusions, and hallucinations share a notable similarity- they 
are visual (or other sensory) experiences which are only partially constrained by actual 
sensory input. However, hallucinations are dissimilar in one important aspect. Visual 
perception and visual illusions always have inducing stimuli, whereas hallucinations can be 
entirely internally generated. As discussed in Chapter 1.3, schizophrenic subjects 
demonstrate notable atypicalities in illusion perception. In typical subjects, illusions 
demonstrate a tendency towards perceiving what is dictated by feedback or top-down 
information, as opposed to veridical feedforward input (Notredame et al., 2015). 
Schizophrenic differences usually manifest as reduced illusory experience, particularly if the 
illusion is caused by the context or is an example of surround suppression e.g. there is less 
feedback influence (Chen et al., 2008; Dakin et al., 2005; Uhlhaas et al., 2004). Importantly, 
the deficits seen in illusion perception in schizophrenia often suggest that the affected 
systems are upstream regions, as illusions relying only on low level computations remain 
unaffected (Tibber et al., 2012; Yang et al., 2013). 
 
The positive symptoms of schizophrenia- hallucinations and delusions- can be characterised 
as failures of feedback and feedforward interactions. Schizophrenic symptoms of psychosis 
have also been conceptualised in terms of predictive coding (Fletcher & Frith, 2009; Friston, 
2005), with the disruption arising from feedforward and feedback signalling. Hallucinations 
are perceptions in the absence of inducing stimuli (or which surpass the inducing stimuli), 
considered to arise from the over exertion of top-down predictions over true input (Corlett et 
al., 2011; Corlett et al., 2010; Fletcher & Frith, 2009). In this manner, they are similar to our 
conceptualisation of illusions. In delusions, maladapted or absent top-down modulation was 
thought to allocate aberrant salience to stimuli, promoting learning and further disrupted 
feedback information (Corlett & Fletcher, 2012; Corlett et al., 2010; Fletcher & Frith, 2009; 
Friston & Kiebel, 2009; Kapur, 2003). A reduction in fed back predictions has also been used 
to explain reduced illusion perception in schizophrenic subjects (Silverstein & Keane, 2011). 
These propositions demonstrate a great conflict in schizophrenia research- differing results 
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and symptomology suggest both strong top-down effects on perception and also a stronger 
impact of feedforward information or veridical perception (Notredame et al., 2015). 
 
Adams et al. (2013) suggest a resolution to this conflict may be that psychosis results from 
issues not with top-down prediction, but from a dysfunctional balance of the precision and 
weightings of fed forward sensory input and fed back predictions (Corlett et al., 2011; 
Friston, 2005; Schmack et al., 2013). They hypothesise that hallucinations result from 
enhanced top-down precision, allowing feedback to completely dominate sensory experience 
and falsely infer sensory stimulation (Schmack et al., 2013; Schmack et al., 2015). Delusions 
instead arise when precision and weightings of fed forward prediction error are increased, 
promoting attention to irrelevant stimuli and more updating of higher level predictive models 
on the basis of this inaccurate error information (Fletcher & Frith, 2009; Kapur, 2003). 
Delusions therefore develop across time. This explanation firstly does not require the conflict 
of top-down increase in one psychosis symptom but decrease in other. Secondly, this 
conceptualisation solves the tenacity problem - that if delusions arise purely from too much 
bottom-up influence of sensory data they should be easily changed (Corlett et al., 2010). This 
conceptualisation means that the dysfunction exists in the balance of influence of feedback 
and feedforward information (Jardri & Denève, 2013). 
 
In terms of underlying neurobiology, greater precision is implemented in the brain by gain in 
the post-synaptic feedforward error signal (Feldman & Friston, 2010). This increase in gain 
heightens the weighting of the feedforward error signal. In line with the description of the 
neurobiology of feedforward and feedback described in Chapter 6.6 and 6.8; the pyramidal 
cell structures in superficial layers are thought to calculate these aberrant prediction errors. 
Importantly, glutamatergic NMDA receptor function modulates the post-synaptic gain of 
information and integration in the pyramidal neuron (Adams et al., 2013). This information 
can be integrated over long time periods, allowing feedback input to distal synapses to affect 
the output of the cell. NMDA receptor dysfunction is central to schizophrenia (Corlett et al., 
2011). Dopaminergic activity also modulates synaptic gain, and again is dysfunctional in 
schizophrenia (Corlett et al., 2011; Friston, 2009, 2010). Consistent with the layer 
architecture of both feedback and feedforward processing, a review by Harrison and 
Weinberger (2005) showed that most recorded neuropathologies in schizophrenia were in the 
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midlayers and layer V (Adams et al., 2013). The majority of the obvious neuropathology is 
concentrated in high level prefrontal and temporal cortices, with particular deficits 
supragranular layers that contain superficial pyramidal cells.  
 
Schizophrenic brains also demonstrate non-typical computations throughout the cortical 
microcircuit including deficits in inhibition (O'Donnell, 2011). If excitatory cortical loops are 
allowed to run riot with reduced inhibitory control, then both feedforward and feedback 
information will become stronger. Notredame et al. (2015) characterised this as a ‘circular 
propagation’ of issues- feedforward information is perpetuated up the hierarchy without 
inhibition where it affects high level representations, in turn feedback (affected by the 
feedforward input) can completely change the perception of feedforward activity when it is 
propagated down the hierarchy (Notredame et al., 2015). A reduction of inhibition therefore 
biases the system in two ways. Essentially the neuropathology observed in subject groups 
supports a hypothesis of dysfunction in pyramidal cell computation; mediated by issues with 
NMDA receptor function, and glutamatergic, GABAergic, and dopaminergic processing 
(particularly D1; Adams et al., 2013).  
 
In the two illusions we investigate in fMRI, schizophrenic subjects experience a mixture of 
enhanced and reduced illusory effects. The rubber hand illusion (Chapters 2 and 3) is 
stronger in patient groups, quicker in onset, and induces greater distortion of perceived real 
hand position (Peled et al., 2003; Peled et al., 2000; Thakkar et al., 2011). Positive symptoms 
are related to increased illusion experience only during synchronous stimulation (Peled et al., 
2003; Thakkar et al., 2011). The distinction between the self and other may be diminished in 
schizophrenia (Asai et al., 2011) and this is potentially related to their difficulty in separating 
self-generated from externally-generated actions (Blakemore et al., 2000; Synofzik et al., 
2010; Voss et al., 2010). The rubber hand illusion may also be relevant for theories of how 
schizophrenic delusions arise- in this illusion psychiatrically healthy subjects accept unusual 
explanations for bottom-up sensory stimuli (that the rubber hand belongs to their body). This 
is in concordance with theories that propose that delusions are correct responses to atypical 
inputs (Fletcher & Frith, 2009). If feedforward input is dysfunctionally over weighted, then 
false beliefs will perpetuate (Hohwy & Paton, 2010). 
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These results have several potential explanations from bidirectional cortical processing. The 
combined feedforward inputs from visual, tactile, and proprioceptive senses must be coherent 
to incite the RHI (synchronous stimulation; Botvinick & Cohen, 1998; Hohwy & Paton, 
2010; Paton et al., 2012). These feedforward signals are in contrast to internal, top-down 
body schema which models the existing hand as a body part. In typical subjects, coherent 
feedforward information from multiple modalities is sufficient to overcome and alter the 
existing body schema to incorporate the rubber hand. This new schema shows strong 
hallucination-like effects- subjects feel as if the rubber hand  is the source of their sensation 
and even perceive the newly-integrated rubber hand as being more aesthetically similar to 
their existing limb. In schizophrenic subjects, either the multimodal bottom-up inputs are 
given more precision and weight in determining the resulting perception, or top-down body 
schema is weaker initially (Mishara & Sterzer, 2015). Given the broader research field, it 
seems likely that the gain of feedforward input is given more weight, resulting in strong 
feedforward influence in updating higher level body schema (Adams et al., 2013; Corlett et 
al., 2011). The new body schema is then fed back down the hierarchy, resulting in stronger 
RHI experience and faster illusion emergence (Thakkar et al., 2011). In our paradigm we 
would anticipate a stronger multivariate pattern for illusion perception in V1 in schizophrenic 
subject groups, indicative of the stronger illusion perception. 
 
Conversely, motion-induced blindness is reduced in schizophrenic subjects, particularly in 
rate of illusory disappearance (Tschacher et al., 2006). MIB experience (rate and duration) 
within the patient group also positively correlates with positive symptoms (hallucinations and 
delusion), whilst negative symptoms were associated with reduced MIB experience. This 
suggests that the top-down motion information we observe in typical subjects is reduced in 
schizophrenic subjects, whilst the strength of the feedforward target presented is retained or 
enhanced. Early visual cortical GABA is correlated with fewer perceptual switches and 
lengthened duration of bistable percepts (van Loon et al., 2013). Schizophrenic subjects show 
reduced GABA in this region, related to more veridical perception in surround suppression 
paradigms (Yoon et al., 2010). The percept is biased to a visible target not to the motion field 
(invisible target). However, the mechanisms of MIB in schizophrenic groups do not precisely 
mimic those seen in other bistable stimuli. In bistable motion paradigms schizophrenic 
subjects show increased switching between two percepts, and do not show the ‘sticking’ to a 
percept seen in typical subjects (Schmack et al., 2015), whilst in MIB subjects stick to the 
veridical percept. Researches have suggested that MIB is not necessarily a case of true 
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bistability as it demonstrates different global and local effects (Jaworska & Lages, 2014). 
Unlike other bistable percepts MIB has one percept which is veridical and one which is 
inferred, whereas during other bistable percepts both percepts are equally veridical. One 
possibility is that top-down feedback influences only apply during target invisibility, against 
Donner et al. (2008) findings, which suggest that there are top-down effects from different 
sources during both target visibility and invisibility.  
 
The different response profile of MIB seen in schizophrenia is consistent with Adams’ 
proposals that precision may be affected in the pyramidal cells of schizophrenic subjects. We 
therefore may not observe the same extent of distortion of the target representation in V1 in 
such groups. Interestingly, schizophrenic subjects also experience less apparent motion 
(Crawford et al., 2010; Sanders et al., 2013). We suggest that MIB and apparent motion share 
a causal mechanism of feedback from V5 to V1 (Muckli et al., 2005; Muckli et al., 2002; 
Sterzer et al., 2006; see Chapter 4). 
 
Due to its relative novelty, FFD has not been investigated in clinical groups. We would 
expect the FFD to be attenuated in schizophrenic populations, as they show attenuation of 
other context illusions (Notredame et al., 2015) and illusions which rely on expectations 
about faces (Dima et al., 2009). FFD may be interesting for use in a clinical population as it 
provides a case where completely typical feedforward face stimulation gives rise to a 
monstrous hallucination-like percept in typical observers. It therefore may also allow us to 
probe how such distortions are formed in healthy patients. 
 
6.10. Conclusions 
 
Visual perception is determined by the combination of feedforward retinal input to the eyes 
and feedback and lateral connections in the cortex which communicates context. This 
constructive mechanism results in highly adaptive perception. However, under certain 
conditions it can also give rise to incorrect percepts or even illusions. Illusions therefore have 
a special status as they can reveal the constructive powers of the visual cortex. This thesis 
aimed to elucidate feedback to early visual cortex during illusions. Furthermore, we aimed to 
develop the understanding of illusory paradigms in order to extend these into schizophrenic 
test groups. As illusions allow us to investigate constructive vision, they also allow us to 
elucidate the feedback and feedforward deficits in schizophrenia. 
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This thesis presented four experiments demonstrating the effects of constructive vision in 
illusions, and the illusion effect on early visual cortical activity. We employed a multimodal 
illusion to demonstrate that the congruency of multimodal feedforward inputs can change 
higher level models of body schema (Chapter 2). We then used fMRI to show that during 
this illusion there is information in early visual cortical activity about the illusory state and its 
congruence with the feedforward input (Chapter 3). In a second fMRI experiment we 
investigated an illusion in which motion causes visual stimuli to go unseen (Chapter 4). We 
demonstrate that illusory effects can interrupt the representation of a salient target in V1 
despite constant feedforward input. This study also showed that V1 activity has a relationship 
with resulting visual awareness. Our data from both fMRI experiments is further evidence 
that top-down feedback has effects at the level of early visual cortex, even in the absence of 
differential feedforward input. In our last experimental chapter we explore a new visual 
illusion which causes perceived monstrous distortion in stimuli despite normal retinal input. 
The illusion appears to arise from object-general comparison mechanisms between 
successively presented stimuli. 
   
Taken together, these chapters demonstrate several illusions that may arise from top-down 
feedback to the level of early visual cortex. We have discussed these results in the context of 
top-down feedback, considering whether lateral connections also contribute to the results we 
observe. We debate how attention may modulate the illusions we use and how it affects our 
data. Importantly we elucidate the biological realisation of feedback and feedforward 
integration in these illusions; proposing that layer-specific processing of feedback and 
feedforward information paired with integration of the two sources within layer V pyramidal 
neurons allows feedback to affect processing in visual cortex. We hypothesise on the 
neurobiological specifics in the illusions detailed in this thesis. We discuss the relationship 
between activity patterns in early visual cortex and the resulting perceptual awareness and 
suggest how our paradigms could be used to investigate consciousness. We propose that the 
predictive coding hypothesis of cortical function could explain the results we and others 
observe, is consistent with the underlying neurobiology, and discuss how our paradigms 
could be adapted to better probe cortical prediction.  
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Lastly, we present evidence that cortical feedback and feedforward contributions are 
dysfunctional in schizophrenia. We consider how this could produce the wide range of 
perceptual deficits observed and the positive symptoms of the disorder- hallucinations and 
delusions. We explore how the neuronal architecture underlying feedback and feedforward 
integration could be at fault in schizophrenia and characterise these deficits in terms of 
predictive coding theory. We discuss the schizophrenic response to illusory stimuli and 
explore the possibilities for using illusion studies like those we detail to elucidate feedback 
and feedforward integration problems in the disorder. If we can elucidate the mechanisms 
underlying these illusions, we can use them to investigate cortical processing in non-
neurotypical populations in future.  
 
Throughout the discussion we propose further avenues for research; specifically in using 
layer-specific high field fMRI to clarify how these illusions are manifested in cortical layers, 
utilising different analysis techniques to better investigate whether feedback is a causal 
mechanism in these illusions, as opposed to a secondary effect, and in applying these 
illusions to schizophrenia research. In terms of the application of these illusions to 
schizophrenia research, motion-induced blindness is a promising research avenue. Whilst the 
mechanisms of the illusion are not yet completely clear, there are recorded behavioural 
differences between schizophrenic and typical populations in the illusion which can be linked 
to the potential theoretical and neural underpinnings. We therefore have clear hypotheses for 
the feedforward and feedback integration differences that may be observed. Future 
investigation using more invasive techniques, such as optogenetic fMRI will be required to 
clarify the relationship between layer-specific BOLD response and neuronal contributions to 
feedback and the integration of feedback and feedforward (Lee et al., 2010).  
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8. APPENDICES 
Appendix 2 
A.2.1. Pairwise comparisons for the main effect of visuotactile synchronicity on Likert 
statement responses.   
 
Table A.2.1. Comparisons between Likert responses for visuotactile asynchronicities. Blue 
highlights demonstrate those which are significant. Significance measurements are Bonferroni 
corrected.  
 
  
Lower Bound Upper Bound
200ms 0.329 0.134 0.249 -0.101 0.758
300ms .571
* 0.172 0.038 0.022 1.121
400ms .782
* 0.189 0.006 0.179 1.385
600ms .832
* 0.195 0.005 0.209 1.455
0ms -0.329 0.134 0.249 -0.758 0.101
300ms 0.243 0.116 0.509 -0.128 0.614
400ms 0.454 0.153 0.083 -0.036 0.943
600ms 0.504 0.181 0.124 -0.076 1.083
0ms -.571
* 0.172 0.038 -1.121 -0.022
200ms -0.243 0.116 0.509 -0.614 0.128
400ms 0.211 0.181 1.000 -0.369 0.790
600ms 0.261 0.171 1.000 -0.287 0.808
0ms -.782
* 0.189 0.006 -1.385 -0.179
200ms -0.454 0.153 0.083 -0.943 0.036
300ms -0.211 0.181 1.000 -0.790 0.369
600ms 0.050 0.118 1.000 -0.329 0.429
0ms -.832
* 0.195 0.005 -1.455 -0.209
200ms -0.504 0.181 0.124 -1.083 0.076
300ms -0.261 0.171 1.000 -0.808 0.287
600ms -0.050 0.118 1.000 -0.429 0.329
Pairwise Comparisons - Visuotactile Asynchronicity
Visuotactile Condition
Mean 
Difference 
(I-J) Std. Error Sig.
95% Confidence Interval
0ms
200ms
300ms
400ms
600ms
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A.2.2. Pairwise comparisons for the main effect of Likert statement on Likert 
statement responses.   
 
Table A.2.2. Comparisons between Likert responses for Likert statements. Blue highlights 
demonstrate those which are significant. Significance measurements are Bonferroni corrected.  
Lower Bound Upper Bound
2 0.725 0.312 0.674 -0.377 1.827
3 1.160 0.384 0.154 -0.196 2.516
4 1.440 0.433 0.079 -0.090 2.970
5 1.475
* 0.416 0.049 0.005 2.945
6 0.715 0.415 1.000 -0.752 2.182
7 1.140 0.367 0.129 -0.157 2.437
1 -0.725 0.312 0.674 -1.827 0.377
3 0.435 0.260 1.000 -0.482 1.352
4 0.715 0.334 0.965 -0.463 1.893
5 0.750 0.312 0.573 -0.353 1.853
6 -0.010 0.239 1.000 -0.853 0.833
7 0.415 0.278 1.000 -0.568 1.398
1 -1.160 0.384 0.154 -2.516 0.196
2 -0.435 0.260 1.000 -1.352 0.482
4 0.280 0.202 1.000 -0.433 0.993
5 0.315 0.147 0.973 -0.205 0.835
6 -0.445 0.303 1.000 -1.513 0.623
7 -0.020 0.128 1.000 -0.472 0.432
1 -1.440 0.433 0.079 -2.970 0.090
2 -0.715 0.334 0.965 -1.893 0.463
3 -0.280 0.202 1.000 -0.993 0.433
5 0.035 0.175 1.000 -0.582 0.652
6 -0.725 0.295 0.512 -1.767 0.317
7 -0.300 0.157 1.000 -0.855 0.255
1 -1.475
* 0.416 0.049 -2.945 -0.005
2 -0.750 0.312 0.573 -1.853 0.353
3 -0.315 0.147 0.973 -0.835 0.205
4 -0.035 0.175 1.000 -0.652 0.582
6 -0.760 0.277 0.279 -1.737 0.217
7 -0.335 0.157 0.996 -0.891 0.221
1 -0.715 0.415 1.000 -2.182 0.752
2 0.010 0.239 1.000 -0.833 0.853
3 0.445 0.303 1.000 -0.623 1.513
4 0.725 0.295 0.512 -0.317 1.767
5 0.760 0.277 0.279 -0.217 1.737
7 0.425 0.274 1.000 -0.544 1.394
1 -1.140 0.367 0.129 -2.437 0.157
2 -0.415 0.278 1.000 -1.398 0.568
3 0.020 0.128 1.000 -0.432 0.472
4 0.300 0.157 1.000 -0.255 0.855
5 0.335 0.157 0.996 -0.221 0.891
6 -0.425 0.274 1.000 -1.394 0.544
Pairwise Comparisons - Likert Statement
Likert Statement
Mean 
Difference 
(I-J) Std. Error Sig.
95% Confidence Interval
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
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A.2.3. 95% Confidence intervals on the mean for the interactive effects of visuotactile 
synchronicity and Likert statement on Likert statement responses.   
 
 
Table A.2.3. 95% Confidence intervals for Likert responses for the interaction between 
visuotactile asynchronicities and Likert statements.  
  
Lower Bound Upper Bound
1 4.275 0.436 3.359 5.191
2 4.025 0.468 3.041 5.009
3 3.125 0.390 2.305 3.945
4 2.575 0.308 1.928 3.222
5 2.550 0.376 1.759 3.341
6 3.325 0.450 2.379 4.271
7 3.100 0.322 2.424 3.776
1 4.000 0.501 2.948 5.052
2 3.225 0.438 2.306 4.144
3 2.775 0.391 1.953 3.597
4 2.375 0.295 1.754 2.996
5 2.525 0.377 1.733 3.317
6 3.225 0.473 2.231 4.219
7 2.550 0.349 1.818 3.282
1 3.650 0.460 2.684 4.616
2 2.925 0.446 1.988 3.862
3 2.625 0.388 1.809 3.441
4 2.250 0.305 1.609 2.891
5 2.100 0.310 1.449 2.751
6 2.975 0.385 2.167 3.783
7 2.450 0.325 1.768 3.132
1 3.300 0.461 2.331 4.269
2 2.500 0.393 1.675 3.325
3 2.250 0.324 1.570 2.930
4 2.200 0.267 1.638 2.762
5 1.975 0.281 1.385 2.565
6 2.800 0.415 1.929 3.671
7 2.475 0.266 1.917 3.033
1 3.425 0.462 2.454 4.396
2 2.350 0.411 1.486 3.214
3 2.075 0.263 1.523 2.627
4 2.050 0.221 1.585 2.515
5 2.125 0.326 1.440 2.810
6 2.750 0.420 1.867 3.633
7 2.375 0.341 1.658 3.092
Pairwise Comparisons - Visuotactile Condition x Statement
Visuotactile Condition Mean Std. Error
95% Confidence Interval
0ms
200ms
300ms
400ms
600ms
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Appendix 3 
 
Appendix 3.1. V1 TAL Coordinates and Number of Voxels 
 
 
Table A.3.1. Mean TAL coordinates, TAL coordinate standard deviations, and number of voxels 
for the V1 ROI of each subject. 
  
  
V1 mean x mean y mean z std dev x std dev y std dev z n voxels
S1 7.86 -80.15 9.66 3.73 8.84 5.74 5926
S2 5.71 -82.84 -3.28 3.77 8.55 9.92 7713
S3 12.48 -86.67 6.14 4.25 8.76 7.58 6402
S4 8.33 -89.5 3.89 3.97 6.04 10.57 6830
S5 12.07 -83 3.42 5.79 8.19 5.75 6258
S6 5.07 -82.28 -6.88 4.78 7.6 8.61 6089
S7 11.47 -88.01 0.6 8.23 6.95 9.8 8683
S8 9.89 -78.61 -7.79 6.2 7.41 5.07 5307
S9 8.78 -85.57 8.19 3.84 8.11 8.1 7858
S10 9.31 -79.98 -9.39 5.34 10.03 9.76 8187
S11 8.91 -81.3 -0.55 5.91 9.63 8.42 8680
S12 0.05 -85.73 -12.98 5.07 8.71 6.96 5332
S13 6.78 -83.34 2.17 5.78 9.25 9.05 8016
S14 8.55 -82.83 4.47 4.32 8.17 7.12 7571
S15 12.63 -80.78 7.26 7.02 10.76 7.54 10115
S16 6.94 -78.86 1.09 4.1 8.71 7.3 5489
S17 8.12 -80.3 -3.39 4.7 8 8.34 5586
S18 8.64 -85.18 -2.42 5.08 9.24 6.43 6803
S19 8.6 -87.95 2.04 7.37 7.87 6.45 6593
S20 12.22 -89.24 -0.19 7.44 8.06 5.54 7150
S21 9.41 -86.04 2.78 6.13 10.36 5.08 6755
S22 6.69 -86.96 10.14 3.98 8.02 6.04 5526
S23 5.54 -88.04 -6.38 4.28 8.58 9.92 7458
Mean TAL Location 8.436956522 -84.05043478 0.373913043 5.264347826 8.514782609 7.612608696 6970.73913
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Appendix 3.2. Left V5 TAL Coordinates and Number of Voxels 
 
 
Table A.3.2. Mean TAL coordinates, TAL coordinate standard deviations, and number of voxels 
for the left V5 ROI of each subject. 
 
  
Left V5 mean x mean y mean z std dev x std dev y std dev z n voxels
S1 -41.86 -65.67 0.21 3.14 2.39 1.23 312
S2 -58.16 -34.77 14.27 4.49 4.38 3.17 1239
S3 -54.26 -40.37 4.24 1.96 1.54 1.42 114
S4 -51.75 -68.29 9.76 3.06 3.32 2.65 421
S5 -60.88 -47.53 10.71 3.94 3.04 4.81 1012
S6 -44.13 -45.33 8.45 1.78 2.75 1.52 181
S7 -53.98 -65.02 13.1 4.27 3.83 3.28 1267
S8 -42.52 -64.86 4.72 3.01 2.21 2.09 321
S9 -44.54 -50.12 -2.12 3.1 2.18 2.46 687
S10 -49.85 -49.22 0.97 3.86 2.76 1.81 596
S11 -37.63 -70.97 6.52 2.63 3.98 2.59 739
S12 -55.6 -49.42 7.02 1.35 1.27 1.39 99
S13 -50.97 -60.55 9.24 2.67 4.1 1.61 432
S14 -53.96 -57.27 4.11 3.2 3.66 2.81 1193
S15 -48.48 -64.35 3.34 2.67 2.85 3.67 939
S16 -45.53 -62.81 10.66 3.61 2.47 2.76 742
S17 -45.96 -67.65 -3.51 4.19 2.56 2.97 1051
S18 -38.72 -58.6 5.09 1.5 2.08 3.24 229
S19 -47.4 -49.23 10.29 3.53 4.39 2.23 619
S20 -55.38 -59.76 2.92 2.7 1.27 2.06 107
S21 -43.49 -65.12 -1.28 4.19 3.7 2.35 546
S22 -37.49 -70.34 5.94 2.26 3.59 2.04 484
S23 -58.04 -55.21 -2.83 3.87 3.95 2.91 1188
S24 -38.38 -74.08 7.07 2.27 2.69 1.75 295
S25 -45.85 -58.92 4.33 2.48 2.01 2.94 377
S26 -52.96 -54.36 9.72 3.9 2.9 2.99 924
S27 -48.68 -67.11 14.78 1.83 1.99 4.23 345
S28 -53.26 -60.72 9.02 2.75 1.69 2.02 395
Mean TAL Location -48.56107143 -58.4875 5.955 3.0075 2.841071429 2.535714286 601.9285714
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Appendix 3.3. Right V5 TAL Coordinates and Number of Voxels 
 
 
Table A.3.3. Mean TAL coordinates, TAL coordinate standard deviations, and number of voxels 
for the right V5 ROI of each subject. 
 
  
Right V5 mean x mean y mean z std dev x std dev y std dev z n voxels
S1 41.53 -62.71 4.59 2.38 2.67 3.09 733
S2 37.13 -62.15 5.17 2.79 3.11 3.37 929
S3 41.02 -61.42 7.26 2.47 1.94 4.27 699
S4 44.44 -55.48 6.61 4.15 3.73 2.1 1046
S5 41.98 -76.57 -0.07 3.2 3.27 2.77 756
S6 43.21 -57.29 1.51 5.91 2.73 4.01 941
S7 41.27 -60.23 5.85 3.22 4.95 1.92 1060
S8 41.52 -58.91 -3.86 1.56 2.47 2.42 292
S9 36.16 -68.12 -0.27 2.16 4.39 2.2 617
S10 47.86 -52.49 -5.07 4.48 3.46 2.34 1283
S11 47.59 -66.2 -0.47 3.83 2.37 3.11 966
S12 49.43 -68.94 -9.87 3.27 3.07 2.81 853
S13 37.55 -59.57 9.05 2.72 3.95 2.4 779
S14 45.16 -65.18 -5.18 6.21 2.82 2.54 1405
S15 45.25 -59.32 5.16 3.44 2.61 2.81 876
S16 42.31 -57.77 6.77 3.75 2.21 3.08 701
S17 43.08 -68.38 0.36 3.43 3.7 2.43 860
S18 43.89 -56.82 5.03 2.7 4.41 2.25 792
S19 41.88 -51.41 7.71 2.87 2.89 3.3 813
S20 44.74 -56.37 0.77 3.02 1.66 1.98 353
S21 39.82 -62.17 5.08 2.58 2.9 2.81 771
S22 45.23 -55.95 0.59 4.15 2.28 2.31 685
S23 36.5 -63.47 -1.48 2.23 5.97 5.96 1172
S24 39.65 -72.19 7.3 1.91 3.25 2.52 384
S25 39.15 -56.64 5.7 2.28 3.44 2.19 657
S26 42.83 -60.02 1.75 2.16 3.5 3.28 824
S27 40.82 -58.31 13.64 2.79 2.72 2.98 716
S28 44.19 -72.43 -1.19 3.93 3.55 3.5 1436
Mean TAL Location 42.32821429 -61.66107143 2.587142857 3.199642857 3.215 2.883928571 835.6785714
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Appendix 3.4. Lateral Occipital Complex TAL Coordinates and Number of Voxels 
 
Table A.3.4. Mean TAL coordinates, TAL coordinate standard deviations, and number of voxels 
for the LOC ROI of each subject.  
LOC mean x mean y mean z std dev x std dev y std dev z n voxels
S1 38.8 -72.84 0.97 3.01 1.62 3.36 518
S2 38.97 -68.02 -4.24 2.55 2.12 3.1 585
S3 43.04 -62.25 -7.02 2.96 5.22 2.13 912
S4 41.09 -68.75 -1.56 3.43 4.93 2.82 1117
S5 28.34 -81.71 -9.2 2.02 2.98 2.93 531
S6 45.09 -72.91 -4.8 2.1 5.43 3.53 614
S7 42.66 -76.34 7.02 2.61 2.59 3.4 792
S8 43.89 -77.25 -8.39 3.22 1.33 0.88 104
S9 36.75 -69.82 -0.99 2.69 2.79 2.16 593
S10 41.39 -72.7 -5.87 3.15 2.25 3.53 755
S11 38.77 -79.5 -4.16 2.62 4.1 2.11 738
S12 44.23 -70.69 -10.47 2.8 3.89 2.31 690
S13 47.22 -74.91 -5.1 2.43 3.36 5.03 1243
S14 41.72 -67.81 -15.19 3.15 3.63 3.34 1282
S15 39.36 -79.28 -3.27 1.96 2.14 1.51 272
S16 39.64 -72.79 4.36 3.53 2.91 2.63 810
S17 43.67 -63.92 -6 2.74 2.56 3.75 884
S18 47.81 -60.82 -9.02 2.96 5.06 3.34 1269
S19 45.95 -72.19 3.79 1.76 2.89 1.73 368
S20 38.1 -67.98 -12.67 1.98 2.56 2.01 381
S21 42.3 -74.64 -6.11 2.89 3.39 2.78 729
S22 43.81 -74.4 -9.76 2.27 3.16 3.33 853
S23 43.06 -73.67 -5.67 3.67 3.09 3.15 895
S24 41.96 -81.63 -0.54 2.06 2.04 2.5 404
S25 45.45 -65.76 -6.2 2.8 3.55 2.21 671
S26 46.98 -72.86 -10.27 2.5 3.88 3.11 803
S27 44.47 -68.05 0.9 2.41 2.26 2.54 508
S28 43.36 -70.69 -16.88 3.15 3.02 3.95 1070
Mean TAL Location 42.06714286 -71.935 -5.226428571 2.693571429 3.169642857 2.8275 728.25
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Appendix 3.5. VHand TAL Coordinates and Number of Voxels  
 
 
Table A.3.5. Mean TAL coordinates, TAL coordinate standard deviations, and number of voxels 
for the VHand ROI of each subject. 
 
  
VHand mean x mean y mean z std dev x std dev y std dev z n voxels
S1 10.17 -80.26 7.03 3.02 2.25 2.16 544
S2 1.3 -84.19 -0.65 1.48 2.28 1.63 219
S3 7.62 -74.06 -2.59 1.38 1.27 1.46 106
S4 13.39 -85.16 -1.48 2.64 1.82 2.44 228
S5 1.81 -84.86 -3.48 2.74 1.78 2.01 418
S6 5.98 -76.2 1.58 1.5 1.39 1.39 105
S7 3.8 -89.63 -13.45 2.2 2.39 3.65 596
S8 0.42 -85.77 -10.66 1.75 2.73 2.39 420
S9 17.95 -84.15 -7.41 1.38 1.74 1.86 153
S10 14.4 -88.06 9.52 3.13 2.09 2.71 461
S11 9.41 -73.97 5.54 3.04 1.71 1.69 344
S12 2.33 -83.59 -15.04 1.54 1.77 1.59 190
S13 6.04 -85.82 2.14 2.78 2.62 2.89 517
S14 0.29 -84.24 0.23 1.5 2.11 1.91 242
S15 3.64 -85.77 -5.07 1.53 2.59 1.77 286
S16 14.26 -94.61 5.07 1.52 2.44 2.36 246
S17 12.62 -84.18 1.64 5.21 3.73 3.4 443
S18 11.01 -85.78 2.2 1.25 2.08 1.35 143
S19 6.14 -74.28 0.52 2.48 3.07 2.1 471
S20 18.24 -94.81 -10.98 1.98 2.72 2.33 213
S21 9.15 -92.15 0.42 1.37 1.72 1.58 165
S22 15.57 -95.86 -5.1 1.58 1.78 1.53 100
S23 24.23 -94.88 -9.53 3.9 2.05 3.12 533
S24 23.71 -95.3 1.37 2.51 2.42 2.62 420
S25 1.41 -75.24 5.24 1.15 1.32 1.41 80
S26 4.18 -79.66 -6.81 3.33 2.57 2.59 668
Mean TAL Location 9.195 -85.09538462 -1.913461538 2.226538462 2.170769231 2.151538462 319.6538462
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Appendix 3.6. VHand TAL Coordinates and Number of Voxels  
 
 
Table A.3.6. Mean TAL coordinates, TAL coordinate standard deviations, and number of voxels 
for the VHand ROI of each subject. 
  
vPMC mean x mean y mean z std dev x std dev y std dev z n voxels
S1 55.67 0.56 16.66 3.26 1.95 3.65 829
S2 49.87 2.45 15.13 2.9 2.02 4.16 857
S3 55.41 2.17 21.5 2.56 1.7 4.26 670
S4 51.39 8.23 17.43 3.74 1.9 3.25 820
S5 53.26 10.67 17.15 3.74 2.73 3.76 1083
S6 54.82 -4.03 23.06 2.67 1.75 3.03 480
S7 53.89 4.91 15.51 2.9 2.48 4.5 1028
S8 55.08 4.38 23.37 3.32 2.79 2.46 711
S9 56.27 2.76 18.19 2.58 1.7 3.79 656
S10 52.89 0.95 19.54 2.93 1.57 4.28 758
S11 54.59 5.3 12.7 3.04 1.49 3.51 530
S12 49.82 4.11 18.19 2.53 2.42 4.16 856
S13 54.16 4.3 14.13 3.09 1.98 5.28 800
S14 55.59 -2 21.57 5.28 1.91 5.55 1611
S15 48.83 3.43 16.94 2.84 1.99 4.36 809
S16 54.1 -1.09 20.87 4.95 2.32 2.96 901
S17 48.86 -0.56 23.35 2.91 1.61 4.13 581
S18 57.08 -3.04 18.44 3.05 2.26 2.93 649
S19 54.26 8.54 16.22 2.99 2.23 4.64 976
S20 54.97 4.91 17.38 2.52 1.65 4.93 771
S21 56.01 0.1 17.76 2.53 2.41 2.67 446
S22 50.77 8.99 17.7 3.99 2.04 4.01 1047
S23 55.33 5.8 18.08 2.97 2.6 4.48 958
S24 56.36 -0.21 19.13 2.2 1.58 4.33 574
S25 54.38 -1.87 20.15 2.75 1.65 3.28 582
S26 55.74 5.58 16.77 3.36 3.07 3.5 871
S27 48.56 10.14 4.11 2.06 1.7 2.38 259
S28 54.59 -2.03 25.51 4.03 1.81 4.05 969
Mean TAL Location 53.6625 2.980357143 18.091 3.131785714 2.046785714 3.8675 788.643
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Appendix 4.2.  
 
Appendix 4.2.1. Experiment 1: V1 Target Region TAL Coordinates and Number of 
Voxels 
 
Table A.4.2.1. Mean TAL coordinates, TAL coordinate standard deviations, and number of 
voxels for the target ROI of each subject. Blue denotes subject who saw a flickering target.  
 
  
Experiment 1
V1 Target Region mean x mean y mean z std dev x std dev y std dev z n voxels
S1 3.12 -74.65 0.91 2.51 3.16 3.02 406
S2 -0.51 -74 -9.07 1.52 2.56 2.69 441
S3 4.12 -81.58 -9.16 2.54 3.94 2.69 853
S4 3.1 -77.76 -14.77 1.85 3.19 1.89 358
S5 1.79 -78.92 -9.82 1.24 2.06 2.35 226
S6 5.45 -72.53 -1.98 2 2.34 3 529
S7 -1.58 -78.52 -17.23 1.49 2.21 2.45 324
S8 1.78 -76.85 -16.11 2.22 2.74 2.93 594
S9 2.49 -78.12 -6.34 2.68 5.01 2.2 837
S10 1.45 -77.59 -8.85 2.18 4.74 3.26 1272
S11 0.23 -82.14 -12.28 1.67 4.03 4.15 1051
S12 5.39 -79.51 -13.17 1.53 2.45 1.89 284
S13 3.01 -73.62 -8.49 2.19 3.12 3.9 1026
S14 1.06 -74.34 0.56 1.3 1.77 2 180
S15 0.85 -69.09 -9.09 1.42 1.85 1.44 141
S16 2.96 -68.91 -12.69 2.2 1.03 2.01 146
S17 2.81 -71.02 -6.75 0.61 1.79 1.49 64
S18 5.22 -71.16 0.86 1.52 2.43 2.26 292
Mean TAL Location 2.3744 -75.573 -8.526 1.815 2.801111 2.534444 501.333
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Appendix 4.2.2. Experiment 2: V1 Target Region TAL Coordinates and Number of 
Voxels 
 
 
Table A.4.2.2. Mean TAL coordinates, TAL coordinate standard deviations, and number of 
voxels for the target ROI of each subject.  
 
 
  
Experiment 2
V1 Target Region mean x mean y mean z std dev x std dev y std dev z n voxels
S1 2.11 -78.43 -4.69 2.03 3.22 5.23 1125
S2 5.1 -83.6 -11.61 2.62 2.24 3.9 736
S3 2.63 -70.93 1.84 2.69 2.83 3.07 791
Mean TAL Location 3.28 -77.653 -4.82 2.446667 2.763333 4.066667 884
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Appendix 4.2.3. Experiment 1: V5 Target Region TAL Coordinates and Number of 
Voxels 
 
Table A.4.2.3. Mean TAL coordinates, TAL coordinate standard deviations, and number of 
voxels for the V5 ROI of each subject. Blue denotes subject who saw a flickering target.  
 
 
  
Experiment 1
V5 mean x mean y mean z std dev x std dev y std dev z n voxels
S1 46.63 -67.32 3.19 3.25 2.24 1.98 501
S2 43.12 -57.57 1.64 5.29 3.58 2.32 904
S3 38.43 -58.72 12.62 3.73 2.72 4.34 1464
S4 47.4 -61.86 3.65 3.92 2.18 1.76 362
S5 44.83 -61.25 3.35 4.23 2.39 2.52 626
S6 38.19 -54.54 11.3 1.8 2.61 2.68 302
S7 35.61 -68.1 1.49 2.77 2.44 4.51 778
S8 36.23 -61.7 0.22 2.26 1.77 1.69 221
S9 38.53 -68.39 7.13 3.18 3.15 1.8 389
S10 38.14 -62.35 6.45 3.29 1.53 3.05 392
S11 33.2 -67.44 12.69 2.01 3.6 1.89 296
S12 43.33 -63.91 -0.4 2.59 2.89 1.93 323
S13 44.63 -53.53 1.67 2.21 1.49 1.87 130
S14 48.99 -57.53 9.27 1.82 1.57 2.77 237
S15 39.07 -68.92 1.31 2.32 2.75 1.57 300
S16 36.7 -64.99 -9.7 1.94 1.59 1.84 210
S17 40.55 -56.99 -0.64 2.09 2.63 2.11 330
S18 47.87 -65.82 -5.75 3.28 2.14 2.3 422
Mean TAL Location 41.192 -62.274 3.305 2.887778 2.403889 2.385 454.833
8. APPENDICES 
235 
 
Appendix 4.2.4. Experiment 2: V5 Target Region TAL Coordinates and Number of 
Voxels 
 
 
Table A.4.2.4. Mean TAL coordinates, TAL coordinate standard deviations, and number of 
voxels for the V5 ROI of each subject.  
 
 
Experiment 2
V5 mean x mean y mean z std dev x std dev y std dev z n voxels
S1 46.96 -66.53 0.32 2.9 2.38 4.4 569
S2 32.44 -68.56 9.96 2.05 4.01 1.94 508
S3 38.28 -69.37 2.8 3.33 3.76 4.4 1062
Mean TAL Location 39.227 -68.153 4.36 2.76 3.383333 3.58 713
